Annotation of www/security.html, Revision 1.125
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1.20 deraadt 4: <title>OpenBSD Security</title>
1.1 deraadt 5: <link rev=made href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>
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7: <meta name="description" content="OpenBSD advisories">
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1.77 deraadt 14: <img alt="[OpenBSD]" height=30 width=141 SRC="images/smalltitle.gif">
1.106 deraadt 15: <p>
1.110 deraadt 16: <h2><font color=#e00000>Security</font><hr></h2>
1.1 deraadt 17:
1.114 philen 18: <table width="100%">
19: <tr>
20: <td colspan="2">
21: <strong>Index</strong>
22: </td>
23: </tr>
24: <tr>
25: <td valign="top">
1.106 deraadt 26: <a href=#goals>Security goals of the Project</a>.<br>
27: <a href=#disclosure>Full Disclosure policy</a>.<br>
28: <a href=#process>Source code auditing process</a>.<br>
1.111 aaron 29: <a href=#default>"Secure by Default"</a>.<br>
1.106 deraadt 30: <a href=#crypto>Use of Cryptography</a>.<br>
31: <p>
32: <a href=#watching>Watching changes</a>.<br>
33: <a href=#reporting>Reporting security issues</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 34: <a href=#papers>Further Reading</a><br>
1.106 deraadt 35: <p>
1.114 philen 36: </td>
37: <td valign="top">
1.124 deraadt 38: <a href="#27">For 2.7 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.119 deraadt 39: <a href="#26">For 2.6 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.114 philen 40: <a href="#25">For 2.5 security advisories</a>.<br>
41: <a href="#24">For 2.4 security advisories</a>.<br>
42: <a href="#23">For 2.3 security advisories</a>.<br>
43: <a href="#22">For 2.2 security advisories</a>.<br>
44: <a href="#21">For 2.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
45: <a href="#20">For 2.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
46: </td>
47: </tr>
48: </table>
1.56 deraadt 49: <hr>
50:
1.106 deraadt 51: <dl>
52: <a name=goals></a>
1.110 deraadt 53: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Goal</font></h3><p>
1.22 deraadt 54:
1.14 deraadt 55: OpenBSD believes in strong security. Our aspiration is to be NUMBER
1.22 deraadt 56: ONE in the industry for security (if we are not already there). Our
57: open software development model permits us to take a more
58: uncompromising view towards increased security than Sun, SGI, IBM, HP,
59: or other vendors are able to. We can make changes the vendors would
1.27 deraadt 60: not make. Also, since OpenBSD is exported with <a href=crypto.html>
1.45 deraadt 61: cryptography</a>, we are able to take cryptographic approaches towards
62: fixing security problems.<p>
1.18 deraadt 63:
1.106 deraadt 64: <a name=disclosure></a>
1.110 deraadt 65: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Full Disclosure</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 66:
1.45 deraadt 67: Like many readers of the
1.102 deraadt 68: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>
1.18 deraadt 69: BUGTRAQ mailing list</a>,
1.106 deraadt 70: we believe in full disclosure of security problems. In the
71: operating system arena, we were probably the first to embrace
72: the concept. Many vendors, even of free software, still try
73: to hide issues from their users.<p>
74:
75: Security information moves very fast in cracker circles. On the other
76: hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security
77: fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix
78: turnaround is possible. Thus we think that full disclosure helps the
79: people who really care about security.<p>
80:
1.111 aaron 81: <a name=process>
1.110 deraadt 82: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Audit Process</font></h3><p>
1.15 deraadt 83:
1.12 deraadt 84: Our security auditing team typically has between six and twelve
1.45 deraadt 85: members who continue to search for and fix new security holes. We
86: have been auditing since the summer of 1996. The process we follow to
87: increase security is simply a comprehensive file-by-file analysis of
1.106 deraadt 88: every critical software component. We are not so much looking for
89: security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if
90: years later someone discovers a the problem used to be a security
91: issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the
92: better. Flaws have been found in just about every area of the system.
93: Entire new classes of security problems have been found during our
94: audit, and often source code which had been audited earlier needs
95: re-auditing with these new flaws in mind. Code often gets audited
96: multiple times, and by multiple people with different auditing
97: skills.<p>
1.12 deraadt 98:
1.94 deraadt 99: Some members of our security auditing team worked for Secure Networks,
100: the company that made the industry's premier network security scanning
101: software package Ballista (Secure Networks got purchased by Network
102: Associates, Ballista got renamed to Cybercop Scanner, and well...)
103: That company did a lot of security research, and thus fit in well
1.106 deraadt 104: with the OpenBSD stance. OpenBSD passed Ballista's tests with flying
105: colours since day 1.<p>
1.31 deraadt 106:
1.34 deraadt 107: Another facet of our security auditing process is its proactiveness.
1.45 deraadt 108: In most cases we have found that the determination of exploitability
109: is not an issue. During our ongoing auditing process we find many
110: bugs, and endeavor to fix them even though exploitability is not
111: proven. We fix the bug, and we move on to find other bugs to fix. We
112: have fixed many simple and obvious careless programming errors in code
113: and only months later discovered that the problems were in fact
114: exploitable. (Or, more likely someone on
1.102 deraadt 115: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>
1.45 deraadt 116: would report that other operating systems were vulnerable to a `newly
117: discovered problem', and then it would be discovered that OpenBSD had
118: been fixed in a previous release). In other cases we have been saved
119: from full exploitability of complex step-by-step attacks because we
120: had fixed one of the intermediate steps. An example of where we
1.94 deraadt 121: managed such a success is the lpd advisory that Secure Networks put out.
122: <p>
1.29 deraadt 123:
1.110 deraadt 124: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>The Reward</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 125:
1.45 deraadt 126: Our proactive auditing process has really paid off. Statements like
1.35 deraadt 127: ``This problem was fixed in OpenBSD about 6 months ago'' have become
1.45 deraadt 128: commonplace in security forums like
1.102 deraadt 129: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>.<p>
1.35 deraadt 130:
1.45 deraadt 131: The most intense part of our security auditing happened immediately
1.80 espie 132: before the OpenBSD 2.0 release and during the 2.0->2.1 transition,
1.45 deraadt 133: over the last third of 1996 and first half of 1997. Thousands (yes,
134: thousands) of security issues were fixed rapidly over this year-long
135: period; bugs like the standard buffer overflows, protocol
136: implementation weaknesses, information gathering, and filesystem
137: races. Hence most of the security problems that we encountered were
138: fixed before our 2.1 release, and then a far smaller number needed
139: fixing for our 2.2 release. We do not find as many problems anymore,
140: it is simply a case of diminishing returns. Recently the security
141: problems we find and fix tend to be significantly more obscure or
142: complicated. Still we will persist for a number of reasons:<p>
1.36 deraadt 143:
1.35 deraadt 144: <ul>
1.45 deraadt 145: <li>Occasionally we find a simple problem we missed earlier. Doh!
1.35 deraadt 146: <li>Security is like an arms race; the best attackers will continue
1.45 deraadt 147: to search for more complicated exploits, so we will too.
148: <li>Finding and fixing subtle flaws in complicated software is
149: a lot of fun.
1.35 deraadt 150: </ul>
1.106 deraadt 151: <p>
1.15 deraadt 152:
1.14 deraadt 153: The auditing process is not over yet, and as you can see we continue
1.28 deraadt 154: to find and fix new security flaws.<p>
1.12 deraadt 155:
1.106 deraadt 156: <a name=default></a>
1.110 deraadt 157: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>"Secure by Default"</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 158:
159: To ensure that novice users of OpenBSD do not need to become security
160: experts overnight (a viewpoint which other vendors seem to have), we
161: ship the operating system in a Secure by Default mode. All non-essential
162: services are disabled. As the user/administrator becomes more familiar
163: with the system, he will discover that he has to enable daemons and other
164: parts of the system. During the process of learning how to enable a new
165: service, the novice is more likely to learn of security considerations.<p>
166:
167: This is in stark contrast to the increasing number of systems that
168: ship with NFS, mountd, web servers, and various other services enabled
169: by default, creating instantaneous security problems for their users
170: within minutes after their first install.<p>
171:
1.111 aaron 172: <a name=crypto>
1.110 deraadt 173: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Cryptography</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 174:
175: And of course, since the OpenBSD project is based in Canada, it is possible
176: for us to integrate cryptography. For more information, read the page
1.116 deraadt 177: outlining <a href=crypto.html>what we have done with cryptography</a>.</p>
1.106 deraadt 178:
1.110 deraadt 179: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Advisories</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 180:
181: <dl>
182:
183: <li>
1.124 deraadt 184: <a name=27></a>
185:
186: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.7 Security Advisories</font></h3>
187: These are the OpenBSD 2.7 advisories -- all these problems are solved
188: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
189: OpenBSD 2.6 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.7.
190:
191: <p>
192: <ul>
193: <li>No 2.7 security advisories yet.
194: </ul>
195:
196: <p>
197: <li>
1.119 deraadt 198: <a name=26></a>
199:
200: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.6 Security Advisories</font></h3>
201: These are the OpenBSD 2.6 advisories -- all these problems are solved
202: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
203: OpenBSD 2.5 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.6.
204:
205: <p>
206: <ul>
1.125 ! deraadt 207: <li><a href=errata.html#procfs>May 25, 2000:
! 208: xlockmore has a bug which a localhost attacker can use to gain
! 209: access to the encrypted root password hash (which is normally
! 210: encoded using blowfish (see
! 211: <a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=crypt&sektion=3">
! 212: crypt(3)</a>)
! 213: (patch included).</a>
1.123 deraadt 214: <li><a href=errata.html#procfs>Jan 20, 2000:
215: Systems running with procfs enabled and mounted are
216: vulnerable to a very tricky exploit. procfs is not
217: mounted by default.
218: (patch included).</a>
1.119 deraadt 219: <li><a href=errata.html#ifmedia>Nov 9, 1999:
1.125 ! deraadt 220: Any user could change interface media configurations, resulting in
! 221: a localhost denial of service attack.
1.119 deraadt 222: (patch included).</a>
1.120 deraadt 223: <li><a href=errata.html#sslUSA>Dec 2, 1999:
224: A buffer overflow in the RSAREF code included in the
225: USA version of libssl, is possibly exploitable in
226: httpd, ssh, or isakmpd, if SSL/RSA features are enabled.
1.124 deraadt 227: (patch included).<br></a>
228: <strong>Update:</strong> Turns out that this was not exploitable
229: in any of the software included in OpenBSD 2.6.
1.121 deraadt 230: <li><a href=errata.html#sendmail>Dec 4, 1999:
231: Sendmail permitted any user to cause a aliases file wrap,
232: thus exposing the system to a race where the aliases file
233: did not exist.
234: (patch included).</a>
1.119 deraadt 235: </ul>
236:
237: <p>
238: <li>
239:
1.93 deraadt 240: <a name=25></a>
1.106 deraadt 241:
1.110 deraadt 242: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.5 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.93 deraadt 243: These are the OpenBSD 2.5 advisories -- all these problems are solved
244: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
245: OpenBSD 2.4 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.5.
246:
1.96 deraadt 247: <p>
1.104 deraadt 248: <ul>
1.117 deraadt 249: <li><a href=errata25.html#cron>Aug 30, 1999:
1.103 deraadt 250: In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the
251: fake popen() and run sendmail as the user, not as root.
252: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 253: <li><a href=errata25.html#miscfs>Aug 12, 1999: The procfs and fdescfs
1.101 deraadt 254: filesystems had an overrun in their handling of uio_offset
255: in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
256: enabled by default). (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 257: <li><a href=errata25.html#profil>Aug 9, 1999: Stop profiling (see profil(2))
1.100 deraadt 258: when we execve() a new process. (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 259: <li><a href=errata25.html#ipsec_in_use>Aug 6, 1999: Packets that should have
1.98 deraadt 260: been handled by IPsec may be transmitted as cleartext.
261: PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
262: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 263: <li><a href=errata25.html#rc>Aug 5, 1999: In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for
1.97 deraadt 264: motd re-writing and change the find(1) to use -execdir
265: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 266: <li><a href=errata25.html#chflags>Jul 30, 1999: Do not permit regular
1.95 deraadt 267: users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or block devices
268: which they may currently be the owner of (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 269: <li><a href=errata25.html#nroff>Jul 27, 1999: Cause groff(1) to be invoked
1.95 deraadt 270: with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1) (patch included).</a>
1.93 deraadt 271: </ul>
272:
1.106 deraadt 273: <p>
274: <li>
1.75 deraadt 275: <a name=24></a>
1.110 deraadt 276: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.4 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.75 deraadt 277: These are the OpenBSD 2.4 advisories -- all these problems are solved
278: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
279: OpenBSD 2.3 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.4.
280:
1.96 deraadt 281: <p>
1.75 deraadt 282: <ul>
1.92 deraadt 283: <li><a href=errata24.html#poll>Mar 22, 1999: The nfds argument for poll(2) needs
1.91 deraadt 284: to be constrained, to avoid kvm starvation (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 285: <li><a href=errata24.html#tss>Mar 21, 1999: A change in TSS handling stops
1.91 deraadt 286: another kernel crash case caused by the <strong>crashme</strong>
287: program (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 288: <li><a href=errata24.html#nlink>Feb 25, 1999: An unbounded increment on the
1.90 deraadt 289: nlink value in FFS and EXT2FS filesystems can cause a system crash.
1.89 deraadt 290: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 291: <li><a href=errata24.html#ping>Feb 23, 1999: Yet another buffer overflow
1.88 deraadt 292: existed in ping(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 293: <li><a href=errata24.html#ipqrace>Feb 19, 1999: ipintr() had a race in use of
1.87 deraadt 294: the ipq, which could permit an attacker to cause a crash.
295: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 296: <li><a href=errata24.html#accept>Feb 17, 1999: A race condition in the
1.86 deraadt 297: kernel between accept(2) and select(2) could permit an attacker
298: to hang sockets from remote.
299: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 300: <li><a href=errata24.html#maxqueue>Feb 17, 1999: IP fragment assembly can
1.85 deraadt 301: bog the machine excessively and cause problems.
302: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 303: <li><a href=errata24.html#trctrap>Feb 12, 1999: i386 T_TRCTRAP handling and
1.84 deraadt 304: DDB interacted to possibly cause a crash.
305: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 306: <li><a href=errata24.html#rst>Feb 11, 1999: TCP/IP RST handling was sloppy.
1.83 deraadt 307: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 308: <li><a href=errata24.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
1.81 deraadt 309: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 310: <li><a href=errata24.html#termcap>Nov 19, 1998: There is a possibly locally
1.82 deraadt 311: exploitable problem relating to environment variables in termcap
312: and curses. (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 313: <li><a href=errata24.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
1.78 deraadt 314: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.75 deraadt 315: </ul>
316:
1.106 deraadt 317: <p>
318: <li>
1.58 deraadt 319: <a name=23></a>
1.110 deraadt 320: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.3 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.73 deraadt 321: These are the OpenBSD 2.3 advisories -- all these problems are solved
322: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
323: OpenBSD 2.2 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.3.
1.53 matthieu 324:
1.96 deraadt 325: <p>
1.53 matthieu 326: <ul>
1.81 deraadt 327: <li><a href=errata23.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
328: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.78 deraadt 329: <li><a href=errata23.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
330: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 331: <li><a href=errata23.html#fdalloc>Jul 2, 1998: setuid and setgid processes
1.72 deraadt 332: should not be executed with fd slots 0, 1, or 2 free.
333: (patch included).</a>
1.79 deraadt 334: <li><a href=errata23.html#resolver>August 31, 1998: A benign looking resolver buffer overflow bug was re-introduced accidentally (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 335: <li><a href=errata23.html#xlib>June 6, 1998: Further problems with the X
1.71 deraadt 336: libraries (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 337: <li><a href=errata23.html#pctr>June 4, 1998: on non-Intel i386 machines, any user
1.72 deraadt 338: can use pctr(4) to crash the machine.</a>
1.76 aaron 339: <li><a href=errata23.html#kill>May 17, 1998: kill(2) of setuid/setgid target
1.66 deraadt 340: processes too permissive (4th revision patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 341: <li><a href=errata23.html#immutable>May 11, 1998: mmap() permits partial bypassing
1.60 deraadt 342: of immutable and append-only file flags. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 343: <li><a href=errata23.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm and Xaw
1.58 deraadt 344: (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 345: <li><a href=errata23.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC packets
1.59 deraadt 346: if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
1.53 matthieu 347: </ul>
1.9 deraadt 348:
1.106 deraadt 349: <p>
350: <li>
1.58 deraadt 351: <a name=22></a>
1.110 deraadt 352: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.2 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.45 deraadt 353: These are the OpenBSD 2.2 advisories. All these problems are solved
1.55 deraadt 354: in <a href=23.html>OpenBSD 2.3</a>. Some of these problems
1.45 deraadt 355: still exist in other operating systems. (The supplied patches are for
356: OpenBSD 2.2; they may or may not work on OpenBSD 2.1).
1.9 deraadt 357:
1.96 deraadt 358: <p>
1.9 deraadt 359: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 360: <li><a href=errata22.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC
361: packets if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
362: <li><a href=errata22.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm
363: and Xaw (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
364: <li><a href=errata22.html#uucpd>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer overflow in uucpd
365: (patch included).</a>
366: <li><a href=errata22.html#rmjob>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer mismanagement in lprm
367: (patch included).</a>
368: <li><a href=errata22.html#ping>Mar 31, 1998: Overflow in ping -R (patch included).</a>
369: <li><a href=errata22.html#named>Mar 30, 1998: Overflow in named fake-iquery
1.59 deraadt 370: (patch included).</a>
1.72 deraadt 371: <li><a href=errata22.html#mountd>Mar 2, 1998: Accidental NFS filesystem
372: export (patch included).</a>
1.112 philen 373: <li><a href="advisories/mmap.txt">Feb 26, 1998: Read-write mmap() flaw.</a>
1.72 deraadt 374: Revision 3 of the patch is available <a href=errata22.html#mmap>here</a>
1.112 philen 375: <li><a href="advisories/sourceroute.txt">Feb 19, 1998: Sourcerouted Packet
1.59 deraadt 376: Acceptance.</a>
1.50 deraadt 377: A patch is available <a href=errata22.html#sourceroute>here</a>.
1.122 rohee 378: <li><a href=errata22.html#ruserok>Feb 13, 1998: Setuid coredump & Ruserok()
1.72 deraadt 379: flaw (patch included).</a>
380: <li><a href=errata22.html#ldso>Feb 9, 1998: MIPS ld.so flaw (patch included).</a>
381: <li><a href=errata22.html#f00f>Dec 10, 1997: Intel P5 f00f lockup
1.59 deraadt 382: (patch included).</a>
1.1 deraadt 383: </ul>
384:
1.106 deraadt 385: <p>
386: <li>
1.58 deraadt 387: <a name=21></a>
1.110 deraadt 388: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.1 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.52 deraadt 389: These are the OpenBSD 2.1 advisories. All these problems are solved
390: in <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>. Some of these problems still
391: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.1, we
392: would strongly recommend an upgrade to the newest release, as this
393: patch list only attempts at fixing the most important security
394: problems. In particular, OpenBSD 2.2 fixes numerous localhost
395: security problems. Many of those problems were solved in ways which
396: make it hard for us to provide patches).
397:
1.96 deraadt 398: <p>
1.52 deraadt 399: <ul>
1.112 philen 400: <li><a href="advisories/signals.txt">Sep 15, 1997: Deviant Signals (patch included)</a>
401: <li><a href="advisories/rfork.txt">Aug 2, 1997: Rfork() system call flaw
1.59 deraadt 402: (patch included)</a>
1.112 philen 403: <li><a href="advisories/procfs.txt">Jun 24, 1997: Procfs flaws (patch included)</a>
1.52 deraadt 404: </ul>
1.51 deraadt 405:
1.106 deraadt 406: <p>
407: <li>
408: <a name=20></a>
1.110 deraadt 409: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.99 deraadt 410: These are the OpenBSD 2.0 advisories. All these problems are solved
411: in <a href=21.html>OpenBSD 2.1</a>. Some of these problems still
412: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.0, we
413: commend you for being there back in the old days!, but you're really
414: missing out if you don't install a new version!)
415:
416: <p>
417: <ul>
1.112 philen 418: <li><a href="advisories/res_random.txt">April 22, 1997: Predictable IDs in the
1.99 deraadt 419: resolver (patch included)</a>
420: <li>Many others... if people can hunt them down, please let me know
421: and we'll put them up here.
422: </ul>
423:
1.106 deraadt 424: </dl>
1.51 deraadt 425: <p>
1.106 deraadt 426:
427: <a name=watching></a>
1.110 deraadt 428: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Watching our Changes</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 429:
1.21 deraadt 430: Since we take a proactive stance with security, we are continually
431: finding and fixing new security problems. Not all of these problems
1.80 espie 432: get widely reported because (as stated earlier) many of them are not
1.45 deraadt 433: confirmed to be exploitable; many simple bugs we fix do turn out to
434: have security consequences we could not predict. We do not have the
435: time resources to make these changes available in the above format.<p>
1.21 deraadt 436:
437: Thus there are usually minor security fixes in the current source code
438: beyond the previous major OpenBSD release. We make a limited
1.45 deraadt 439: guarantee that these problems are of minimal impact and unproven
1.44 ian 440: exploitability. If we discover that a problem definitely matters for
1.45 deraadt 441: security, patches will show up here <strong>VERY</strong> quickly.<p>
1.21 deraadt 442:
1.45 deraadt 443: People who are really concerned with security can do a number of
444: things:<p>
1.21 deraadt 445:
446: <ul>
447: <li>If you understand security issues, watch our
1.27 deraadt 448: <a href=mail.html>source-changes mailing list</a> and keep an
1.23 deraadt 449: eye out for things which appear security related. Since
1.21 deraadt 450: exploitability is not proven for many of the fixes we make,
451: do not expect the relevant commit message to say "SECURITY FIX!".
452: If a problem is proven and serious, a patch will be available
453: here very shortly after.
454: <li>Track our current source code tree, and teach yourself how to do a
1.29 deraadt 455: complete system build from time to time (read /usr/src/Makefile
456: carefully). Users can make the assumption that the current
457: source tree always has stronger security than the previous release.
1.45 deraadt 458: However, building your own system from source code is not trivial;
459: it is nearly 300MB of source code, and problems do occur as we
460: transition between major releases.
1.115 ericj 461: <li>Install a binary snapshot for your
1.80 espie 462: architecture, which are made available fairly often. For
1.29 deraadt 463: instance, an i386 snapshot is typically made available weekly.
1.21 deraadt 464: </ul>
465:
1.9 deraadt 466: <p>
1.111 aaron 467: <a name=reporting>
1.110 deraadt 468: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Reporting problems</font></h3><p>
1.3 deraadt 469:
1.5 deraadt 470: <p> If you find a new security problem, you can mail it to
1.6 deraadt 471: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>deraadt@openbsd.org</a>.
1.7 deraadt 472: <br>
1.5 deraadt 473: If you wish to PGP encode it (but please only do so if privacy is very
1.112 philen 474: urgent, since it is inconvenient) use this <a href="advisories/pgpkey.txt">pgp key</a>.
1.5 deraadt 475:
1.107 deraadt 476: <p>
477: <a name=papers></a>
1.110 deraadt 478: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Further Reading</font></h3><p>
1.107 deraadt 479:
480: A number of papers have been written by OpenBSD team members, about security
481: related changes they have done in OpenBSD. The postscript versions of these
1.108 deraadt 482: documents are available as follows.<p>
1.107 deraadt 483:
484: <ul>
1.113 deraadt 485: <li>A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme.<br>
1.118 deraadt 486: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 487: by <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos<a/>,
488: <a href=mailto:dm@openbsd.org>David Mazieres</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 489: <a href=papers/bcrypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
490: <a href=papers/bcrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 491: <p>
492: <li>Cryptography in OpenBSD: An Overview.<br>
1.118 deraadt 493: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 494: by <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>,
495: <a href=mailto:niklas@openbsd.org>Niklas Hallqvist</a>,
496: <a href=mailto:art@openbsd.org>Artur Grabowski</a>,
497: <a href=mailto:angelos@openbsd.org>Angelos D. Keromytis</a>,
498: <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 499: <a href=papers/crypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
500: <a href=papers/crypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 501: <p>
502: <li>strlcpy and strlcat -- consistent, safe, string copy and concatenation.<br>
1.118 deraadt 503: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 504: by <a href=mailto:millert@openbsd.org>Todd C. Miller</a>,
505: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>.<br>
1.109 deraadt 506: <a href=papers/strlcpy-paper.ps>paper</a> and
507: <a href=papers/strlcpy-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 508: <p>
1.118 deraadt 509: <li>Dealing with Public Ethernet Jacks-Switches, Gateways, and Authentication.<br>
510: <a href=events.html#lisa99>LISA 1999</a>,
511: by <a href=mailto:beck@openbsd.org>Bob Beck</a>.<br>
512: <a href=papers/authgw-paper.ps>paper</a> and
513: <a href=papers/authgw-slides.ps>slides</a>.
514: <p>
1.107 deraadt 515: </ul>
516:
1.106 deraadt 517: </dl>
518:
1.2 deraadt 519: <hr>
1.68 pauls 520: <a href=index.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.24 deraadt 521: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
522: <br>
1.125 ! deraadt 523: <small>$OpenBSD: security.html,v 1.124 2000/05/23 20:58:20 deraadt Exp $</small>
1.1 deraadt 524:
1.24 deraadt 525: </body>
526: </html>
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