Annotation of www/security.html, Revision 1.110
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1.20 deraadt 4: <title>OpenBSD Security</title>
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1.77 deraadt 14: <img alt="[OpenBSD]" height=30 width=141 SRC="images/smalltitle.gif">
1.106 deraadt 15: <p>
1.110 ! deraadt 16: <h2><font color=#e00000>Security</font><hr></h2>
1.1 deraadt 17:
1.106 deraadt 18: <strong>Index</strong><br>
19: <a href=#goals>Security goals of the Project</a>.<br>
20: <a href=#disclosure>Full Disclosure policy</a>.<br>
21: <a href=#process>Source code auditing process</a>.<br>
22: <a href=#process>"Secure by Default"</a>.<br>
23: <a href=#crypto>Use of Cryptography</a>.<br>
24: <p>
25: <a href=#25>For 2.5 security advisories</a>.<br>
26: <a href=#24>For 2.4 security advisories</a>.<br>
27: <a href=#23>For 2.3 security advisories</a>.<br>
28: <a href=#22>For 2.2 security advisories</a>.<br>
29: <a href=#21>For 2.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
30: <a href=#20>For 2.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
31: <p>
32: <a href=#watching>Watching changes</a>.<br>
33: <a href=#reporting>Reporting security issues</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 34: <a href=#papers>Further Reading</a><br>
1.106 deraadt 35: <p>
1.56 deraadt 36: <hr>
37:
1.106 deraadt 38: <dl>
39: <a name=goals></a>
1.110 ! deraadt 40: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Goal</font></h3><p>
1.22 deraadt 41:
1.14 deraadt 42: OpenBSD believes in strong security. Our aspiration is to be NUMBER
1.22 deraadt 43: ONE in the industry for security (if we are not already there). Our
44: open software development model permits us to take a more
45: uncompromising view towards increased security than Sun, SGI, IBM, HP,
46: or other vendors are able to. We can make changes the vendors would
1.27 deraadt 47: not make. Also, since OpenBSD is exported with <a href=crypto.html>
1.45 deraadt 48: cryptography</a>, we are able to take cryptographic approaches towards
49: fixing security problems.<p>
1.18 deraadt 50:
1.106 deraadt 51: <a name=disclosure></a>
1.110 ! deraadt 52: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Full Disclosure</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 53:
1.45 deraadt 54: Like many readers of the
1.102 deraadt 55: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>
1.18 deraadt 56: BUGTRAQ mailing list</a>,
1.106 deraadt 57: we believe in full disclosure of security problems. In the
58: operating system arena, we were probably the first to embrace
59: the concept. Many vendors, even of free software, still try
60: to hide issues from their users.<p>
61:
62: Security information moves very fast in cracker circles. On the other
63: hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security
64: fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix
65: turnaround is possible. Thus we think that full disclosure helps the
66: people who really care about security.<p>
67:
1.110 ! deraadt 68: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Audit Process</font></h3><p>
1.15 deraadt 69:
1.12 deraadt 70: Our security auditing team typically has between six and twelve
1.45 deraadt 71: members who continue to search for and fix new security holes. We
72: have been auditing since the summer of 1996. The process we follow to
73: increase security is simply a comprehensive file-by-file analysis of
1.106 deraadt 74: every critical software component. We are not so much looking for
75: security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if
76: years later someone discovers a the problem used to be a security
77: issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the
78: better. Flaws have been found in just about every area of the system.
79: Entire new classes of security problems have been found during our
80: audit, and often source code which had been audited earlier needs
81: re-auditing with these new flaws in mind. Code often gets audited
82: multiple times, and by multiple people with different auditing
83: skills.<p>
1.12 deraadt 84:
1.94 deraadt 85: Some members of our security auditing team worked for Secure Networks,
86: the company that made the industry's premier network security scanning
87: software package Ballista (Secure Networks got purchased by Network
88: Associates, Ballista got renamed to Cybercop Scanner, and well...)
89: That company did a lot of security research, and thus fit in well
1.106 deraadt 90: with the OpenBSD stance. OpenBSD passed Ballista's tests with flying
91: colours since day 1.<p>
1.31 deraadt 92:
1.34 deraadt 93: Another facet of our security auditing process is its proactiveness.
1.45 deraadt 94: In most cases we have found that the determination of exploitability
95: is not an issue. During our ongoing auditing process we find many
96: bugs, and endeavor to fix them even though exploitability is not
97: proven. We fix the bug, and we move on to find other bugs to fix. We
98: have fixed many simple and obvious careless programming errors in code
99: and only months later discovered that the problems were in fact
100: exploitable. (Or, more likely someone on
1.102 deraadt 101: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>
1.45 deraadt 102: would report that other operating systems were vulnerable to a `newly
103: discovered problem', and then it would be discovered that OpenBSD had
104: been fixed in a previous release). In other cases we have been saved
105: from full exploitability of complex step-by-step attacks because we
106: had fixed one of the intermediate steps. An example of where we
1.94 deraadt 107: managed such a success is the lpd advisory that Secure Networks put out.
108: <p>
1.29 deraadt 109:
1.110 ! deraadt 110: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>The Reward</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 111:
1.45 deraadt 112: Our proactive auditing process has really paid off. Statements like
1.35 deraadt 113: ``This problem was fixed in OpenBSD about 6 months ago'' have become
1.45 deraadt 114: commonplace in security forums like
1.102 deraadt 115: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>.<p>
1.35 deraadt 116:
1.45 deraadt 117: The most intense part of our security auditing happened immediately
1.80 espie 118: before the OpenBSD 2.0 release and during the 2.0->2.1 transition,
1.45 deraadt 119: over the last third of 1996 and first half of 1997. Thousands (yes,
120: thousands) of security issues were fixed rapidly over this year-long
121: period; bugs like the standard buffer overflows, protocol
122: implementation weaknesses, information gathering, and filesystem
123: races. Hence most of the security problems that we encountered were
124: fixed before our 2.1 release, and then a far smaller number needed
125: fixing for our 2.2 release. We do not find as many problems anymore,
126: it is simply a case of diminishing returns. Recently the security
127: problems we find and fix tend to be significantly more obscure or
128: complicated. Still we will persist for a number of reasons:<p>
1.36 deraadt 129:
1.35 deraadt 130: <ul>
1.45 deraadt 131: <li>Occasionally we find a simple problem we missed earlier. Doh!
1.35 deraadt 132: <li>Security is like an arms race; the best attackers will continue
1.45 deraadt 133: to search for more complicated exploits, so we will too.
134: <li>Finding and fixing subtle flaws in complicated software is
135: a lot of fun.
1.35 deraadt 136: </ul>
1.106 deraadt 137: <p>
1.15 deraadt 138:
1.14 deraadt 139: The auditing process is not over yet, and as you can see we continue
1.28 deraadt 140: to find and fix new security flaws.<p>
1.12 deraadt 141:
1.106 deraadt 142: <a name=default></a>
1.110 ! deraadt 143: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>"Secure by Default"</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 144:
145: To ensure that novice users of OpenBSD do not need to become security
146: experts overnight (a viewpoint which other vendors seem to have), we
147: ship the operating system in a Secure by Default mode. All non-essential
148: services are disabled. As the user/administrator becomes more familiar
149: with the system, he will discover that he has to enable daemons and other
150: parts of the system. During the process of learning how to enable a new
151: service, the novice is more likely to learn of security considerations.<p>
152:
153: This is in stark contrast to the increasing number of systems that
154: ship with NFS, mountd, web servers, and various other services enabled
155: by default, creating instantaneous security problems for their users
156: within minutes after their first install.<p>
157:
1.110 ! deraadt 158: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Cryptography</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 159:
160: And of course, since the OpenBSD project is based in Canada, it is possible
161: for us to integrate cryptography. For more information, read the page
162: outlying <a href=crypto.html>what we have done with cryptography</a>.</p>
163:
1.110 ! deraadt 164: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Advisories</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 165:
166: <dl>
167:
168: <li>
1.93 deraadt 169: <a name=25></a>
1.106 deraadt 170:
1.110 ! deraadt 171: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.5 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.93 deraadt 172: These are the OpenBSD 2.5 advisories -- all these problems are solved
173: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
174: OpenBSD 2.4 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.5.
175:
1.96 deraadt 176: <p>
1.104 deraadt 177: <ul>
178: <li><a href=errata.html#cron>Aug 30, 1999:
1.103 deraadt 179: In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the
180: fake popen() and run sendmail as the user, not as root.
181: (patch included).</a>
1.104 deraadt 182: <li><a href=errata.html#miscfs>Aug 12, 1999: The procfs and fdescfs
1.101 deraadt 183: filesystems had an overrun in their handling of uio_offset
184: in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
185: enabled by default). (patch included).</a>
1.100 deraadt 186: <li><a href=errata.html#profil>Aug 9, 1999: Stop profiling (see profil(2))
187: when we execve() a new process. (patch included).</a>
1.105 deraadt 188: <li><a href=errata.html#ipsec_in_use>Aug 6, 1999: Packets that should have
1.98 deraadt 189: been handled by IPsec may be transmitted as cleartext.
190: PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
191: (patch included).</a>
1.97 deraadt 192: <li><a href=errata.html#rc>Aug 5, 1999: In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for
193: motd re-writing and change the find(1) to use -execdir
194: (patch included).</a>
1.95 deraadt 195: <li><a href=errata.html#chflags>Jul 30, 1999: Do not permit regular
196: users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or block devices
197: which they may currently be the owner of (patch included).</a>
198: <li><a href=errata.html#nroff>Jul 27, 1999: Cause groff(1) to be invoked
199: with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1) (patch included).</a>
1.93 deraadt 200: </ul>
201:
1.106 deraadt 202: <p>
203: <li>
1.75 deraadt 204: <a name=24></a>
1.110 ! deraadt 205: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.4 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.75 deraadt 206: These are the OpenBSD 2.4 advisories -- all these problems are solved
207: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
208: OpenBSD 2.3 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.4.
209:
1.96 deraadt 210: <p>
1.75 deraadt 211: <ul>
1.92 deraadt 212: <li><a href=errata24.html#poll>Mar 22, 1999: The nfds argument for poll(2) needs
1.91 deraadt 213: to be constrained, to avoid kvm starvation (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 214: <li><a href=errata24.html#tss>Mar 21, 1999: A change in TSS handling stops
1.91 deraadt 215: another kernel crash case caused by the <strong>crashme</strong>
216: program (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 217: <li><a href=errata24.html#nlink>Feb 25, 1999: An unbounded increment on the
1.90 deraadt 218: nlink value in FFS and EXT2FS filesystems can cause a system crash.
1.89 deraadt 219: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 220: <li><a href=errata24.html#ping>Feb 23, 1999: Yet another buffer overflow
1.88 deraadt 221: existed in ping(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 222: <li><a href=errata24.html#ipqrace>Feb 19, 1999: ipintr() had a race in use of
1.87 deraadt 223: the ipq, which could permit an attacker to cause a crash.
224: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 225: <li><a href=errata24.html#accept>Feb 17, 1999: A race condition in the
1.86 deraadt 226: kernel between accept(2) and select(2) could permit an attacker
227: to hang sockets from remote.
228: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 229: <li><a href=errata24.html#maxqueue>Feb 17, 1999: IP fragment assembly can
1.85 deraadt 230: bog the machine excessively and cause problems.
231: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 232: <li><a href=errata24.html#trctrap>Feb 12, 1999: i386 T_TRCTRAP handling and
1.84 deraadt 233: DDB interacted to possibly cause a crash.
234: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 235: <li><a href=errata24.html#rst>Feb 11, 1999: TCP/IP RST handling was sloppy.
1.83 deraadt 236: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 237: <li><a href=errata24.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
1.81 deraadt 238: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 239: <li><a href=errata24.html#termcap>Nov 19, 1998: There is a possibly locally
1.82 deraadt 240: exploitable problem relating to environment variables in termcap
241: and curses. (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 242: <li><a href=errata24.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
1.78 deraadt 243: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.75 deraadt 244: </ul>
245:
1.106 deraadt 246: <p>
247: <li>
1.58 deraadt 248: <a name=23></a>
1.110 ! deraadt 249: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.3 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.73 deraadt 250: These are the OpenBSD 2.3 advisories -- all these problems are solved
251: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
252: OpenBSD 2.2 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.3.
1.53 matthieu 253:
1.96 deraadt 254: <p>
1.53 matthieu 255: <ul>
1.81 deraadt 256: <li><a href=errata23.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
257: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.78 deraadt 258: <li><a href=errata23.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
259: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 260: <li><a href=errata23.html#fdalloc>Jul 2, 1998: setuid and setgid processes
1.72 deraadt 261: should not be executed with fd slots 0, 1, or 2 free.
262: (patch included).</a>
1.79 deraadt 263: <li><a href=errata23.html#resolver>August 31, 1998: A benign looking resolver buffer overflow bug was re-introduced accidentally (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 264: <li><a href=errata23.html#xlib>June 6, 1998: Further problems with the X
1.71 deraadt 265: libraries (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 266: <li><a href=errata23.html#pctr>June 4, 1998: on non-Intel i386 machines, any user
1.72 deraadt 267: can use pctr(4) to crash the machine.</a>
1.76 aaron 268: <li><a href=errata23.html#kill>May 17, 1998: kill(2) of setuid/setgid target
1.66 deraadt 269: processes too permissive (4th revision patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 270: <li><a href=errata23.html#immutable>May 11, 1998: mmap() permits partial bypassing
1.60 deraadt 271: of immutable and append-only file flags. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 272: <li><a href=errata23.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm and Xaw
1.58 deraadt 273: (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 274: <li><a href=errata23.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC packets
1.59 deraadt 275: if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
1.53 matthieu 276: </ul>
1.9 deraadt 277:
1.106 deraadt 278: <p>
279: <li>
1.58 deraadt 280: <a name=22></a>
1.110 ! deraadt 281: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.2 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.45 deraadt 282: These are the OpenBSD 2.2 advisories. All these problems are solved
1.55 deraadt 283: in <a href=23.html>OpenBSD 2.3</a>. Some of these problems
1.45 deraadt 284: still exist in other operating systems. (The supplied patches are for
285: OpenBSD 2.2; they may or may not work on OpenBSD 2.1).
1.9 deraadt 286:
1.96 deraadt 287: <p>
1.9 deraadt 288: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 289: <li><a href=errata22.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC
290: packets if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
291: <li><a href=errata22.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm
292: and Xaw (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
293: <li><a href=errata22.html#uucpd>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer overflow in uucpd
294: (patch included).</a>
295: <li><a href=errata22.html#rmjob>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer mismanagement in lprm
296: (patch included).</a>
297: <li><a href=errata22.html#ping>Mar 31, 1998: Overflow in ping -R (patch included).</a>
298: <li><a href=errata22.html#named>Mar 30, 1998: Overflow in named fake-iquery
1.59 deraadt 299: (patch included).</a>
1.72 deraadt 300: <li><a href=errata22.html#mountd>Mar 2, 1998: Accidental NFS filesystem
301: export (patch included).</a>
302: <li><a href=advisories/mmap>Feb 26, 1998: Read-write mmap() flaw.</a>
303: Revision 3 of the patch is available <a href=errata22.html#mmap>here</a>
1.59 deraadt 304: <li><a href=advisories/sourceroute>Feb 19, 1998: Sourcerouted Packet
305: Acceptance.</a>
1.50 deraadt 306: A patch is available <a href=errata22.html#sourceroute>here</a>.
1.72 deraadt 307: <li><a href=errata22.html#ruserok>Feb 13, 1998: Setuid coredump & Ruserok()
308: flaw (patch included).</a>
309: <li><a href=errata22.html#ldso>Feb 9, 1998: MIPS ld.so flaw (patch included).</a>
310: <li><a href=errata22.html#f00f>Dec 10, 1997: Intel P5 f00f lockup
1.59 deraadt 311: (patch included).</a>
1.1 deraadt 312: </ul>
313:
1.106 deraadt 314: <p>
315: <li>
1.58 deraadt 316: <a name=21></a>
1.110 ! deraadt 317: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.1 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.52 deraadt 318: These are the OpenBSD 2.1 advisories. All these problems are solved
319: in <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>. Some of these problems still
320: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.1, we
321: would strongly recommend an upgrade to the newest release, as this
322: patch list only attempts at fixing the most important security
323: problems. In particular, OpenBSD 2.2 fixes numerous localhost
324: security problems. Many of those problems were solved in ways which
325: make it hard for us to provide patches).
326:
1.96 deraadt 327: <p>
1.52 deraadt 328: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 329: <li><a href=advisories/signals>Sep 15, 1997: Deviant Signals (patch included)</a>
1.59 deraadt 330: <li><a href=advisories/rfork>Aug 2, 1997: Rfork() system call flaw
331: (patch included)</a>
332: <li><a href=advisories/procfs>Jun 24, 1997: Procfs flaws (patch included)</a>
1.52 deraadt 333: </ul>
1.51 deraadt 334:
1.106 deraadt 335: <p>
336: <li>
337: <a name=20></a>
1.110 ! deraadt 338: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.99 deraadt 339: These are the OpenBSD 2.0 advisories. All these problems are solved
340: in <a href=21.html>OpenBSD 2.1</a>. Some of these problems still
341: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.0, we
342: commend you for being there back in the old days!, but you're really
343: missing out if you don't install a new version!)
344:
345: <p>
346: <ul>
347: <li><a href=advisories/res_random>April 22, 1997: Predictable IDs in the
348: resolver (patch included)</a>
349: <li>Many others... if people can hunt them down, please let me know
350: and we'll put them up here.
351: </ul>
352:
1.106 deraadt 353: </dl>
1.51 deraadt 354: <p>
1.106 deraadt 355:
356: <a name=watching></a>
1.110 ! deraadt 357: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Watching our Changes</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 358:
1.21 deraadt 359: Since we take a proactive stance with security, we are continually
360: finding and fixing new security problems. Not all of these problems
1.80 espie 361: get widely reported because (as stated earlier) many of them are not
1.45 deraadt 362: confirmed to be exploitable; many simple bugs we fix do turn out to
363: have security consequences we could not predict. We do not have the
364: time resources to make these changes available in the above format.<p>
1.21 deraadt 365:
366: Thus there are usually minor security fixes in the current source code
367: beyond the previous major OpenBSD release. We make a limited
1.45 deraadt 368: guarantee that these problems are of minimal impact and unproven
1.44 ian 369: exploitability. If we discover that a problem definitely matters for
1.45 deraadt 370: security, patches will show up here <strong>VERY</strong> quickly.<p>
1.21 deraadt 371:
1.45 deraadt 372: People who are really concerned with security can do a number of
373: things:<p>
1.21 deraadt 374:
375: <ul>
376: <li>If you understand security issues, watch our
1.27 deraadt 377: <a href=mail.html>source-changes mailing list</a> and keep an
1.23 deraadt 378: eye out for things which appear security related. Since
1.21 deraadt 379: exploitability is not proven for many of the fixes we make,
380: do not expect the relevant commit message to say "SECURITY FIX!".
381: If a problem is proven and serious, a patch will be available
382: here very shortly after.
383: <li>Track our current source code tree, and teach yourself how to do a
1.29 deraadt 384: complete system build from time to time (read /usr/src/Makefile
385: carefully). Users can make the assumption that the current
386: source tree always has stronger security than the previous release.
1.45 deraadt 387: However, building your own system from source code is not trivial;
388: it is nearly 300MB of source code, and problems do occur as we
389: transition between major releases.
1.29 deraadt 390: <li>Install a binary <a href=snapshots.html>snapshot</a> for your
1.80 espie 391: architecture, which are made available fairly often. For
1.29 deraadt 392: instance, an i386 snapshot is typically made available weekly.
1.21 deraadt 393: </ul>
394:
1.9 deraadt 395: <p>
1.110 ! deraadt 396: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Reporting problems</font></h3><p>
1.3 deraadt 397:
1.5 deraadt 398: <p> If you find a new security problem, you can mail it to
1.6 deraadt 399: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>deraadt@openbsd.org</a>.
1.7 deraadt 400: <br>
1.5 deraadt 401: If you wish to PGP encode it (but please only do so if privacy is very
1.27 deraadt 402: urgent, since it is inconvenient) use this <a href=advisories/pgpkey>pgp key</a>.
1.5 deraadt 403:
1.107 deraadt 404: <p>
405: <a name=papers></a>
1.110 ! deraadt 406: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Further Reading</font></h3><p>
1.107 deraadt 407:
408: A number of papers have been written by OpenBSD team members, about security
409: related changes they have done in OpenBSD. The postscript versions of these
1.108 deraadt 410: documents are available as follows.<p>
1.107 deraadt 411:
412: <ul>
413: <li>A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme
414: Niels Provos, David Mazieres.<br>
415: <a href=papers/bcrypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
416: <a href=papers/bcrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
417: <li>Cryptography in OpenBSD: An Overview<br>
418: Theo de Raadt, Niklas Hallqvist, Artur Grabowski,
419: Angelos D. Keromytis, Niels Provos.<br>
420: <a href=papers/crypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
421: <a href=papers/crypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.109 deraadt 422: <li>strlcpy and strlcat -- consistent, safe, string copy and concatenation.
423: Todd C. Miller, Theo de Raadt.<br>
424: <a href=papers/strlcpy-paper.ps>paper</a> and
425: <a href=papers/strlcpy-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.107 deraadt 426: </ul>
427:
1.106 deraadt 428: </dl>
429:
1.2 deraadt 430: <hr>
1.68 pauls 431: <a href=index.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.24 deraadt 432: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
433: <br>
1.110 ! deraadt 434: <small>$OpenBSD: security.html,v 1.109 1999/09/22 06:02:04 deraadt Exp $</small>
1.1 deraadt 435:
1.24 deraadt 436: </body>
437: </html>
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