Annotation of www/security.html, Revision 1.108
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1.106 deraadt 16: <hr>
17:
18: <p>
19: <h2><font color=#e00000><strong>Security</strong></font></h2>
1.1 deraadt 20:
1.106 deraadt 21: <strong>Index</strong><br>
22: <a href=#goals>Security goals of the Project</a>.<br>
23: <a href=#disclosure>Full Disclosure policy</a>.<br>
24: <a href=#process>Source code auditing process</a>.<br>
25: <a href=#process>"Secure by Default"</a>.<br>
26: <a href=#crypto>Use of Cryptography</a>.<br>
27: <p>
28: <a href=#25>For 2.5 security advisories</a>.<br>
29: <a href=#24>For 2.4 security advisories</a>.<br>
30: <a href=#23>For 2.3 security advisories</a>.<br>
31: <a href=#22>For 2.2 security advisories</a>.<br>
32: <a href=#21>For 2.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
33: <a href=#20>For 2.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
34: <p>
35: <a href=#watching>Watching changes</a>.<br>
36: <a href=#reporting>Reporting security issues</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 37: <a href=#papers>Further Reading</a><br>
1.106 deraadt 38: <p>
1.56 deraadt 39: <hr>
40:
1.106 deraadt 41: <dl>
42: <a name=goals></a>
43: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Goal</strong></font></h3><p>
1.22 deraadt 44:
1.14 deraadt 45: OpenBSD believes in strong security. Our aspiration is to be NUMBER
1.22 deraadt 46: ONE in the industry for security (if we are not already there). Our
47: open software development model permits us to take a more
48: uncompromising view towards increased security than Sun, SGI, IBM, HP,
49: or other vendors are able to. We can make changes the vendors would
1.27 deraadt 50: not make. Also, since OpenBSD is exported with <a href=crypto.html>
1.45 deraadt 51: cryptography</a>, we are able to take cryptographic approaches towards
52: fixing security problems.<p>
1.18 deraadt 53:
1.106 deraadt 54: <a name=disclosure></a>
55: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Full Disclosure</strong></font></h3><p>
56:
1.45 deraadt 57: Like many readers of the
1.102 deraadt 58: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>
1.18 deraadt 59: BUGTRAQ mailing list</a>,
1.106 deraadt 60: we believe in full disclosure of security problems. In the
61: operating system arena, we were probably the first to embrace
62: the concept. Many vendors, even of free software, still try
63: to hide issues from their users.<p>
64:
65: Security information moves very fast in cracker circles. On the other
66: hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security
67: fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix
68: turnaround is possible. Thus we think that full disclosure helps the
69: people who really care about security.<p>
70:
71: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Audit Process</strong></font></h3><p>
1.15 deraadt 72:
1.12 deraadt 73: Our security auditing team typically has between six and twelve
1.45 deraadt 74: members who continue to search for and fix new security holes. We
75: have been auditing since the summer of 1996. The process we follow to
76: increase security is simply a comprehensive file-by-file analysis of
1.106 deraadt 77: every critical software component. We are not so much looking for
78: security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if
79: years later someone discovers a the problem used to be a security
80: issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the
81: better. Flaws have been found in just about every area of the system.
82: Entire new classes of security problems have been found during our
83: audit, and often source code which had been audited earlier needs
84: re-auditing with these new flaws in mind. Code often gets audited
85: multiple times, and by multiple people with different auditing
86: skills.<p>
1.12 deraadt 87:
1.94 deraadt 88: Some members of our security auditing team worked for Secure Networks,
89: the company that made the industry's premier network security scanning
90: software package Ballista (Secure Networks got purchased by Network
91: Associates, Ballista got renamed to Cybercop Scanner, and well...)
92: That company did a lot of security research, and thus fit in well
1.106 deraadt 93: with the OpenBSD stance. OpenBSD passed Ballista's tests with flying
94: colours since day 1.<p>
1.31 deraadt 95:
1.34 deraadt 96: Another facet of our security auditing process is its proactiveness.
1.45 deraadt 97: In most cases we have found that the determination of exploitability
98: is not an issue. During our ongoing auditing process we find many
99: bugs, and endeavor to fix them even though exploitability is not
100: proven. We fix the bug, and we move on to find other bugs to fix. We
101: have fixed many simple and obvious careless programming errors in code
102: and only months later discovered that the problems were in fact
103: exploitable. (Or, more likely someone on
1.102 deraadt 104: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>
1.45 deraadt 105: would report that other operating systems were vulnerable to a `newly
106: discovered problem', and then it would be discovered that OpenBSD had
107: been fixed in a previous release). In other cases we have been saved
108: from full exploitability of complex step-by-step attacks because we
109: had fixed one of the intermediate steps. An example of where we
1.94 deraadt 110: managed such a success is the lpd advisory that Secure Networks put out.
111: <p>
1.29 deraadt 112:
1.106 deraadt 113: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>The Reward</strong></font></h3><p>
114:
1.45 deraadt 115: Our proactive auditing process has really paid off. Statements like
1.35 deraadt 116: ``This problem was fixed in OpenBSD about 6 months ago'' have become
1.45 deraadt 117: commonplace in security forums like
1.102 deraadt 118: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>.<p>
1.35 deraadt 119:
1.45 deraadt 120: The most intense part of our security auditing happened immediately
1.80 espie 121: before the OpenBSD 2.0 release and during the 2.0->2.1 transition,
1.45 deraadt 122: over the last third of 1996 and first half of 1997. Thousands (yes,
123: thousands) of security issues were fixed rapidly over this year-long
124: period; bugs like the standard buffer overflows, protocol
125: implementation weaknesses, information gathering, and filesystem
126: races. Hence most of the security problems that we encountered were
127: fixed before our 2.1 release, and then a far smaller number needed
128: fixing for our 2.2 release. We do not find as many problems anymore,
129: it is simply a case of diminishing returns. Recently the security
130: problems we find and fix tend to be significantly more obscure or
131: complicated. Still we will persist for a number of reasons:<p>
1.36 deraadt 132:
1.35 deraadt 133: <ul>
1.45 deraadt 134: <li>Occasionally we find a simple problem we missed earlier. Doh!
1.35 deraadt 135: <li>Security is like an arms race; the best attackers will continue
1.45 deraadt 136: to search for more complicated exploits, so we will too.
137: <li>Finding and fixing subtle flaws in complicated software is
138: a lot of fun.
1.35 deraadt 139: </ul>
1.106 deraadt 140: <p>
1.15 deraadt 141:
1.14 deraadt 142: The auditing process is not over yet, and as you can see we continue
1.28 deraadt 143: to find and fix new security flaws.<p>
1.12 deraadt 144:
1.106 deraadt 145: <a name=default></a>
146: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>"Secure by Default"</strong></font></h3><p>
147:
148: To ensure that novice users of OpenBSD do not need to become security
149: experts overnight (a viewpoint which other vendors seem to have), we
150: ship the operating system in a Secure by Default mode. All non-essential
151: services are disabled. As the user/administrator becomes more familiar
152: with the system, he will discover that he has to enable daemons and other
153: parts of the system. During the process of learning how to enable a new
154: service, the novice is more likely to learn of security considerations.<p>
155:
156: This is in stark contrast to the increasing number of systems that
157: ship with NFS, mountd, web servers, and various other services enabled
158: by default, creating instantaneous security problems for their users
159: within minutes after their first install.<p>
160:
161: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Cryptography</strong></font></h3><p>
162:
163: And of course, since the OpenBSD project is based in Canada, it is possible
164: for us to integrate cryptography. For more information, read the page
165: outlying <a href=crypto.html>what we have done with cryptography</a>.</p>
166:
167: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Advisories</strong></font></h3><p>
168:
169: <dl>
170:
171: <li>
1.93 deraadt 172: <a name=25></a>
1.106 deraadt 173:
1.93 deraadt 174: <h3><font color=#e00000><strong>OpenBSD 2.5 Security Advisories</strong></font></h3>
175: These are the OpenBSD 2.5 advisories -- all these problems are solved
176: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
177: OpenBSD 2.4 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.5.
178:
1.96 deraadt 179: <p>
1.104 deraadt 180: <ul>
181: <li><a href=errata.html#cron>Aug 30, 1999:
1.103 deraadt 182: In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the
183: fake popen() and run sendmail as the user, not as root.
184: (patch included).</a>
1.104 deraadt 185: <li><a href=errata.html#miscfs>Aug 12, 1999: The procfs and fdescfs
1.101 deraadt 186: filesystems had an overrun in their handling of uio_offset
187: in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
188: enabled by default). (patch included).</a>
1.100 deraadt 189: <li><a href=errata.html#profil>Aug 9, 1999: Stop profiling (see profil(2))
190: when we execve() a new process. (patch included).</a>
1.105 deraadt 191: <li><a href=errata.html#ipsec_in_use>Aug 6, 1999: Packets that should have
1.98 deraadt 192: been handled by IPsec may be transmitted as cleartext.
193: PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
194: (patch included).</a>
1.97 deraadt 195: <li><a href=errata.html#rc>Aug 5, 1999: In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for
196: motd re-writing and change the find(1) to use -execdir
197: (patch included).</a>
1.95 deraadt 198: <li><a href=errata.html#chflags>Jul 30, 1999: Do not permit regular
199: users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or block devices
200: which they may currently be the owner of (patch included).</a>
201: <li><a href=errata.html#nroff>Jul 27, 1999: Cause groff(1) to be invoked
202: with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1) (patch included).</a>
1.93 deraadt 203: </ul>
204:
1.106 deraadt 205: <p>
206: <li>
1.75 deraadt 207: <a name=24></a>
208: <h3><font color=#e00000><strong>OpenBSD 2.4 Security Advisories</strong></font></h3>
209: These are the OpenBSD 2.4 advisories -- all these problems are solved
210: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
211: OpenBSD 2.3 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.4.
212:
1.96 deraadt 213: <p>
1.75 deraadt 214: <ul>
1.92 deraadt 215: <li><a href=errata24.html#poll>Mar 22, 1999: The nfds argument for poll(2) needs
1.91 deraadt 216: to be constrained, to avoid kvm starvation (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 217: <li><a href=errata24.html#tss>Mar 21, 1999: A change in TSS handling stops
1.91 deraadt 218: another kernel crash case caused by the <strong>crashme</strong>
219: program (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 220: <li><a href=errata24.html#nlink>Feb 25, 1999: An unbounded increment on the
1.90 deraadt 221: nlink value in FFS and EXT2FS filesystems can cause a system crash.
1.89 deraadt 222: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 223: <li><a href=errata24.html#ping>Feb 23, 1999: Yet another buffer overflow
1.88 deraadt 224: existed in ping(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 225: <li><a href=errata24.html#ipqrace>Feb 19, 1999: ipintr() had a race in use of
1.87 deraadt 226: the ipq, which could permit an attacker to cause a crash.
227: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 228: <li><a href=errata24.html#accept>Feb 17, 1999: A race condition in the
1.86 deraadt 229: kernel between accept(2) and select(2) could permit an attacker
230: to hang sockets from remote.
231: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 232: <li><a href=errata24.html#maxqueue>Feb 17, 1999: IP fragment assembly can
1.85 deraadt 233: bog the machine excessively and cause problems.
234: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 235: <li><a href=errata24.html#trctrap>Feb 12, 1999: i386 T_TRCTRAP handling and
1.84 deraadt 236: DDB interacted to possibly cause a crash.
237: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 238: <li><a href=errata24.html#rst>Feb 11, 1999: TCP/IP RST handling was sloppy.
1.83 deraadt 239: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 240: <li><a href=errata24.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
1.81 deraadt 241: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 242: <li><a href=errata24.html#termcap>Nov 19, 1998: There is a possibly locally
1.82 deraadt 243: exploitable problem relating to environment variables in termcap
244: and curses. (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 245: <li><a href=errata24.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
1.78 deraadt 246: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.75 deraadt 247: </ul>
248:
1.106 deraadt 249: <p>
250: <li>
1.58 deraadt 251: <a name=23></a>
1.52 deraadt 252: <h3><font color=#e00000><strong>OpenBSD 2.3 Security Advisories</strong></font></h3>
1.73 deraadt 253: These are the OpenBSD 2.3 advisories -- all these problems are solved
254: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
255: OpenBSD 2.2 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.3.
1.53 matthieu 256:
1.96 deraadt 257: <p>
1.53 matthieu 258: <ul>
1.81 deraadt 259: <li><a href=errata23.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
260: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.78 deraadt 261: <li><a href=errata23.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
262: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 263: <li><a href=errata23.html#fdalloc>Jul 2, 1998: setuid and setgid processes
1.72 deraadt 264: should not be executed with fd slots 0, 1, or 2 free.
265: (patch included).</a>
1.79 deraadt 266: <li><a href=errata23.html#resolver>August 31, 1998: A benign looking resolver buffer overflow bug was re-introduced accidentally (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 267: <li><a href=errata23.html#xlib>June 6, 1998: Further problems with the X
1.71 deraadt 268: libraries (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 269: <li><a href=errata23.html#pctr>June 4, 1998: on non-Intel i386 machines, any user
1.72 deraadt 270: can use pctr(4) to crash the machine.</a>
1.76 aaron 271: <li><a href=errata23.html#kill>May 17, 1998: kill(2) of setuid/setgid target
1.66 deraadt 272: processes too permissive (4th revision patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 273: <li><a href=errata23.html#immutable>May 11, 1998: mmap() permits partial bypassing
1.60 deraadt 274: of immutable and append-only file flags. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 275: <li><a href=errata23.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm and Xaw
1.58 deraadt 276: (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 277: <li><a href=errata23.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC packets
1.59 deraadt 278: if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
1.53 matthieu 279: </ul>
1.9 deraadt 280:
1.106 deraadt 281: <p>
282: <li>
1.58 deraadt 283: <a name=22></a>
1.12 deraadt 284: <h3><font color=#e00000><strong>OpenBSD 2.2 Security Advisories</strong></font></h3>
1.45 deraadt 285: These are the OpenBSD 2.2 advisories. All these problems are solved
1.55 deraadt 286: in <a href=23.html>OpenBSD 2.3</a>. Some of these problems
1.45 deraadt 287: still exist in other operating systems. (The supplied patches are for
288: OpenBSD 2.2; they may or may not work on OpenBSD 2.1).
1.9 deraadt 289:
1.96 deraadt 290: <p>
1.9 deraadt 291: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 292: <li><a href=errata22.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC
293: packets if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
294: <li><a href=errata22.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm
295: and Xaw (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
296: <li><a href=errata22.html#uucpd>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer overflow in uucpd
297: (patch included).</a>
298: <li><a href=errata22.html#rmjob>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer mismanagement in lprm
299: (patch included).</a>
300: <li><a href=errata22.html#ping>Mar 31, 1998: Overflow in ping -R (patch included).</a>
301: <li><a href=errata22.html#named>Mar 30, 1998: Overflow in named fake-iquery
1.59 deraadt 302: (patch included).</a>
1.72 deraadt 303: <li><a href=errata22.html#mountd>Mar 2, 1998: Accidental NFS filesystem
304: export (patch included).</a>
305: <li><a href=advisories/mmap>Feb 26, 1998: Read-write mmap() flaw.</a>
306: Revision 3 of the patch is available <a href=errata22.html#mmap>here</a>
1.59 deraadt 307: <li><a href=advisories/sourceroute>Feb 19, 1998: Sourcerouted Packet
308: Acceptance.</a>
1.50 deraadt 309: A patch is available <a href=errata22.html#sourceroute>here</a>.
1.72 deraadt 310: <li><a href=errata22.html#ruserok>Feb 13, 1998: Setuid coredump & Ruserok()
311: flaw (patch included).</a>
312: <li><a href=errata22.html#ldso>Feb 9, 1998: MIPS ld.so flaw (patch included).</a>
313: <li><a href=errata22.html#f00f>Dec 10, 1997: Intel P5 f00f lockup
1.59 deraadt 314: (patch included).</a>
1.1 deraadt 315: </ul>
316:
1.106 deraadt 317: <p>
318: <li>
1.58 deraadt 319: <a name=21></a>
1.52 deraadt 320: <h3><font color=#e00000><strong>OpenBSD 2.1 Security Advisories</strong></font></h3>
321: These are the OpenBSD 2.1 advisories. All these problems are solved
322: in <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>. Some of these problems still
323: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.1, we
324: would strongly recommend an upgrade to the newest release, as this
325: patch list only attempts at fixing the most important security
326: problems. In particular, OpenBSD 2.2 fixes numerous localhost
327: security problems. Many of those problems were solved in ways which
328: make it hard for us to provide patches).
329:
1.96 deraadt 330: <p>
1.52 deraadt 331: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 332: <li><a href=advisories/signals>Sep 15, 1997: Deviant Signals (patch included)</a>
1.59 deraadt 333: <li><a href=advisories/rfork>Aug 2, 1997: Rfork() system call flaw
334: (patch included)</a>
335: <li><a href=advisories/procfs>Jun 24, 1997: Procfs flaws (patch included)</a>
1.52 deraadt 336: </ul>
1.51 deraadt 337:
1.106 deraadt 338: <p>
339: <li>
340: <a name=20></a>
1.99 deraadt 341: <h3><font color=#e00000><strong>OpenBSD 2.0 Security Advisories</strong></font></h3>
342: These are the OpenBSD 2.0 advisories. All these problems are solved
343: in <a href=21.html>OpenBSD 2.1</a>. Some of these problems still
344: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.0, we
345: commend you for being there back in the old days!, but you're really
346: missing out if you don't install a new version!)
347:
348: <p>
349: <ul>
350: <li><a href=advisories/res_random>April 22, 1997: Predictable IDs in the
351: resolver (patch included)</a>
352: <li>Many others... if people can hunt them down, please let me know
353: and we'll put them up here.
354: </ul>
355:
1.106 deraadt 356: </dl>
1.51 deraadt 357: <p>
1.106 deraadt 358:
359: <a name=watching></a>
360: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Watching our Changes</strong></font></h3><p>
361:
1.21 deraadt 362: Since we take a proactive stance with security, we are continually
363: finding and fixing new security problems. Not all of these problems
1.80 espie 364: get widely reported because (as stated earlier) many of them are not
1.45 deraadt 365: confirmed to be exploitable; many simple bugs we fix do turn out to
366: have security consequences we could not predict. We do not have the
367: time resources to make these changes available in the above format.<p>
1.21 deraadt 368:
369: Thus there are usually minor security fixes in the current source code
370: beyond the previous major OpenBSD release. We make a limited
1.45 deraadt 371: guarantee that these problems are of minimal impact and unproven
1.44 ian 372: exploitability. If we discover that a problem definitely matters for
1.45 deraadt 373: security, patches will show up here <strong>VERY</strong> quickly.<p>
1.21 deraadt 374:
1.45 deraadt 375: People who are really concerned with security can do a number of
376: things:<p>
1.21 deraadt 377:
378: <ul>
379: <li>If you understand security issues, watch our
1.27 deraadt 380: <a href=mail.html>source-changes mailing list</a> and keep an
1.23 deraadt 381: eye out for things which appear security related. Since
1.21 deraadt 382: exploitability is not proven for many of the fixes we make,
383: do not expect the relevant commit message to say "SECURITY FIX!".
384: If a problem is proven and serious, a patch will be available
385: here very shortly after.
386: <li>Track our current source code tree, and teach yourself how to do a
1.29 deraadt 387: complete system build from time to time (read /usr/src/Makefile
388: carefully). Users can make the assumption that the current
389: source tree always has stronger security than the previous release.
1.45 deraadt 390: However, building your own system from source code is not trivial;
391: it is nearly 300MB of source code, and problems do occur as we
392: transition between major releases.
1.29 deraadt 393: <li>Install a binary <a href=snapshots.html>snapshot</a> for your
1.80 espie 394: architecture, which are made available fairly often. For
1.29 deraadt 395: instance, an i386 snapshot is typically made available weekly.
1.21 deraadt 396: </ul>
397:
1.9 deraadt 398: <p>
1.106 deraadt 399: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Reporting problems</strong></font></h3><p>
1.3 deraadt 400:
1.5 deraadt 401: <p> If you find a new security problem, you can mail it to
1.6 deraadt 402: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>deraadt@openbsd.org</a>.
1.7 deraadt 403: <br>
1.5 deraadt 404: If you wish to PGP encode it (but please only do so if privacy is very
1.27 deraadt 405: urgent, since it is inconvenient) use this <a href=advisories/pgpkey>pgp key</a>.
1.5 deraadt 406:
1.107 deraadt 407: <p>
408: <a name=papers></a>
409: <li><h3><font color=#e00000><strong>Further Reading</strong></font></h3><p>
410:
411: A number of papers have been written by OpenBSD team members, about security
412: related changes they have done in OpenBSD. The postscript versions of these
1.108 ! deraadt 413: documents are available as follows.<p>
1.107 deraadt 414:
415: <ul>
416: <li>A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme
417: Niels Provos, David Mazieres.<br>
418: <a href=papers/bcrypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
419: <a href=papers/bcrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
420: <li>Cryptography in OpenBSD: An Overview<br>
421: Theo de Raadt, Niklas Hallqvist, Artur Grabowski,
422: Angelos D. Keromytis, Niels Provos.<br>
423: <a href=papers/crypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
424: <a href=papers/crypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
425: </ul>
426:
1.106 deraadt 427: </dl>
428:
1.2 deraadt 429: <hr>
1.68 pauls 430: <a href=index.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.24 deraadt 431: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
432: <br>
1.108 ! deraadt 433: <small>$OpenBSD: security.html,v 1.107 1999/09/22 06:00:52 deraadt Exp $</small>
1.1 deraadt 434:
1.24 deraadt 435: </body>
436: </html>
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