Annotation of www/security.html, Revision 1.114
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1.20 deraadt 4: <title>OpenBSD Security</title>
1.1 deraadt 5: <link rev=made href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>
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7: <meta name="description" content="OpenBSD advisories">
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1.77 deraadt 14: <img alt="[OpenBSD]" height=30 width=141 SRC="images/smalltitle.gif">
1.106 deraadt 15: <p>
1.110 deraadt 16: <h2><font color=#e00000>Security</font><hr></h2>
1.1 deraadt 17:
1.114 ! philen 18: <table width="100%">
! 19: <tr>
! 20: <td colspan="2">
! 21: <strong>Index</strong>
! 22: </td>
! 23: </tr>
! 24: <tr>
! 25: <td valign="top">
1.106 deraadt 26: <a href=#goals>Security goals of the Project</a>.<br>
27: <a href=#disclosure>Full Disclosure policy</a>.<br>
28: <a href=#process>Source code auditing process</a>.<br>
1.111 aaron 29: <a href=#default>"Secure by Default"</a>.<br>
1.106 deraadt 30: <a href=#crypto>Use of Cryptography</a>.<br>
31: <p>
32: <a href=#watching>Watching changes</a>.<br>
33: <a href=#reporting>Reporting security issues</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 34: <a href=#papers>Further Reading</a><br>
1.106 deraadt 35: <p>
1.114 ! philen 36: </td>
! 37: <td valign="top">
! 38: <a href="#25">For 2.5 security advisories</a>.<br>
! 39: <a href="#24">For 2.4 security advisories</a>.<br>
! 40: <a href="#23">For 2.3 security advisories</a>.<br>
! 41: <a href="#22">For 2.2 security advisories</a>.<br>
! 42: <a href="#21">For 2.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
! 43: <a href="#20">For 2.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
! 44: </td>
! 45: </tr>
! 46: </table>
1.56 deraadt 47: <hr>
48:
1.106 deraadt 49: <dl>
50: <a name=goals></a>
1.110 deraadt 51: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Goal</font></h3><p>
1.22 deraadt 52:
1.14 deraadt 53: OpenBSD believes in strong security. Our aspiration is to be NUMBER
1.22 deraadt 54: ONE in the industry for security (if we are not already there). Our
55: open software development model permits us to take a more
56: uncompromising view towards increased security than Sun, SGI, IBM, HP,
57: or other vendors are able to. We can make changes the vendors would
1.27 deraadt 58: not make. Also, since OpenBSD is exported with <a href=crypto.html>
1.45 deraadt 59: cryptography</a>, we are able to take cryptographic approaches towards
60: fixing security problems.<p>
1.18 deraadt 61:
1.106 deraadt 62: <a name=disclosure></a>
1.110 deraadt 63: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Full Disclosure</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 64:
1.45 deraadt 65: Like many readers of the
1.102 deraadt 66: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>
1.18 deraadt 67: BUGTRAQ mailing list</a>,
1.106 deraadt 68: we believe in full disclosure of security problems. In the
69: operating system arena, we were probably the first to embrace
70: the concept. Many vendors, even of free software, still try
71: to hide issues from their users.<p>
72:
73: Security information moves very fast in cracker circles. On the other
74: hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security
75: fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix
76: turnaround is possible. Thus we think that full disclosure helps the
77: people who really care about security.<p>
78:
1.111 aaron 79: <a name=process>
1.110 deraadt 80: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Audit Process</font></h3><p>
1.15 deraadt 81:
1.12 deraadt 82: Our security auditing team typically has between six and twelve
1.45 deraadt 83: members who continue to search for and fix new security holes. We
84: have been auditing since the summer of 1996. The process we follow to
85: increase security is simply a comprehensive file-by-file analysis of
1.106 deraadt 86: every critical software component. We are not so much looking for
87: security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if
88: years later someone discovers a the problem used to be a security
89: issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the
90: better. Flaws have been found in just about every area of the system.
91: Entire new classes of security problems have been found during our
92: audit, and often source code which had been audited earlier needs
93: re-auditing with these new flaws in mind. Code often gets audited
94: multiple times, and by multiple people with different auditing
95: skills.<p>
1.12 deraadt 96:
1.94 deraadt 97: Some members of our security auditing team worked for Secure Networks,
98: the company that made the industry's premier network security scanning
99: software package Ballista (Secure Networks got purchased by Network
100: Associates, Ballista got renamed to Cybercop Scanner, and well...)
101: That company did a lot of security research, and thus fit in well
1.106 deraadt 102: with the OpenBSD stance. OpenBSD passed Ballista's tests with flying
103: colours since day 1.<p>
1.31 deraadt 104:
1.34 deraadt 105: Another facet of our security auditing process is its proactiveness.
1.45 deraadt 106: In most cases we have found that the determination of exploitability
107: is not an issue. During our ongoing auditing process we find many
108: bugs, and endeavor to fix them even though exploitability is not
109: proven. We fix the bug, and we move on to find other bugs to fix. We
110: have fixed many simple and obvious careless programming errors in code
111: and only months later discovered that the problems were in fact
112: exploitable. (Or, more likely someone on
1.102 deraadt 113: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>
1.45 deraadt 114: would report that other operating systems were vulnerable to a `newly
115: discovered problem', and then it would be discovered that OpenBSD had
116: been fixed in a previous release). In other cases we have been saved
117: from full exploitability of complex step-by-step attacks because we
118: had fixed one of the intermediate steps. An example of where we
1.94 deraadt 119: managed such a success is the lpd advisory that Secure Networks put out.
120: <p>
1.29 deraadt 121:
1.110 deraadt 122: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>The Reward</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 123:
1.45 deraadt 124: Our proactive auditing process has really paid off. Statements like
1.35 deraadt 125: ``This problem was fixed in OpenBSD about 6 months ago'' have become
1.45 deraadt 126: commonplace in security forums like
1.102 deraadt 127: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>.<p>
1.35 deraadt 128:
1.45 deraadt 129: The most intense part of our security auditing happened immediately
1.80 espie 130: before the OpenBSD 2.0 release and during the 2.0->2.1 transition,
1.45 deraadt 131: over the last third of 1996 and first half of 1997. Thousands (yes,
132: thousands) of security issues were fixed rapidly over this year-long
133: period; bugs like the standard buffer overflows, protocol
134: implementation weaknesses, information gathering, and filesystem
135: races. Hence most of the security problems that we encountered were
136: fixed before our 2.1 release, and then a far smaller number needed
137: fixing for our 2.2 release. We do not find as many problems anymore,
138: it is simply a case of diminishing returns. Recently the security
139: problems we find and fix tend to be significantly more obscure or
140: complicated. Still we will persist for a number of reasons:<p>
1.36 deraadt 141:
1.35 deraadt 142: <ul>
1.45 deraadt 143: <li>Occasionally we find a simple problem we missed earlier. Doh!
1.35 deraadt 144: <li>Security is like an arms race; the best attackers will continue
1.45 deraadt 145: to search for more complicated exploits, so we will too.
146: <li>Finding and fixing subtle flaws in complicated software is
147: a lot of fun.
1.35 deraadt 148: </ul>
1.106 deraadt 149: <p>
1.15 deraadt 150:
1.14 deraadt 151: The auditing process is not over yet, and as you can see we continue
1.28 deraadt 152: to find and fix new security flaws.<p>
1.12 deraadt 153:
1.106 deraadt 154: <a name=default></a>
1.110 deraadt 155: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>"Secure by Default"</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 156:
157: To ensure that novice users of OpenBSD do not need to become security
158: experts overnight (a viewpoint which other vendors seem to have), we
159: ship the operating system in a Secure by Default mode. All non-essential
160: services are disabled. As the user/administrator becomes more familiar
161: with the system, he will discover that he has to enable daemons and other
162: parts of the system. During the process of learning how to enable a new
163: service, the novice is more likely to learn of security considerations.<p>
164:
165: This is in stark contrast to the increasing number of systems that
166: ship with NFS, mountd, web servers, and various other services enabled
167: by default, creating instantaneous security problems for their users
168: within minutes after their first install.<p>
169:
1.111 aaron 170: <a name=crypto>
1.110 deraadt 171: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Cryptography</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 172:
173: And of course, since the OpenBSD project is based in Canada, it is possible
174: for us to integrate cryptography. For more information, read the page
175: outlying <a href=crypto.html>what we have done with cryptography</a>.</p>
176:
1.110 deraadt 177: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Advisories</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 178:
179: <dl>
180:
181: <li>
1.93 deraadt 182: <a name=25></a>
1.106 deraadt 183:
1.110 deraadt 184: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.5 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.93 deraadt 185: These are the OpenBSD 2.5 advisories -- all these problems are solved
186: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
187: OpenBSD 2.4 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.5.
188:
1.96 deraadt 189: <p>
1.104 deraadt 190: <ul>
191: <li><a href=errata.html#cron>Aug 30, 1999:
1.103 deraadt 192: In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the
193: fake popen() and run sendmail as the user, not as root.
194: (patch included).</a>
1.104 deraadt 195: <li><a href=errata.html#miscfs>Aug 12, 1999: The procfs and fdescfs
1.101 deraadt 196: filesystems had an overrun in their handling of uio_offset
197: in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
198: enabled by default). (patch included).</a>
1.100 deraadt 199: <li><a href=errata.html#profil>Aug 9, 1999: Stop profiling (see profil(2))
200: when we execve() a new process. (patch included).</a>
1.105 deraadt 201: <li><a href=errata.html#ipsec_in_use>Aug 6, 1999: Packets that should have
1.98 deraadt 202: been handled by IPsec may be transmitted as cleartext.
203: PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
204: (patch included).</a>
1.97 deraadt 205: <li><a href=errata.html#rc>Aug 5, 1999: In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for
206: motd re-writing and change the find(1) to use -execdir
207: (patch included).</a>
1.95 deraadt 208: <li><a href=errata.html#chflags>Jul 30, 1999: Do not permit regular
209: users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or block devices
210: which they may currently be the owner of (patch included).</a>
211: <li><a href=errata.html#nroff>Jul 27, 1999: Cause groff(1) to be invoked
212: with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1) (patch included).</a>
1.93 deraadt 213: </ul>
214:
1.106 deraadt 215: <p>
216: <li>
1.75 deraadt 217: <a name=24></a>
1.110 deraadt 218: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.4 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.75 deraadt 219: These are the OpenBSD 2.4 advisories -- all these problems are solved
220: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
221: OpenBSD 2.3 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.4.
222:
1.96 deraadt 223: <p>
1.75 deraadt 224: <ul>
1.92 deraadt 225: <li><a href=errata24.html#poll>Mar 22, 1999: The nfds argument for poll(2) needs
1.91 deraadt 226: to be constrained, to avoid kvm starvation (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 227: <li><a href=errata24.html#tss>Mar 21, 1999: A change in TSS handling stops
1.91 deraadt 228: another kernel crash case caused by the <strong>crashme</strong>
229: program (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 230: <li><a href=errata24.html#nlink>Feb 25, 1999: An unbounded increment on the
1.90 deraadt 231: nlink value in FFS and EXT2FS filesystems can cause a system crash.
1.89 deraadt 232: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 233: <li><a href=errata24.html#ping>Feb 23, 1999: Yet another buffer overflow
1.88 deraadt 234: existed in ping(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 235: <li><a href=errata24.html#ipqrace>Feb 19, 1999: ipintr() had a race in use of
1.87 deraadt 236: the ipq, which could permit an attacker to cause a crash.
237: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 238: <li><a href=errata24.html#accept>Feb 17, 1999: A race condition in the
1.86 deraadt 239: kernel between accept(2) and select(2) could permit an attacker
240: to hang sockets from remote.
241: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 242: <li><a href=errata24.html#maxqueue>Feb 17, 1999: IP fragment assembly can
1.85 deraadt 243: bog the machine excessively and cause problems.
244: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 245: <li><a href=errata24.html#trctrap>Feb 12, 1999: i386 T_TRCTRAP handling and
1.84 deraadt 246: DDB interacted to possibly cause a crash.
247: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 248: <li><a href=errata24.html#rst>Feb 11, 1999: TCP/IP RST handling was sloppy.
1.83 deraadt 249: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 250: <li><a href=errata24.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
1.81 deraadt 251: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 252: <li><a href=errata24.html#termcap>Nov 19, 1998: There is a possibly locally
1.82 deraadt 253: exploitable problem relating to environment variables in termcap
254: and curses. (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 255: <li><a href=errata24.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
1.78 deraadt 256: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.75 deraadt 257: </ul>
258:
1.106 deraadt 259: <p>
260: <li>
1.58 deraadt 261: <a name=23></a>
1.110 deraadt 262: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.3 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.73 deraadt 263: These are the OpenBSD 2.3 advisories -- all these problems are solved
264: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
265: OpenBSD 2.2 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.3.
1.53 matthieu 266:
1.96 deraadt 267: <p>
1.53 matthieu 268: <ul>
1.81 deraadt 269: <li><a href=errata23.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
270: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.78 deraadt 271: <li><a href=errata23.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
272: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 273: <li><a href=errata23.html#fdalloc>Jul 2, 1998: setuid and setgid processes
1.72 deraadt 274: should not be executed with fd slots 0, 1, or 2 free.
275: (patch included).</a>
1.79 deraadt 276: <li><a href=errata23.html#resolver>August 31, 1998: A benign looking resolver buffer overflow bug was re-introduced accidentally (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 277: <li><a href=errata23.html#xlib>June 6, 1998: Further problems with the X
1.71 deraadt 278: libraries (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 279: <li><a href=errata23.html#pctr>June 4, 1998: on non-Intel i386 machines, any user
1.72 deraadt 280: can use pctr(4) to crash the machine.</a>
1.76 aaron 281: <li><a href=errata23.html#kill>May 17, 1998: kill(2) of setuid/setgid target
1.66 deraadt 282: processes too permissive (4th revision patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 283: <li><a href=errata23.html#immutable>May 11, 1998: mmap() permits partial bypassing
1.60 deraadt 284: of immutable and append-only file flags. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 285: <li><a href=errata23.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm and Xaw
1.58 deraadt 286: (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 287: <li><a href=errata23.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC packets
1.59 deraadt 288: if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
1.53 matthieu 289: </ul>
1.9 deraadt 290:
1.106 deraadt 291: <p>
292: <li>
1.58 deraadt 293: <a name=22></a>
1.110 deraadt 294: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.2 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.45 deraadt 295: These are the OpenBSD 2.2 advisories. All these problems are solved
1.55 deraadt 296: in <a href=23.html>OpenBSD 2.3</a>. Some of these problems
1.45 deraadt 297: still exist in other operating systems. (The supplied patches are for
298: OpenBSD 2.2; they may or may not work on OpenBSD 2.1).
1.9 deraadt 299:
1.96 deraadt 300: <p>
1.9 deraadt 301: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 302: <li><a href=errata22.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC
303: packets if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
304: <li><a href=errata22.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm
305: and Xaw (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
306: <li><a href=errata22.html#uucpd>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer overflow in uucpd
307: (patch included).</a>
308: <li><a href=errata22.html#rmjob>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer mismanagement in lprm
309: (patch included).</a>
310: <li><a href=errata22.html#ping>Mar 31, 1998: Overflow in ping -R (patch included).</a>
311: <li><a href=errata22.html#named>Mar 30, 1998: Overflow in named fake-iquery
1.59 deraadt 312: (patch included).</a>
1.72 deraadt 313: <li><a href=errata22.html#mountd>Mar 2, 1998: Accidental NFS filesystem
314: export (patch included).</a>
1.112 philen 315: <li><a href="advisories/mmap.txt">Feb 26, 1998: Read-write mmap() flaw.</a>
1.72 deraadt 316: Revision 3 of the patch is available <a href=errata22.html#mmap>here</a>
1.112 philen 317: <li><a href="advisories/sourceroute.txt">Feb 19, 1998: Sourcerouted Packet
1.59 deraadt 318: Acceptance.</a>
1.50 deraadt 319: A patch is available <a href=errata22.html#sourceroute>here</a>.
1.72 deraadt 320: <li><a href=errata22.html#ruserok>Feb 13, 1998: Setuid coredump & Ruserok()
321: flaw (patch included).</a>
322: <li><a href=errata22.html#ldso>Feb 9, 1998: MIPS ld.so flaw (patch included).</a>
323: <li><a href=errata22.html#f00f>Dec 10, 1997: Intel P5 f00f lockup
1.59 deraadt 324: (patch included).</a>
1.1 deraadt 325: </ul>
326:
1.106 deraadt 327: <p>
328: <li>
1.58 deraadt 329: <a name=21></a>
1.110 deraadt 330: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.1 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.52 deraadt 331: These are the OpenBSD 2.1 advisories. All these problems are solved
332: in <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>. Some of these problems still
333: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.1, we
334: would strongly recommend an upgrade to the newest release, as this
335: patch list only attempts at fixing the most important security
336: problems. In particular, OpenBSD 2.2 fixes numerous localhost
337: security problems. Many of those problems were solved in ways which
338: make it hard for us to provide patches).
339:
1.96 deraadt 340: <p>
1.52 deraadt 341: <ul>
1.112 philen 342: <li><a href="advisories/signals.txt">Sep 15, 1997: Deviant Signals (patch included)</a>
343: <li><a href="advisories/rfork.txt">Aug 2, 1997: Rfork() system call flaw
1.59 deraadt 344: (patch included)</a>
1.112 philen 345: <li><a href="advisories/procfs.txt">Jun 24, 1997: Procfs flaws (patch included)</a>
1.52 deraadt 346: </ul>
1.51 deraadt 347:
1.106 deraadt 348: <p>
349: <li>
350: <a name=20></a>
1.110 deraadt 351: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.99 deraadt 352: These are the OpenBSD 2.0 advisories. All these problems are solved
353: in <a href=21.html>OpenBSD 2.1</a>. Some of these problems still
354: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.0, we
355: commend you for being there back in the old days!, but you're really
356: missing out if you don't install a new version!)
357:
358: <p>
359: <ul>
1.112 philen 360: <li><a href="advisories/res_random.txt">April 22, 1997: Predictable IDs in the
1.99 deraadt 361: resolver (patch included)</a>
362: <li>Many others... if people can hunt them down, please let me know
363: and we'll put them up here.
364: </ul>
365:
1.106 deraadt 366: </dl>
1.51 deraadt 367: <p>
1.106 deraadt 368:
369: <a name=watching></a>
1.110 deraadt 370: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Watching our Changes</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 371:
1.21 deraadt 372: Since we take a proactive stance with security, we are continually
373: finding and fixing new security problems. Not all of these problems
1.80 espie 374: get widely reported because (as stated earlier) many of them are not
1.45 deraadt 375: confirmed to be exploitable; many simple bugs we fix do turn out to
376: have security consequences we could not predict. We do not have the
377: time resources to make these changes available in the above format.<p>
1.21 deraadt 378:
379: Thus there are usually minor security fixes in the current source code
380: beyond the previous major OpenBSD release. We make a limited
1.45 deraadt 381: guarantee that these problems are of minimal impact and unproven
1.44 ian 382: exploitability. If we discover that a problem definitely matters for
1.45 deraadt 383: security, patches will show up here <strong>VERY</strong> quickly.<p>
1.21 deraadt 384:
1.45 deraadt 385: People who are really concerned with security can do a number of
386: things:<p>
1.21 deraadt 387:
388: <ul>
389: <li>If you understand security issues, watch our
1.27 deraadt 390: <a href=mail.html>source-changes mailing list</a> and keep an
1.23 deraadt 391: eye out for things which appear security related. Since
1.21 deraadt 392: exploitability is not proven for many of the fixes we make,
393: do not expect the relevant commit message to say "SECURITY FIX!".
394: If a problem is proven and serious, a patch will be available
395: here very shortly after.
396: <li>Track our current source code tree, and teach yourself how to do a
1.29 deraadt 397: complete system build from time to time (read /usr/src/Makefile
398: carefully). Users can make the assumption that the current
399: source tree always has stronger security than the previous release.
1.45 deraadt 400: However, building your own system from source code is not trivial;
401: it is nearly 300MB of source code, and problems do occur as we
402: transition between major releases.
1.29 deraadt 403: <li>Install a binary <a href=snapshots.html>snapshot</a> for your
1.80 espie 404: architecture, which are made available fairly often. For
1.29 deraadt 405: instance, an i386 snapshot is typically made available weekly.
1.21 deraadt 406: </ul>
407:
1.9 deraadt 408: <p>
1.111 aaron 409: <a name=reporting>
1.110 deraadt 410: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Reporting problems</font></h3><p>
1.3 deraadt 411:
1.5 deraadt 412: <p> If you find a new security problem, you can mail it to
1.6 deraadt 413: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>deraadt@openbsd.org</a>.
1.7 deraadt 414: <br>
1.5 deraadt 415: If you wish to PGP encode it (but please only do so if privacy is very
1.112 philen 416: urgent, since it is inconvenient) use this <a href="advisories/pgpkey.txt">pgp key</a>.
1.5 deraadt 417:
1.107 deraadt 418: <p>
419: <a name=papers></a>
1.110 deraadt 420: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Further Reading</font></h3><p>
1.107 deraadt 421:
422: A number of papers have been written by OpenBSD team members, about security
423: related changes they have done in OpenBSD. The postscript versions of these
1.108 deraadt 424: documents are available as follows.<p>
1.107 deraadt 425:
426: <ul>
1.113 deraadt 427: <li>A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme.<br>
428: by <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos<a/>,
429: <a href=mailto:dm@openbsd.org>David Mazieres</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 430: <a href=papers/bcrypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
431: <a href=papers/bcrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 432: <p>
433: <li>Cryptography in OpenBSD: An Overview.<br>
434: by <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>,
435: <a href=mailto:niklas@openbsd.org>Niklas Hallqvist</a>,
436: <a href=mailto:art@openbsd.org>Artur Grabowski</a>,
437: <a href=mailto:angelos@openbsd.org>Angelos D. Keromytis</a>,
438: <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 439: <a href=papers/crypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
440: <a href=papers/crypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 441: <p>
442: <li>strlcpy and strlcat -- consistent, safe, string copy and concatenation.<br>
443: by <a href=mailto:millert@openbsd.org>Todd C. Miller</a>,
444: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>.<br>
1.109 deraadt 445: <a href=papers/strlcpy-paper.ps>paper</a> and
446: <a href=papers/strlcpy-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 447: <p>
1.107 deraadt 448: </ul>
449:
1.106 deraadt 450: </dl>
451:
1.2 deraadt 452: <hr>
1.68 pauls 453: <a href=index.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.24 deraadt 454: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
455: <br>
1.114 ! philen 456: <small>$OpenBSD: security.html,v 1.113 1999/10/02 00:51:05 deraadt Exp $</small>
1.1 deraadt 457:
1.24 deraadt 458: </body>
459: </html>
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