===================================================================
RCS file: /cvsrepo/anoncvs/cvs/www/innovations.html,v
retrieving revision 1.80
retrieving revision 1.81
diff -c -r1.80 -r1.81
*** www/innovations.html	2019/06/01 22:54:16	1.80
--- www/innovations.html	2019/06/01 23:12:48	1.81
***************
*** 129,135 ****
  	(<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/sigreturn.2">sigreturn(2)</a>
  	oriented programming) mitigation: attacks researched by
  	<a href="http://www.cs.vu.nl/~herbertb/papers/srop_sp14.pdf">Eric Bosman</a>
! 	and Herbert Bos in 2014, solution implemented by Theo de Raadt in May 2016, 
  	enabled by default since OpenBSD 6.0.
      <li><strong>Library order randomization</strong>:
  	In <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/rc.8">rc(8)</a>, re-link
--- 129,135 ----
  	(<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/sigreturn.2">sigreturn(2)</a>
  	oriented programming) mitigation: attacks researched by
  	<a href="http://www.cs.vu.nl/~herbertb/papers/srop_sp14.pdf">Eric Bosman</a>
! 	and Herbert Bos in 2014, solution implemented by Theo de Raadt in May 2016,
  	enabled by default since OpenBSD 6.0.
      <li><strong>Library order randomization</strong>:
  	In <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/rc.8">rc(8)</a>, re-link
***************
*** 164,170 ****
  	innaccurately target gadgets. These NOP sequences are converted into
  	trap sequences where possible. Todd Mortimer and Theo de Raadt, June
  	2017.
!     <li><strong>Kernel relinking at boot</strong>: 
  	the .o files of the kernel are relinked in random order from a
  	link-kit, before every reboot. This provides substantial interior
  	randomization in the kernel's text and data segments for layout and
--- 164,170 ----
  	innaccurately target gadgets. These NOP sequences are converted into
  	trap sequences where possible. Todd Mortimer and Theo de Raadt, June
  	2017.
!     <li><strong>Kernel relinking at boot</strong>:
  	the .o files of the kernel are relinked in random order from a
  	link-kit, before every reboot. This provides substantial interior
  	randomization in the kernel's text and data segments for layout and
***************
*** 172,178 ****
  	kernel boot, similar to the userland fork+exec model described above
  	but for the kernel.  Theo de Raadt, June 2017.
      <li>
! 	Rearranged i386/amd64 register allocator order in 
  	<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/clang.1">clang(1)</a>
  	to reduce polymorphic RET instructions:
  	Todd Mortimer, November 20, 2017.
--- 172,178 ----
  	kernel boot, similar to the userland fork+exec model described above
  	but for the kernel.  Theo de Raadt, June 2017.
      <li>
! 	Rearranged i386/amd64 register allocator order in
  	<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/clang.1">clang(1)</a>
  	to reduce polymorphic RET instructions:
  	Todd Mortimer, November 20, 2017.
***************
*** 181,187 ****
  	embedded polymorphic RET instructions.  Enhancements to
  	<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/clang.1">clang(1)</a>
  	Todd Mortimer, April 28, 2018 and onwards.
!     <li><b>MAP_STACK</b> addition to 
  	<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/mmap.2">mmap(2)</a>
  	allows opportunistic verification that the stack-register
  	points at stack memory, therefore catching pivots to non-stack
--- 181,187 ----
  	embedded polymorphic RET instructions.  Enhancements to
  	<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/clang.1">clang(1)</a>
  	Todd Mortimer, April 28, 2018 and onwards.
!     <li><b>MAP_STACK</b> addition to
  	<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/mmap.2">mmap(2)</a>
  	allows opportunistic verification that the stack-register
  	points at stack memory, therefore catching pivots to non-stack
***************
*** 192,198 ****
  	<b>.openbsd.randomdata</b> section) to consistency-check the
  	return address on the stack.  Implemented for AMD64 and ARM64
  	by Todd Mortimer in OpenBSD 6.4.
!     <li><b>MAP_CONCEAL</b> addition to 
  	<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/mmap.2">mmap(2)</a>
  	disallows memory pages to be written to core dumps, preventing
  	accidental exposure of private information.
--- 192,198 ----
  	<b>.openbsd.randomdata</b> section) to consistency-check the
  	return address on the stack.  Implemented for AMD64 and ARM64
  	by Todd Mortimer in OpenBSD 6.4.
!     <li><b>MAP_CONCEAL</b> addition to
  	<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/mmap.2">mmap(2)</a>
  	disallows memory pages to be written to core dumps, preventing
  	accidental exposure of private information.
***************
*** 562,568 ****
      <li><a href="https://man.openbsd.org/ping.8">ping(8)</a>:
  	Restructured to include IPv6 functionality and maintained by Florian Obser.
  	The separate
! 	<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-6.0/ping6.8">ping6(8)</a> 
  	was superseded on September 17, 2016,
  	and the new, combined version was released with OpenBSD 6.1.
      <li><a href="https://man.openbsd.org/xenodm.1">xenodm(1)</a>:
--- 562,568 ----
      <li><a href="https://man.openbsd.org/ping.8">ping(8)</a>:
  	Restructured to include IPv6 functionality and maintained by Florian Obser.
  	The separate
! 	<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-6.0/ping6.8">ping6(8)</a>
  	was superseded on September 17, 2016,
  	and the new, combined version was released with OpenBSD 6.1.
      <li><a href="https://man.openbsd.org/xenodm.1">xenodm(1)</a>: