Annotation of www/security.html, Revision 1.106
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1.20 deraadt 4: <title>OpenBSD Security</title>
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1.106 ! deraadt 16: <hr>
! 17:
! 18: <p>
! 19: <h2><font color=#e00000><strong>Security</strong></font></h2>
1.1 deraadt 20:
1.106 ! deraadt 21: <strong>Index</strong><br>
! 22: <a href=#goals>Security goals of the Project</a>.<br>
! 23: <a href=#disclosure>Full Disclosure policy</a>.<br>
! 24: <a href=#process>Source code auditing process</a>.<br>
! 25: <a href=#process>"Secure by Default"</a>.<br>
! 26: <a href=#crypto>Use of Cryptography</a>.<br>
! 27: <p>
! 28: <a href=#25>For 2.5 security advisories</a>.<br>
! 29: <a href=#24>For 2.4 security advisories</a>.<br>
! 30: <a href=#23>For 2.3 security advisories</a>.<br>
! 31: <a href=#22>For 2.2 security advisories</a>.<br>
! 32: <a href=#21>For 2.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
! 33: <a href=#20>For 2.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
! 34: <p>
! 35: <a href=#watching>Watching changes</a>.<br>
! 36: <a href=#reporting>Reporting security issues</a>.<br>
! 37: <p>
1.56 deraadt 38: <hr>
39:
1.106 ! deraadt 40: <dl>
! 41: <a name=goals></a>
! 42: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Goal</strong></font></h3><p>
1.22 deraadt 43:
1.14 deraadt 44: OpenBSD believes in strong security. Our aspiration is to be NUMBER
1.22 deraadt 45: ONE in the industry for security (if we are not already there). Our
46: open software development model permits us to take a more
47: uncompromising view towards increased security than Sun, SGI, IBM, HP,
48: or other vendors are able to. We can make changes the vendors would
1.27 deraadt 49: not make. Also, since OpenBSD is exported with <a href=crypto.html>
1.45 deraadt 50: cryptography</a>, we are able to take cryptographic approaches towards
51: fixing security problems.<p>
1.18 deraadt 52:
1.106 ! deraadt 53: <a name=disclosure></a>
! 54: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Full Disclosure</strong></font></h3><p>
! 55:
1.45 deraadt 56: Like many readers of the
1.102 deraadt 57: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>
1.18 deraadt 58: BUGTRAQ mailing list</a>,
1.106 ! deraadt 59: we believe in full disclosure of security problems. In the
! 60: operating system arena, we were probably the first to embrace
! 61: the concept. Many vendors, even of free software, still try
! 62: to hide issues from their users.<p>
! 63:
! 64: Security information moves very fast in cracker circles. On the other
! 65: hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security
! 66: fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix
! 67: turnaround is possible. Thus we think that full disclosure helps the
! 68: people who really care about security.<p>
! 69:
! 70: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Audit Process</strong></font></h3><p>
1.15 deraadt 71:
1.12 deraadt 72: Our security auditing team typically has between six and twelve
1.45 deraadt 73: members who continue to search for and fix new security holes. We
74: have been auditing since the summer of 1996. The process we follow to
75: increase security is simply a comprehensive file-by-file analysis of
1.106 ! deraadt 76: every critical software component. We are not so much looking for
! 77: security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if
! 78: years later someone discovers a the problem used to be a security
! 79: issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the
! 80: better. Flaws have been found in just about every area of the system.
! 81: Entire new classes of security problems have been found during our
! 82: audit, and often source code which had been audited earlier needs
! 83: re-auditing with these new flaws in mind. Code often gets audited
! 84: multiple times, and by multiple people with different auditing
! 85: skills.<p>
1.12 deraadt 86:
1.94 deraadt 87: Some members of our security auditing team worked for Secure Networks,
88: the company that made the industry's premier network security scanning
89: software package Ballista (Secure Networks got purchased by Network
90: Associates, Ballista got renamed to Cybercop Scanner, and well...)
91: That company did a lot of security research, and thus fit in well
1.106 ! deraadt 92: with the OpenBSD stance. OpenBSD passed Ballista's tests with flying
! 93: colours since day 1.<p>
1.31 deraadt 94:
1.34 deraadt 95: Another facet of our security auditing process is its proactiveness.
1.45 deraadt 96: In most cases we have found that the determination of exploitability
97: is not an issue. During our ongoing auditing process we find many
98: bugs, and endeavor to fix them even though exploitability is not
99: proven. We fix the bug, and we move on to find other bugs to fix. We
100: have fixed many simple and obvious careless programming errors in code
101: and only months later discovered that the problems were in fact
102: exploitable. (Or, more likely someone on
1.102 deraadt 103: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>
1.45 deraadt 104: would report that other operating systems were vulnerable to a `newly
105: discovered problem', and then it would be discovered that OpenBSD had
106: been fixed in a previous release). In other cases we have been saved
107: from full exploitability of complex step-by-step attacks because we
108: had fixed one of the intermediate steps. An example of where we
1.94 deraadt 109: managed such a success is the lpd advisory that Secure Networks put out.
110: <p>
1.29 deraadt 111:
1.106 ! deraadt 112: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>The Reward</strong></font></h3><p>
! 113:
1.45 deraadt 114: Our proactive auditing process has really paid off. Statements like
1.35 deraadt 115: ``This problem was fixed in OpenBSD about 6 months ago'' have become
1.45 deraadt 116: commonplace in security forums like
1.102 deraadt 117: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>.<p>
1.35 deraadt 118:
1.45 deraadt 119: The most intense part of our security auditing happened immediately
1.80 espie 120: before the OpenBSD 2.0 release and during the 2.0->2.1 transition,
1.45 deraadt 121: over the last third of 1996 and first half of 1997. Thousands (yes,
122: thousands) of security issues were fixed rapidly over this year-long
123: period; bugs like the standard buffer overflows, protocol
124: implementation weaknesses, information gathering, and filesystem
125: races. Hence most of the security problems that we encountered were
126: fixed before our 2.1 release, and then a far smaller number needed
127: fixing for our 2.2 release. We do not find as many problems anymore,
128: it is simply a case of diminishing returns. Recently the security
129: problems we find and fix tend to be significantly more obscure or
130: complicated. Still we will persist for a number of reasons:<p>
1.36 deraadt 131:
1.35 deraadt 132: <ul>
1.45 deraadt 133: <li>Occasionally we find a simple problem we missed earlier. Doh!
1.35 deraadt 134: <li>Security is like an arms race; the best attackers will continue
1.45 deraadt 135: to search for more complicated exploits, so we will too.
136: <li>Finding and fixing subtle flaws in complicated software is
137: a lot of fun.
1.35 deraadt 138: </ul>
1.106 ! deraadt 139: <p>
1.15 deraadt 140:
1.14 deraadt 141: The auditing process is not over yet, and as you can see we continue
1.28 deraadt 142: to find and fix new security flaws.<p>
1.12 deraadt 143:
1.106 ! deraadt 144: <a name=default></a>
! 145: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>"Secure by Default"</strong></font></h3><p>
! 146:
! 147: To ensure that novice users of OpenBSD do not need to become security
! 148: experts overnight (a viewpoint which other vendors seem to have), we
! 149: ship the operating system in a Secure by Default mode. All non-essential
! 150: services are disabled. As the user/administrator becomes more familiar
! 151: with the system, he will discover that he has to enable daemons and other
! 152: parts of the system. During the process of learning how to enable a new
! 153: service, the novice is more likely to learn of security considerations.<p>
! 154:
! 155: This is in stark contrast to the increasing number of systems that
! 156: ship with NFS, mountd, web servers, and various other services enabled
! 157: by default, creating instantaneous security problems for their users
! 158: within minutes after their first install.<p>
! 159:
! 160: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Cryptography</strong></font></h3><p>
! 161:
! 162: And of course, since the OpenBSD project is based in Canada, it is possible
! 163: for us to integrate cryptography. For more information, read the page
! 164: outlying <a href=crypto.html>what we have done with cryptography</a>.</p>
! 165:
! 166: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Advisories</strong></font></h3><p>
! 167:
! 168: <dl>
! 169:
! 170: <li>
1.93 deraadt 171: <a name=25></a>
1.106 ! deraadt 172:
1.93 deraadt 173: <h3><font color=#e00000><strong>OpenBSD 2.5 Security Advisories</strong></font></h3>
174: These are the OpenBSD 2.5 advisories -- all these problems are solved
175: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
176: OpenBSD 2.4 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.5.
177:
1.96 deraadt 178: <p>
1.104 deraadt 179: <ul>
180: <li><a href=errata.html#cron>Aug 30, 1999:
1.103 deraadt 181: In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the
182: fake popen() and run sendmail as the user, not as root.
183: (patch included).</a>
1.104 deraadt 184: <li><a href=errata.html#miscfs>Aug 12, 1999: The procfs and fdescfs
1.101 deraadt 185: filesystems had an overrun in their handling of uio_offset
186: in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
187: enabled by default). (patch included).</a>
1.100 deraadt 188: <li><a href=errata.html#profil>Aug 9, 1999: Stop profiling (see profil(2))
189: when we execve() a new process. (patch included).</a>
1.105 deraadt 190: <li><a href=errata.html#ipsec_in_use>Aug 6, 1999: Packets that should have
1.98 deraadt 191: been handled by IPsec may be transmitted as cleartext.
192: PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
193: (patch included).</a>
1.97 deraadt 194: <li><a href=errata.html#rc>Aug 5, 1999: In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for
195: motd re-writing and change the find(1) to use -execdir
196: (patch included).</a>
1.95 deraadt 197: <li><a href=errata.html#chflags>Jul 30, 1999: Do not permit regular
198: users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or block devices
199: which they may currently be the owner of (patch included).</a>
200: <li><a href=errata.html#nroff>Jul 27, 1999: Cause groff(1) to be invoked
201: with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1) (patch included).</a>
1.93 deraadt 202: </ul>
203:
1.106 ! deraadt 204: <p>
! 205: <li>
1.75 deraadt 206: <a name=24></a>
207: <h3><font color=#e00000><strong>OpenBSD 2.4 Security Advisories</strong></font></h3>
208: These are the OpenBSD 2.4 advisories -- all these problems are solved
209: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
210: OpenBSD 2.3 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.4.
211:
1.96 deraadt 212: <p>
1.75 deraadt 213: <ul>
1.92 deraadt 214: <li><a href=errata24.html#poll>Mar 22, 1999: The nfds argument for poll(2) needs
1.91 deraadt 215: to be constrained, to avoid kvm starvation (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 216: <li><a href=errata24.html#tss>Mar 21, 1999: A change in TSS handling stops
1.91 deraadt 217: another kernel crash case caused by the <strong>crashme</strong>
218: program (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 219: <li><a href=errata24.html#nlink>Feb 25, 1999: An unbounded increment on the
1.90 deraadt 220: nlink value in FFS and EXT2FS filesystems can cause a system crash.
1.89 deraadt 221: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 222: <li><a href=errata24.html#ping>Feb 23, 1999: Yet another buffer overflow
1.88 deraadt 223: existed in ping(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 224: <li><a href=errata24.html#ipqrace>Feb 19, 1999: ipintr() had a race in use of
1.87 deraadt 225: the ipq, which could permit an attacker to cause a crash.
226: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 227: <li><a href=errata24.html#accept>Feb 17, 1999: A race condition in the
1.86 deraadt 228: kernel between accept(2) and select(2) could permit an attacker
229: to hang sockets from remote.
230: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 231: <li><a href=errata24.html#maxqueue>Feb 17, 1999: IP fragment assembly can
1.85 deraadt 232: bog the machine excessively and cause problems.
233: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 234: <li><a href=errata24.html#trctrap>Feb 12, 1999: i386 T_TRCTRAP handling and
1.84 deraadt 235: DDB interacted to possibly cause a crash.
236: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 237: <li><a href=errata24.html#rst>Feb 11, 1999: TCP/IP RST handling was sloppy.
1.83 deraadt 238: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 239: <li><a href=errata24.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
1.81 deraadt 240: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 241: <li><a href=errata24.html#termcap>Nov 19, 1998: There is a possibly locally
1.82 deraadt 242: exploitable problem relating to environment variables in termcap
243: and curses. (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 244: <li><a href=errata24.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
1.78 deraadt 245: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.75 deraadt 246: </ul>
247:
1.106 ! deraadt 248: <p>
! 249: <li>
1.58 deraadt 250: <a name=23></a>
1.52 deraadt 251: <h3><font color=#e00000><strong>OpenBSD 2.3 Security Advisories</strong></font></h3>
1.73 deraadt 252: These are the OpenBSD 2.3 advisories -- all these problems are solved
253: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
254: OpenBSD 2.2 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.3.
1.53 matthieu 255:
1.96 deraadt 256: <p>
1.53 matthieu 257: <ul>
1.81 deraadt 258: <li><a href=errata23.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
259: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.78 deraadt 260: <li><a href=errata23.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
261: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 262: <li><a href=errata23.html#fdalloc>Jul 2, 1998: setuid and setgid processes
1.72 deraadt 263: should not be executed with fd slots 0, 1, or 2 free.
264: (patch included).</a>
1.79 deraadt 265: <li><a href=errata23.html#resolver>August 31, 1998: A benign looking resolver buffer overflow bug was re-introduced accidentally (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 266: <li><a href=errata23.html#xlib>June 6, 1998: Further problems with the X
1.71 deraadt 267: libraries (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 268: <li><a href=errata23.html#pctr>June 4, 1998: on non-Intel i386 machines, any user
1.72 deraadt 269: can use pctr(4) to crash the machine.</a>
1.76 aaron 270: <li><a href=errata23.html#kill>May 17, 1998: kill(2) of setuid/setgid target
1.66 deraadt 271: processes too permissive (4th revision patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 272: <li><a href=errata23.html#immutable>May 11, 1998: mmap() permits partial bypassing
1.60 deraadt 273: of immutable and append-only file flags. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 274: <li><a href=errata23.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm and Xaw
1.58 deraadt 275: (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 276: <li><a href=errata23.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC packets
1.59 deraadt 277: if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
1.53 matthieu 278: </ul>
1.9 deraadt 279:
1.106 ! deraadt 280: <p>
! 281: <li>
1.58 deraadt 282: <a name=22></a>
1.12 deraadt 283: <h3><font color=#e00000><strong>OpenBSD 2.2 Security Advisories</strong></font></h3>
1.45 deraadt 284: These are the OpenBSD 2.2 advisories. All these problems are solved
1.55 deraadt 285: in <a href=23.html>OpenBSD 2.3</a>. Some of these problems
1.45 deraadt 286: still exist in other operating systems. (The supplied patches are for
287: OpenBSD 2.2; they may or may not work on OpenBSD 2.1).
1.9 deraadt 288:
1.96 deraadt 289: <p>
1.9 deraadt 290: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 291: <li><a href=errata22.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC
292: packets if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
293: <li><a href=errata22.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm
294: and Xaw (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
295: <li><a href=errata22.html#uucpd>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer overflow in uucpd
296: (patch included).</a>
297: <li><a href=errata22.html#rmjob>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer mismanagement in lprm
298: (patch included).</a>
299: <li><a href=errata22.html#ping>Mar 31, 1998: Overflow in ping -R (patch included).</a>
300: <li><a href=errata22.html#named>Mar 30, 1998: Overflow in named fake-iquery
1.59 deraadt 301: (patch included).</a>
1.72 deraadt 302: <li><a href=errata22.html#mountd>Mar 2, 1998: Accidental NFS filesystem
303: export (patch included).</a>
304: <li><a href=advisories/mmap>Feb 26, 1998: Read-write mmap() flaw.</a>
305: Revision 3 of the patch is available <a href=errata22.html#mmap>here</a>
1.59 deraadt 306: <li><a href=advisories/sourceroute>Feb 19, 1998: Sourcerouted Packet
307: Acceptance.</a>
1.50 deraadt 308: A patch is available <a href=errata22.html#sourceroute>here</a>.
1.72 deraadt 309: <li><a href=errata22.html#ruserok>Feb 13, 1998: Setuid coredump & Ruserok()
310: flaw (patch included).</a>
311: <li><a href=errata22.html#ldso>Feb 9, 1998: MIPS ld.so flaw (patch included).</a>
312: <li><a href=errata22.html#f00f>Dec 10, 1997: Intel P5 f00f lockup
1.59 deraadt 313: (patch included).</a>
1.1 deraadt 314: </ul>
315:
1.106 ! deraadt 316: <p>
! 317: <li>
1.58 deraadt 318: <a name=21></a>
1.52 deraadt 319: <h3><font color=#e00000><strong>OpenBSD 2.1 Security Advisories</strong></font></h3>
320: These are the OpenBSD 2.1 advisories. All these problems are solved
321: in <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>. Some of these problems still
322: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.1, we
323: would strongly recommend an upgrade to the newest release, as this
324: patch list only attempts at fixing the most important security
325: problems. In particular, OpenBSD 2.2 fixes numerous localhost
326: security problems. Many of those problems were solved in ways which
327: make it hard for us to provide patches).
328:
1.96 deraadt 329: <p>
1.52 deraadt 330: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 331: <li><a href=advisories/signals>Sep 15, 1997: Deviant Signals (patch included)</a>
1.59 deraadt 332: <li><a href=advisories/rfork>Aug 2, 1997: Rfork() system call flaw
333: (patch included)</a>
334: <li><a href=advisories/procfs>Jun 24, 1997: Procfs flaws (patch included)</a>
1.52 deraadt 335: </ul>
1.51 deraadt 336:
1.106 ! deraadt 337: <p>
! 338: <li>
! 339: <a name=20></a>
1.99 deraadt 340: <h3><font color=#e00000><strong>OpenBSD 2.0 Security Advisories</strong></font></h3>
341: These are the OpenBSD 2.0 advisories. All these problems are solved
342: in <a href=21.html>OpenBSD 2.1</a>. Some of these problems still
343: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.0, we
344: commend you for being there back in the old days!, but you're really
345: missing out if you don't install a new version!)
346:
347: <p>
348: <ul>
349: <li><a href=advisories/res_random>April 22, 1997: Predictable IDs in the
350: resolver (patch included)</a>
351: <li>Many others... if people can hunt them down, please let me know
352: and we'll put them up here.
353: </ul>
354:
1.106 ! deraadt 355: </dl>
1.51 deraadt 356: <p>
1.106 ! deraadt 357:
! 358: <a name=watching></a>
! 359: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Watching our Changes</strong></font></h3><p>
! 360:
1.21 deraadt 361: Since we take a proactive stance with security, we are continually
362: finding and fixing new security problems. Not all of these problems
1.80 espie 363: get widely reported because (as stated earlier) many of them are not
1.45 deraadt 364: confirmed to be exploitable; many simple bugs we fix do turn out to
365: have security consequences we could not predict. We do not have the
366: time resources to make these changes available in the above format.<p>
1.21 deraadt 367:
368: Thus there are usually minor security fixes in the current source code
369: beyond the previous major OpenBSD release. We make a limited
1.45 deraadt 370: guarantee that these problems are of minimal impact and unproven
1.44 ian 371: exploitability. If we discover that a problem definitely matters for
1.45 deraadt 372: security, patches will show up here <strong>VERY</strong> quickly.<p>
1.21 deraadt 373:
1.45 deraadt 374: People who are really concerned with security can do a number of
375: things:<p>
1.21 deraadt 376:
377: <ul>
378: <li>If you understand security issues, watch our
1.27 deraadt 379: <a href=mail.html>source-changes mailing list</a> and keep an
1.23 deraadt 380: eye out for things which appear security related. Since
1.21 deraadt 381: exploitability is not proven for many of the fixes we make,
382: do not expect the relevant commit message to say "SECURITY FIX!".
383: If a problem is proven and serious, a patch will be available
384: here very shortly after.
385: <li>Track our current source code tree, and teach yourself how to do a
1.29 deraadt 386: complete system build from time to time (read /usr/src/Makefile
387: carefully). Users can make the assumption that the current
388: source tree always has stronger security than the previous release.
1.45 deraadt 389: However, building your own system from source code is not trivial;
390: it is nearly 300MB of source code, and problems do occur as we
391: transition between major releases.
1.29 deraadt 392: <li>Install a binary <a href=snapshots.html>snapshot</a> for your
1.80 espie 393: architecture, which are made available fairly often. For
1.29 deraadt 394: instance, an i386 snapshot is typically made available weekly.
1.21 deraadt 395: </ul>
396:
1.9 deraadt 397: <p>
1.106 ! deraadt 398: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Reporting problems</strong></font></h3><p>
1.3 deraadt 399:
1.5 deraadt 400: <p> If you find a new security problem, you can mail it to
1.6 deraadt 401: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>deraadt@openbsd.org</a>.
1.7 deraadt 402: <br>
1.5 deraadt 403: If you wish to PGP encode it (but please only do so if privacy is very
1.27 deraadt 404: urgent, since it is inconvenient) use this <a href=advisories/pgpkey>pgp key</a>.
1.5 deraadt 405:
1.106 ! deraadt 406: </dl>
! 407:
1.2 deraadt 408: <hr>
1.68 pauls 409: <a href=index.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.24 deraadt 410: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
411: <br>
1.106 ! deraadt 412: <small>$OpenBSD: security.html,v 1.105 1999/09/14 05:44:59 deraadt Exp $</small>
1.1 deraadt 413:
1.24 deraadt 414: </body>
415: </html>
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