Annotation of www/security.html, Revision 1.131
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1.20 deraadt 4: <title>OpenBSD Security</title>
1.1 deraadt 5: <link rev=made href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>
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7: <meta name="description" content="OpenBSD advisories">
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1.77 deraadt 14: <img alt="[OpenBSD]" height=30 width=141 SRC="images/smalltitle.gif">
1.106 deraadt 15: <p>
1.110 deraadt 16: <h2><font color=#e00000>Security</font><hr></h2>
1.1 deraadt 17:
1.114 philen 18: <table width="100%">
19: <tr>
20: <td colspan="2">
21: <strong>Index</strong>
22: </td>
23: </tr>
24: <tr>
25: <td valign="top">
1.106 deraadt 26: <a href=#goals>Security goals of the Project</a>.<br>
27: <a href=#disclosure>Full Disclosure policy</a>.<br>
28: <a href=#process>Source code auditing process</a>.<br>
1.111 aaron 29: <a href=#default>"Secure by Default"</a>.<br>
1.106 deraadt 30: <a href=#crypto>Use of Cryptography</a>.<br>
31: <p>
32: <a href=#watching>Watching changes</a>.<br>
33: <a href=#reporting>Reporting security issues</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 34: <a href=#papers>Further Reading</a><br>
1.106 deraadt 35: <p>
1.114 philen 36: </td>
37: <td valign="top">
1.124 deraadt 38: <a href="#27">For 2.7 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.119 deraadt 39: <a href="#26">For 2.6 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.114 philen 40: <a href="#25">For 2.5 security advisories</a>.<br>
41: <a href="#24">For 2.4 security advisories</a>.<br>
42: <a href="#23">For 2.3 security advisories</a>.<br>
43: <a href="#22">For 2.2 security advisories</a>.<br>
44: <a href="#21">For 2.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
45: <a href="#20">For 2.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
46: </td>
47: </tr>
48: </table>
1.56 deraadt 49: <hr>
50:
1.106 deraadt 51: <dl>
52: <a name=goals></a>
1.110 deraadt 53: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Goal</font></h3><p>
1.22 deraadt 54:
1.14 deraadt 55: OpenBSD believes in strong security. Our aspiration is to be NUMBER
1.22 deraadt 56: ONE in the industry for security (if we are not already there). Our
57: open software development model permits us to take a more
58: uncompromising view towards increased security than Sun, SGI, IBM, HP,
59: or other vendors are able to. We can make changes the vendors would
1.27 deraadt 60: not make. Also, since OpenBSD is exported with <a href=crypto.html>
1.45 deraadt 61: cryptography</a>, we are able to take cryptographic approaches towards
62: fixing security problems.<p>
1.18 deraadt 63:
1.106 deraadt 64: <a name=disclosure></a>
1.110 deraadt 65: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Full Disclosure</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 66:
1.45 deraadt 67: Like many readers of the
1.102 deraadt 68: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>
1.18 deraadt 69: BUGTRAQ mailing list</a>,
1.106 deraadt 70: we believe in full disclosure of security problems. In the
71: operating system arena, we were probably the first to embrace
72: the concept. Many vendors, even of free software, still try
73: to hide issues from their users.<p>
74:
75: Security information moves very fast in cracker circles. On the other
76: hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security
77: fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix
78: turnaround is possible. Thus we think that full disclosure helps the
79: people who really care about security.<p>
80:
1.111 aaron 81: <a name=process>
1.110 deraadt 82: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Audit Process</font></h3><p>
1.15 deraadt 83:
1.12 deraadt 84: Our security auditing team typically has between six and twelve
1.45 deraadt 85: members who continue to search for and fix new security holes. We
86: have been auditing since the summer of 1996. The process we follow to
87: increase security is simply a comprehensive file-by-file analysis of
1.106 deraadt 88: every critical software component. We are not so much looking for
89: security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if
90: years later someone discovers a the problem used to be a security
91: issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the
92: better. Flaws have been found in just about every area of the system.
93: Entire new classes of security problems have been found during our
94: audit, and often source code which had been audited earlier needs
95: re-auditing with these new flaws in mind. Code often gets audited
96: multiple times, and by multiple people with different auditing
97: skills.<p>
1.12 deraadt 98:
1.94 deraadt 99: Some members of our security auditing team worked for Secure Networks,
100: the company that made the industry's premier network security scanning
101: software package Ballista (Secure Networks got purchased by Network
102: Associates, Ballista got renamed to Cybercop Scanner, and well...)
103: That company did a lot of security research, and thus fit in well
1.106 deraadt 104: with the OpenBSD stance. OpenBSD passed Ballista's tests with flying
105: colours since day 1.<p>
1.31 deraadt 106:
1.34 deraadt 107: Another facet of our security auditing process is its proactiveness.
1.45 deraadt 108: In most cases we have found that the determination of exploitability
109: is not an issue. During our ongoing auditing process we find many
110: bugs, and endeavor to fix them even though exploitability is not
111: proven. We fix the bug, and we move on to find other bugs to fix. We
112: have fixed many simple and obvious careless programming errors in code
113: and only months later discovered that the problems were in fact
114: exploitable. (Or, more likely someone on
1.102 deraadt 115: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>
1.45 deraadt 116: would report that other operating systems were vulnerable to a `newly
117: discovered problem', and then it would be discovered that OpenBSD had
118: been fixed in a previous release). In other cases we have been saved
119: from full exploitability of complex step-by-step attacks because we
120: had fixed one of the intermediate steps. An example of where we
1.94 deraadt 121: managed such a success is the lpd advisory that Secure Networks put out.
122: <p>
1.29 deraadt 123:
1.110 deraadt 124: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>The Reward</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 125:
1.45 deraadt 126: Our proactive auditing process has really paid off. Statements like
1.35 deraadt 127: ``This problem was fixed in OpenBSD about 6 months ago'' have become
1.45 deraadt 128: commonplace in security forums like
1.102 deraadt 129: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>.<p>
1.35 deraadt 130:
1.45 deraadt 131: The most intense part of our security auditing happened immediately
1.80 espie 132: before the OpenBSD 2.0 release and during the 2.0->2.1 transition,
1.45 deraadt 133: over the last third of 1996 and first half of 1997. Thousands (yes,
134: thousands) of security issues were fixed rapidly over this year-long
135: period; bugs like the standard buffer overflows, protocol
136: implementation weaknesses, information gathering, and filesystem
137: races. Hence most of the security problems that we encountered were
138: fixed before our 2.1 release, and then a far smaller number needed
139: fixing for our 2.2 release. We do not find as many problems anymore,
140: it is simply a case of diminishing returns. Recently the security
141: problems we find and fix tend to be significantly more obscure or
142: complicated. Still we will persist for a number of reasons:<p>
1.36 deraadt 143:
1.35 deraadt 144: <ul>
1.45 deraadt 145: <li>Occasionally we find a simple problem we missed earlier. Doh!
1.35 deraadt 146: <li>Security is like an arms race; the best attackers will continue
1.45 deraadt 147: to search for more complicated exploits, so we will too.
148: <li>Finding and fixing subtle flaws in complicated software is
149: a lot of fun.
1.35 deraadt 150: </ul>
1.106 deraadt 151: <p>
1.15 deraadt 152:
1.14 deraadt 153: The auditing process is not over yet, and as you can see we continue
1.28 deraadt 154: to find and fix new security flaws.<p>
1.12 deraadt 155:
1.106 deraadt 156: <a name=default></a>
1.110 deraadt 157: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>"Secure by Default"</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 158:
159: To ensure that novice users of OpenBSD do not need to become security
160: experts overnight (a viewpoint which other vendors seem to have), we
161: ship the operating system in a Secure by Default mode. All non-essential
162: services are disabled. As the user/administrator becomes more familiar
163: with the system, he will discover that he has to enable daemons and other
164: parts of the system. During the process of learning how to enable a new
165: service, the novice is more likely to learn of security considerations.<p>
166:
167: This is in stark contrast to the increasing number of systems that
168: ship with NFS, mountd, web servers, and various other services enabled
169: by default, creating instantaneous security problems for their users
170: within minutes after their first install.<p>
171:
1.111 aaron 172: <a name=crypto>
1.110 deraadt 173: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Cryptography</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 174:
175: And of course, since the OpenBSD project is based in Canada, it is possible
176: for us to integrate cryptography. For more information, read the page
1.116 deraadt 177: outlining <a href=crypto.html>what we have done with cryptography</a>.</p>
1.106 deraadt 178:
1.110 deraadt 179: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Advisories</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 180:
181: <dl>
182:
183: <li>
1.124 deraadt 184: <a name=27></a>
185:
186: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.7 Security Advisories</font></h3>
187: These are the OpenBSD 2.7 advisories -- all these problems are solved
188: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
189: OpenBSD 2.6 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.7.
190:
191: <p>
192: <ul>
1.128 deraadt 193: <li><a href=errata.html#bridge>May 26, 2000:
1.129 deraadt 194: The bridge(4) <i>learning</i> flag may be bypassed.
1.128 deraadt 195: (patch included)</a>
196:
1.127 kjell 197: <li><a href=errata.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
198: Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
199: in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
200:
1.124 deraadt 201: </ul>
202:
203: <p>
204: <li>
1.119 deraadt 205: <a name=26></a>
206:
207: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.6 Security Advisories</font></h3>
208: These are the OpenBSD 2.6 advisories -- all these problems are solved
209: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
210: OpenBSD 2.5 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.6.
211:
212: <p>
213: <ul>
1.130 deraadt 214: <li><a href=errata26.html#semconfig>May 26, 2000:
215: SYSV semaphore support contained an undocumented system call
1.131 ! deraadt 216: which could wedge semaphore-using processes from exiting. (patch included)</a>
1.127 kjell 217: <li><a href=errata26.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
218: Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
219: in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
1.126 deraadt 220: <li><a href=errata26.html#xlockmore>May 25, 2000:
1.125 deraadt 221: xlockmore has a bug which a localhost attacker can use to gain
222: access to the encrypted root password hash (which is normally
223: encoded using blowfish (see
224: <a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=crypt&sektion=3">
225: crypt(3)</a>)
226: (patch included).</a>
1.126 deraadt 227: <li><a href=errata26.html#procfs>Jan 20, 2000:
1.123 deraadt 228: Systems running with procfs enabled and mounted are
229: vulnerable to a very tricky exploit. procfs is not
230: mounted by default.
231: (patch included).</a>
1.126 deraadt 232: <li><a href=errata26.html#ifmedia>Nov 9, 1999:
1.125 deraadt 233: Any user could change interface media configurations, resulting in
234: a localhost denial of service attack.
1.119 deraadt 235: (patch included).</a>
1.126 deraadt 236: <li><a href=errata26.html#sslUSA>Dec 2, 1999:
1.120 deraadt 237: A buffer overflow in the RSAREF code included in the
238: USA version of libssl, is possibly exploitable in
239: httpd, ssh, or isakmpd, if SSL/RSA features are enabled.
1.124 deraadt 240: (patch included).<br></a>
241: <strong>Update:</strong> Turns out that this was not exploitable
242: in any of the software included in OpenBSD 2.6.
1.126 deraadt 243: <li><a href=errata26.html#sendmail>Dec 4, 1999:
1.121 deraadt 244: Sendmail permitted any user to cause a aliases file wrap,
245: thus exposing the system to a race where the aliases file
246: did not exist.
247: (patch included).</a>
1.119 deraadt 248: </ul>
249:
250: <p>
251: <li>
252:
1.93 deraadt 253: <a name=25></a>
1.106 deraadt 254:
1.110 deraadt 255: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.5 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.93 deraadt 256: These are the OpenBSD 2.5 advisories -- all these problems are solved
257: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
258: OpenBSD 2.4 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.5.
259:
1.96 deraadt 260: <p>
1.104 deraadt 261: <ul>
1.117 deraadt 262: <li><a href=errata25.html#cron>Aug 30, 1999:
1.103 deraadt 263: In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the
264: fake popen() and run sendmail as the user, not as root.
265: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 266: <li><a href=errata25.html#miscfs>Aug 12, 1999: The procfs and fdescfs
1.101 deraadt 267: filesystems had an overrun in their handling of uio_offset
268: in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
269: enabled by default). (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 270: <li><a href=errata25.html#profil>Aug 9, 1999: Stop profiling (see profil(2))
1.100 deraadt 271: when we execve() a new process. (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 272: <li><a href=errata25.html#ipsec_in_use>Aug 6, 1999: Packets that should have
1.98 deraadt 273: been handled by IPsec may be transmitted as cleartext.
274: PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
275: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 276: <li><a href=errata25.html#rc>Aug 5, 1999: In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for
1.97 deraadt 277: motd re-writing and change the find(1) to use -execdir
278: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 279: <li><a href=errata25.html#chflags>Jul 30, 1999: Do not permit regular
1.95 deraadt 280: users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or block devices
281: which they may currently be the owner of (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 282: <li><a href=errata25.html#nroff>Jul 27, 1999: Cause groff(1) to be invoked
1.95 deraadt 283: with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1) (patch included).</a>
1.93 deraadt 284: </ul>
285:
1.106 deraadt 286: <p>
287: <li>
1.75 deraadt 288: <a name=24></a>
1.110 deraadt 289: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.4 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.75 deraadt 290: These are the OpenBSD 2.4 advisories -- all these problems are solved
291: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
292: OpenBSD 2.3 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.4.
293:
1.96 deraadt 294: <p>
1.75 deraadt 295: <ul>
1.92 deraadt 296: <li><a href=errata24.html#poll>Mar 22, 1999: The nfds argument for poll(2) needs
1.91 deraadt 297: to be constrained, to avoid kvm starvation (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 298: <li><a href=errata24.html#tss>Mar 21, 1999: A change in TSS handling stops
1.91 deraadt 299: another kernel crash case caused by the <strong>crashme</strong>
300: program (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 301: <li><a href=errata24.html#nlink>Feb 25, 1999: An unbounded increment on the
1.90 deraadt 302: nlink value in FFS and EXT2FS filesystems can cause a system crash.
1.89 deraadt 303: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 304: <li><a href=errata24.html#ping>Feb 23, 1999: Yet another buffer overflow
1.88 deraadt 305: existed in ping(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 306: <li><a href=errata24.html#ipqrace>Feb 19, 1999: ipintr() had a race in use of
1.87 deraadt 307: the ipq, which could permit an attacker to cause a crash.
308: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 309: <li><a href=errata24.html#accept>Feb 17, 1999: A race condition in the
1.86 deraadt 310: kernel between accept(2) and select(2) could permit an attacker
311: to hang sockets from remote.
312: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 313: <li><a href=errata24.html#maxqueue>Feb 17, 1999: IP fragment assembly can
1.85 deraadt 314: bog the machine excessively and cause problems.
315: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 316: <li><a href=errata24.html#trctrap>Feb 12, 1999: i386 T_TRCTRAP handling and
1.84 deraadt 317: DDB interacted to possibly cause a crash.
318: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 319: <li><a href=errata24.html#rst>Feb 11, 1999: TCP/IP RST handling was sloppy.
1.83 deraadt 320: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 321: <li><a href=errata24.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
1.81 deraadt 322: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 323: <li><a href=errata24.html#termcap>Nov 19, 1998: There is a possibly locally
1.82 deraadt 324: exploitable problem relating to environment variables in termcap
325: and curses. (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 326: <li><a href=errata24.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
1.78 deraadt 327: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.75 deraadt 328: </ul>
329:
1.106 deraadt 330: <p>
331: <li>
1.58 deraadt 332: <a name=23></a>
1.110 deraadt 333: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.3 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.73 deraadt 334: These are the OpenBSD 2.3 advisories -- all these problems are solved
335: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
336: OpenBSD 2.2 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.3.
1.53 matthieu 337:
1.96 deraadt 338: <p>
1.53 matthieu 339: <ul>
1.81 deraadt 340: <li><a href=errata23.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
341: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.78 deraadt 342: <li><a href=errata23.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
343: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 344: <li><a href=errata23.html#fdalloc>Jul 2, 1998: setuid and setgid processes
1.72 deraadt 345: should not be executed with fd slots 0, 1, or 2 free.
346: (patch included).</a>
1.79 deraadt 347: <li><a href=errata23.html#resolver>August 31, 1998: A benign looking resolver buffer overflow bug was re-introduced accidentally (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 348: <li><a href=errata23.html#xlib>June 6, 1998: Further problems with the X
1.71 deraadt 349: libraries (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 350: <li><a href=errata23.html#pctr>June 4, 1998: on non-Intel i386 machines, any user
1.72 deraadt 351: can use pctr(4) to crash the machine.</a>
1.76 aaron 352: <li><a href=errata23.html#kill>May 17, 1998: kill(2) of setuid/setgid target
1.66 deraadt 353: processes too permissive (4th revision patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 354: <li><a href=errata23.html#immutable>May 11, 1998: mmap() permits partial bypassing
1.60 deraadt 355: of immutable and append-only file flags. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 356: <li><a href=errata23.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm and Xaw
1.58 deraadt 357: (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 358: <li><a href=errata23.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC packets
1.59 deraadt 359: if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
1.53 matthieu 360: </ul>
1.9 deraadt 361:
1.106 deraadt 362: <p>
363: <li>
1.58 deraadt 364: <a name=22></a>
1.110 deraadt 365: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.2 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.45 deraadt 366: These are the OpenBSD 2.2 advisories. All these problems are solved
1.55 deraadt 367: in <a href=23.html>OpenBSD 2.3</a>. Some of these problems
1.45 deraadt 368: still exist in other operating systems. (The supplied patches are for
369: OpenBSD 2.2; they may or may not work on OpenBSD 2.1).
1.9 deraadt 370:
1.96 deraadt 371: <p>
1.9 deraadt 372: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 373: <li><a href=errata22.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC
374: packets if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
375: <li><a href=errata22.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm
376: and Xaw (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
377: <li><a href=errata22.html#uucpd>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer overflow in uucpd
378: (patch included).</a>
379: <li><a href=errata22.html#rmjob>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer mismanagement in lprm
380: (patch included).</a>
381: <li><a href=errata22.html#ping>Mar 31, 1998: Overflow in ping -R (patch included).</a>
382: <li><a href=errata22.html#named>Mar 30, 1998: Overflow in named fake-iquery
1.59 deraadt 383: (patch included).</a>
1.72 deraadt 384: <li><a href=errata22.html#mountd>Mar 2, 1998: Accidental NFS filesystem
385: export (patch included).</a>
1.112 philen 386: <li><a href="advisories/mmap.txt">Feb 26, 1998: Read-write mmap() flaw.</a>
1.72 deraadt 387: Revision 3 of the patch is available <a href=errata22.html#mmap>here</a>
1.112 philen 388: <li><a href="advisories/sourceroute.txt">Feb 19, 1998: Sourcerouted Packet
1.59 deraadt 389: Acceptance.</a>
1.50 deraadt 390: A patch is available <a href=errata22.html#sourceroute>here</a>.
1.122 rohee 391: <li><a href=errata22.html#ruserok>Feb 13, 1998: Setuid coredump & Ruserok()
1.72 deraadt 392: flaw (patch included).</a>
393: <li><a href=errata22.html#ldso>Feb 9, 1998: MIPS ld.so flaw (patch included).</a>
394: <li><a href=errata22.html#f00f>Dec 10, 1997: Intel P5 f00f lockup
1.59 deraadt 395: (patch included).</a>
1.1 deraadt 396: </ul>
397:
1.106 deraadt 398: <p>
399: <li>
1.58 deraadt 400: <a name=21></a>
1.110 deraadt 401: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.1 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.52 deraadt 402: These are the OpenBSD 2.1 advisories. All these problems are solved
403: in <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>. Some of these problems still
404: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.1, we
405: would strongly recommend an upgrade to the newest release, as this
406: patch list only attempts at fixing the most important security
407: problems. In particular, OpenBSD 2.2 fixes numerous localhost
408: security problems. Many of those problems were solved in ways which
409: make it hard for us to provide patches).
410:
1.96 deraadt 411: <p>
1.52 deraadt 412: <ul>
1.112 philen 413: <li><a href="advisories/signals.txt">Sep 15, 1997: Deviant Signals (patch included)</a>
414: <li><a href="advisories/rfork.txt">Aug 2, 1997: Rfork() system call flaw
1.59 deraadt 415: (patch included)</a>
1.112 philen 416: <li><a href="advisories/procfs.txt">Jun 24, 1997: Procfs flaws (patch included)</a>
1.52 deraadt 417: </ul>
1.51 deraadt 418:
1.106 deraadt 419: <p>
420: <li>
421: <a name=20></a>
1.110 deraadt 422: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.99 deraadt 423: These are the OpenBSD 2.0 advisories. All these problems are solved
424: in <a href=21.html>OpenBSD 2.1</a>. Some of these problems still
425: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.0, we
426: commend you for being there back in the old days!, but you're really
427: missing out if you don't install a new version!)
428:
429: <p>
430: <ul>
1.112 philen 431: <li><a href="advisories/res_random.txt">April 22, 1997: Predictable IDs in the
1.99 deraadt 432: resolver (patch included)</a>
433: <li>Many others... if people can hunt them down, please let me know
434: and we'll put them up here.
435: </ul>
436:
1.106 deraadt 437: </dl>
1.51 deraadt 438: <p>
1.106 deraadt 439:
440: <a name=watching></a>
1.110 deraadt 441: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Watching our Changes</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 442:
1.21 deraadt 443: Since we take a proactive stance with security, we are continually
444: finding and fixing new security problems. Not all of these problems
1.80 espie 445: get widely reported because (as stated earlier) many of them are not
1.45 deraadt 446: confirmed to be exploitable; many simple bugs we fix do turn out to
447: have security consequences we could not predict. We do not have the
448: time resources to make these changes available in the above format.<p>
1.21 deraadt 449:
450: Thus there are usually minor security fixes in the current source code
451: beyond the previous major OpenBSD release. We make a limited
1.45 deraadt 452: guarantee that these problems are of minimal impact and unproven
1.44 ian 453: exploitability. If we discover that a problem definitely matters for
1.45 deraadt 454: security, patches will show up here <strong>VERY</strong> quickly.<p>
1.21 deraadt 455:
1.45 deraadt 456: People who are really concerned with security can do a number of
457: things:<p>
1.21 deraadt 458:
459: <ul>
460: <li>If you understand security issues, watch our
1.27 deraadt 461: <a href=mail.html>source-changes mailing list</a> and keep an
1.23 deraadt 462: eye out for things which appear security related. Since
1.21 deraadt 463: exploitability is not proven for many of the fixes we make,
464: do not expect the relevant commit message to say "SECURITY FIX!".
465: If a problem is proven and serious, a patch will be available
466: here very shortly after.
467: <li>Track our current source code tree, and teach yourself how to do a
1.29 deraadt 468: complete system build from time to time (read /usr/src/Makefile
469: carefully). Users can make the assumption that the current
470: source tree always has stronger security than the previous release.
1.45 deraadt 471: However, building your own system from source code is not trivial;
472: it is nearly 300MB of source code, and problems do occur as we
473: transition between major releases.
1.115 ericj 474: <li>Install a binary snapshot for your
1.80 espie 475: architecture, which are made available fairly often. For
1.29 deraadt 476: instance, an i386 snapshot is typically made available weekly.
1.21 deraadt 477: </ul>
478:
1.9 deraadt 479: <p>
1.111 aaron 480: <a name=reporting>
1.110 deraadt 481: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Reporting problems</font></h3><p>
1.3 deraadt 482:
1.5 deraadt 483: <p> If you find a new security problem, you can mail it to
1.6 deraadt 484: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>deraadt@openbsd.org</a>.
1.7 deraadt 485: <br>
1.5 deraadt 486: If you wish to PGP encode it (but please only do so if privacy is very
1.112 philen 487: urgent, since it is inconvenient) use this <a href="advisories/pgpkey.txt">pgp key</a>.
1.5 deraadt 488:
1.107 deraadt 489: <p>
490: <a name=papers></a>
1.110 deraadt 491: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Further Reading</font></h3><p>
1.107 deraadt 492:
493: A number of papers have been written by OpenBSD team members, about security
494: related changes they have done in OpenBSD. The postscript versions of these
1.108 deraadt 495: documents are available as follows.<p>
1.107 deraadt 496:
497: <ul>
1.113 deraadt 498: <li>A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme.<br>
1.118 deraadt 499: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 500: by <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos<a/>,
501: <a href=mailto:dm@openbsd.org>David Mazieres</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 502: <a href=papers/bcrypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
503: <a href=papers/bcrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 504: <p>
505: <li>Cryptography in OpenBSD: An Overview.<br>
1.118 deraadt 506: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 507: by <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>,
508: <a href=mailto:niklas@openbsd.org>Niklas Hallqvist</a>,
509: <a href=mailto:art@openbsd.org>Artur Grabowski</a>,
510: <a href=mailto:angelos@openbsd.org>Angelos D. Keromytis</a>,
511: <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 512: <a href=papers/crypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
513: <a href=papers/crypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 514: <p>
515: <li>strlcpy and strlcat -- consistent, safe, string copy and concatenation.<br>
1.118 deraadt 516: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 517: by <a href=mailto:millert@openbsd.org>Todd C. Miller</a>,
518: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>.<br>
1.109 deraadt 519: <a href=papers/strlcpy-paper.ps>paper</a> and
520: <a href=papers/strlcpy-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 521: <p>
1.118 deraadt 522: <li>Dealing with Public Ethernet Jacks-Switches, Gateways, and Authentication.<br>
523: <a href=events.html#lisa99>LISA 1999</a>,
524: by <a href=mailto:beck@openbsd.org>Bob Beck</a>.<br>
525: <a href=papers/authgw-paper.ps>paper</a> and
526: <a href=papers/authgw-slides.ps>slides</a>.
527: <p>
1.107 deraadt 528: </ul>
529:
1.106 deraadt 530: </dl>
531:
1.2 deraadt 532: <hr>
1.68 pauls 533: <a href=index.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.24 deraadt 534: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
535: <br>
1.131 ! deraadt 536: <small>$OpenBSD: security.html,v 1.130 2000/05/26 21:21:46 deraadt Exp $</small>
1.1 deraadt 537:
1.24 deraadt 538: </body>
539: </html>
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