Annotation of www/security.html, Revision 1.158
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2: <html>
3: <head>
1.20 deraadt 4: <title>OpenBSD Security</title>
1.1 deraadt 5: <link rev=made href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>
6: <meta name="resource-type" content="document">
7: <meta name="description" content="OpenBSD advisories">
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1.45 deraadt 10: <meta name="copyright" content="This document copyright 1997,1998 by OpenBSD.">
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1.77 deraadt 14: <img alt="[OpenBSD]" height=30 width=141 SRC="images/smalltitle.gif">
1.106 deraadt 15: <p>
1.110 deraadt 16: <h2><font color=#e00000>Security</font><hr></h2>
1.1 deraadt 17:
1.114 philen 18: <table width="100%">
19: <tr>
20: <td colspan="2">
21: <strong>Index</strong>
22: </td>
23: </tr>
24: <tr>
25: <td valign="top">
1.106 deraadt 26: <a href=#goals>Security goals of the Project</a>.<br>
27: <a href=#disclosure>Full Disclosure policy</a>.<br>
28: <a href=#process>Source code auditing process</a>.<br>
1.111 aaron 29: <a href=#default>"Secure by Default"</a>.<br>
1.106 deraadt 30: <a href=#crypto>Use of Cryptography</a>.<br>
31: <p>
32: <a href=#watching>Watching changes</a>.<br>
33: <a href=#reporting>Reporting security issues</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 34: <a href=#papers>Further Reading</a><br>
1.106 deraadt 35: <p>
1.114 philen 36: </td>
37: <td valign="top">
1.152 deraadt 38: <a href="#28">For 2.8 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.124 deraadt 39: <a href="#27">For 2.7 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.119 deraadt 40: <a href="#26">For 2.6 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.114 philen 41: <a href="#25">For 2.5 security advisories</a>.<br>
42: <a href="#24">For 2.4 security advisories</a>.<br>
43: <a href="#23">For 2.3 security advisories</a>.<br>
44: <a href="#22">For 2.2 security advisories</a>.<br>
45: <a href="#21">For 2.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
46: <a href="#20">For 2.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
47: </td>
48: </tr>
49: </table>
1.56 deraadt 50: <hr>
51:
1.106 deraadt 52: <dl>
53: <a name=goals></a>
1.110 deraadt 54: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Goal</font></h3><p>
1.22 deraadt 55:
1.14 deraadt 56: OpenBSD believes in strong security. Our aspiration is to be NUMBER
1.22 deraadt 57: ONE in the industry for security (if we are not already there). Our
58: open software development model permits us to take a more
59: uncompromising view towards increased security than Sun, SGI, IBM, HP,
60: or other vendors are able to. We can make changes the vendors would
1.27 deraadt 61: not make. Also, since OpenBSD is exported with <a href=crypto.html>
1.45 deraadt 62: cryptography</a>, we are able to take cryptographic approaches towards
63: fixing security problems.<p>
1.18 deraadt 64:
1.106 deraadt 65: <a name=disclosure></a>
1.110 deraadt 66: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Full Disclosure</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 67:
1.45 deraadt 68: Like many readers of the
1.102 deraadt 69: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>
1.18 deraadt 70: BUGTRAQ mailing list</a>,
1.106 deraadt 71: we believe in full disclosure of security problems. In the
72: operating system arena, we were probably the first to embrace
73: the concept. Many vendors, even of free software, still try
74: to hide issues from their users.<p>
75:
76: Security information moves very fast in cracker circles. On the other
77: hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security
78: fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix
79: turnaround is possible. Thus we think that full disclosure helps the
80: people who really care about security.<p>
81:
1.153 jufi 82: <a name=process></a>
1.110 deraadt 83: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Audit Process</font></h3><p>
1.15 deraadt 84:
1.12 deraadt 85: Our security auditing team typically has between six and twelve
1.45 deraadt 86: members who continue to search for and fix new security holes. We
87: have been auditing since the summer of 1996. The process we follow to
88: increase security is simply a comprehensive file-by-file analysis of
1.106 deraadt 89: every critical software component. We are not so much looking for
90: security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if
1.138 deraadt 91: years later someone discovers the problem used to be a security
1.106 deraadt 92: issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the
93: better. Flaws have been found in just about every area of the system.
94: Entire new classes of security problems have been found during our
95: audit, and often source code which had been audited earlier needs
96: re-auditing with these new flaws in mind. Code often gets audited
97: multiple times, and by multiple people with different auditing
98: skills.<p>
1.12 deraadt 99:
1.94 deraadt 100: Some members of our security auditing team worked for Secure Networks,
101: the company that made the industry's premier network security scanning
102: software package Ballista (Secure Networks got purchased by Network
103: Associates, Ballista got renamed to Cybercop Scanner, and well...)
104: That company did a lot of security research, and thus fit in well
1.106 deraadt 105: with the OpenBSD stance. OpenBSD passed Ballista's tests with flying
106: colours since day 1.<p>
1.31 deraadt 107:
1.34 deraadt 108: Another facet of our security auditing process is its proactiveness.
1.45 deraadt 109: In most cases we have found that the determination of exploitability
110: is not an issue. During our ongoing auditing process we find many
111: bugs, and endeavor to fix them even though exploitability is not
112: proven. We fix the bug, and we move on to find other bugs to fix. We
113: have fixed many simple and obvious careless programming errors in code
114: and only months later discovered that the problems were in fact
115: exploitable. (Or, more likely someone on
1.102 deraadt 116: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>
1.45 deraadt 117: would report that other operating systems were vulnerable to a `newly
118: discovered problem', and then it would be discovered that OpenBSD had
119: been fixed in a previous release). In other cases we have been saved
120: from full exploitability of complex step-by-step attacks because we
121: had fixed one of the intermediate steps. An example of where we
1.94 deraadt 122: managed such a success is the lpd advisory that Secure Networks put out.
123: <p>
1.29 deraadt 124:
1.110 deraadt 125: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>The Reward</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 126:
1.45 deraadt 127: Our proactive auditing process has really paid off. Statements like
1.35 deraadt 128: ``This problem was fixed in OpenBSD about 6 months ago'' have become
1.45 deraadt 129: commonplace in security forums like
1.102 deraadt 130: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>.<p>
1.35 deraadt 131:
1.45 deraadt 132: The most intense part of our security auditing happened immediately
1.80 espie 133: before the OpenBSD 2.0 release and during the 2.0->2.1 transition,
1.45 deraadt 134: over the last third of 1996 and first half of 1997. Thousands (yes,
135: thousands) of security issues were fixed rapidly over this year-long
136: period; bugs like the standard buffer overflows, protocol
137: implementation weaknesses, information gathering, and filesystem
138: races. Hence most of the security problems that we encountered were
139: fixed before our 2.1 release, and then a far smaller number needed
140: fixing for our 2.2 release. We do not find as many problems anymore,
141: it is simply a case of diminishing returns. Recently the security
142: problems we find and fix tend to be significantly more obscure or
143: complicated. Still we will persist for a number of reasons:<p>
1.36 deraadt 144:
1.35 deraadt 145: <ul>
1.45 deraadt 146: <li>Occasionally we find a simple problem we missed earlier. Doh!
1.35 deraadt 147: <li>Security is like an arms race; the best attackers will continue
1.45 deraadt 148: to search for more complicated exploits, so we will too.
149: <li>Finding and fixing subtle flaws in complicated software is
150: a lot of fun.
1.35 deraadt 151: </ul>
1.106 deraadt 152: <p>
1.15 deraadt 153:
1.14 deraadt 154: The auditing process is not over yet, and as you can see we continue
1.28 deraadt 155: to find and fix new security flaws.<p>
1.12 deraadt 156:
1.106 deraadt 157: <a name=default></a>
1.110 deraadt 158: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>"Secure by Default"</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 159:
160: To ensure that novice users of OpenBSD do not need to become security
161: experts overnight (a viewpoint which other vendors seem to have), we
162: ship the operating system in a Secure by Default mode. All non-essential
163: services are disabled. As the user/administrator becomes more familiar
164: with the system, he will discover that he has to enable daemons and other
165: parts of the system. During the process of learning how to enable a new
166: service, the novice is more likely to learn of security considerations.<p>
167:
168: This is in stark contrast to the increasing number of systems that
169: ship with NFS, mountd, web servers, and various other services enabled
170: by default, creating instantaneous security problems for their users
171: within minutes after their first install.<p>
172:
1.153 jufi 173: <a name=crypto></a>
1.110 deraadt 174: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Cryptography</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 175:
176: And of course, since the OpenBSD project is based in Canada, it is possible
177: for us to integrate cryptography. For more information, read the page
1.116 deraadt 178: outlining <a href=crypto.html>what we have done with cryptography</a>.</p>
1.106 deraadt 179:
1.110 deraadt 180: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Advisories</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 181:
182: <dl>
183:
184: <li>
1.152 deraadt 185: <a name=28></a>
186:
187: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.8 Security Advisories</font></h3>
188: These are the OpenBSD 2.8 advisories -- all these problems are solved
1.154 millert 189: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
190: <a href=anoncvs.html#using>patch branch</a>.
1.152 deraadt 191:
192: <p>
193: <ul>
1.157 ericj 194: <li><a href=errata.html#procfs>Dec 18, 2000:
195: Procfs contains numerous overflows. Procfs is not used by default in OpenBSD. (patch included).</a>
1.156 deraadt 196: <li><a href=errata.html#kerberos2>Dec 10, 2000:
197: Another problem exists in KerberosIV libraries (patch included).</a>
1.155 deraadt 198: <li><a href=errata.html#kerberos>Dec 7, 2000:
199: A set of problems in KerberosIV exist (patch included).</a>
1.154 millert 200: <li><a href=errata.html#ftpd>Dec 4, 2000:
201: A single-byte buffer overflow exists in ftpd (patch included).</a>
1.152 deraadt 202: </ul>
203:
204: <p>
205: <li>
1.124 deraadt 206: <a name=27></a>
207:
208: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.7 Security Advisories</font></h3>
209: These are the OpenBSD 2.7 advisories -- all these problems are solved
210: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
211: OpenBSD 2.6 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.7.
212:
213: <p>
214: <ul>
1.154 millert 215: <li><a href=errata27.html#ftpd>Dec 4, 2000:
216: A single-byte buffer overflow exists in ftpd (patch included).</a>
1.152 deraadt 217: <li><a href=errata27.html#sshforwarding>Nov 10, 2000:
218: Hostile servers can force OpenSSH clients to do agent or X11 forwarding.
219: (patch included)</a>
220: <li><a href=errata27.html#xtrans>Oct 26, 2000:
1.151 matthieu 221: X11 libraries have 2 potential overflows in xtrans code.
222: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 223: <li><a href=errata27.html#httpd>Oct 18, 2000:
1.150 beck 224: Apache mod_rewrite and mod_vhost_alias modules could expose files
225: on the server in certain configurations if used.
226: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 227: <li><a href=errata27.html#format_strings>Oct 10, 2000:
1.149 millert 228: The telnet daemon does not strip out the TERMINFO, TERMINFO_DIRS,
229: TERMPATH and TERMCAP environment variables as it should.
230: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 231: <li><a href=errata27.html#format_strings>Oct 6, 2000:
1.148 millert 232: There are printf-style format string bugs in several privileged
233: programs. (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 234: <li><a href=errata27.html#curses>Oct 6, 2000:
1.147 millert 235: libcurses honored terminal descriptions in the $HOME/.terminfo
236: directory as well as in the TERMCAP environment variable for
237: setuid and setgid applications.
1.146 deraadt 238: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 239: <li><a href=errata27.html#talkd>Oct 6, 2000:
1.146 deraadt 240: A format string vulnerability exists in talkd(8).
241: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 242: <li><a href=errata27.html#pw_error>Oct 3, 2000:
1.145 aaron 243: A format string vulnerability exists in the pw_error() function of the
244: libutil library, yielding localhost root through chpass(1).
245: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 246: <li><a href=errata27.html#ipsec>Sep 18, 2000:
1.144 jason 247: Bad ESP/AH packets could cause a crash under certain conditions.
248: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 249: <li><a href=errata27.html#xlock>Aug 16, 2000:
1.141 deraadt 250: A format string vulnerability (localhost root) exists in xlock(1).
251: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 252: <li><a href=errata27.html#X11_libs>July 14, 2000:
1.139 deraadt 253: Various bugs found in X11 libraries have various side effects, almost
254: completely denial of service in OpenBSD.
255: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 256: <li><a href=errata27.html#ftpd>July 5, 2000:
1.136 deraadt 257: Just like pretty much all the other unix ftp daemons
258: on the planet, ftpd had a remote root hole in it.
259: Luckily, ftpd was not enabled by default.
1.137 deraadt 260: The problem exists if anonymous ftp is enabled.
1.136 deraadt 261: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 262: <li><a href=errata27.html#mopd>July 5, 2000:
1.136 deraadt 263: Mopd, very rarely used, contained some buffer overflows.
264: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 265: <li><a href=errata27.html#libedit>June 28, 2000:
1.135 deraadt 266: libedit would check for a <b>.editrc</b> file in the current
267: directory. Not known to be a real security issue, but a patch
268: is available anyways.
269: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 270: <li><a href=errata27.html#dhclient>June 24, 2000:
1.134 deraadt 271: A serious bug in dhclient(8) could allow strings from a
272: malicious dhcp server to be executed in the shell as root.
273: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 274: <li><a href=errata27.html#isakmpd>June 9, 2000:
1.133 deraadt 275: A serious bug in isakmpd(8) policy handling wherein
276: policy verification could be completely bypassed in isakmpd.
277: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 278: <li><a href=errata27.html#uselogin>June 6, 2000:
1.132 deraadt 279: The non-default flag UseLogin in <b>/etc/sshd_config</b> is broken,
280: should not be used, and results in security problems on
281: other operating systems.</a>
1.152 deraadt 282: <li><a href=errata27.html#bridge>May 26, 2000:
1.129 deraadt 283: The bridge(4) <i>learning</i> flag may be bypassed.
1.128 deraadt 284: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 285: <li><a href=errata27.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
1.127 kjell 286: Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
287: in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
288:
1.124 deraadt 289: </ul>
290:
291: <p>
292: <li>
1.119 deraadt 293: <a name=26></a>
294:
295: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.6 Security Advisories</font></h3>
296: These are the OpenBSD 2.6 advisories -- all these problems are solved
297: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
298: OpenBSD 2.5 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.6.
299:
300: <p>
301: <ul>
1.130 deraadt 302: <li><a href=errata26.html#semconfig>May 26, 2000:
303: SYSV semaphore support contained an undocumented system call
1.131 deraadt 304: which could wedge semaphore-using processes from exiting. (patch included)</a>
1.127 kjell 305: <li><a href=errata26.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
306: Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
307: in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
1.126 deraadt 308: <li><a href=errata26.html#xlockmore>May 25, 2000:
1.125 deraadt 309: xlockmore has a bug which a localhost attacker can use to gain
310: access to the encrypted root password hash (which is normally
311: encoded using blowfish (see
312: <a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=crypt&sektion=3">
313: crypt(3)</a>)
314: (patch included).</a>
1.126 deraadt 315: <li><a href=errata26.html#procfs>Jan 20, 2000:
1.123 deraadt 316: Systems running with procfs enabled and mounted are
317: vulnerable to a very tricky exploit. procfs is not
318: mounted by default.
319: (patch included).</a>
1.126 deraadt 320: <li><a href=errata26.html#ifmedia>Nov 9, 1999:
1.125 deraadt 321: Any user could change interface media configurations, resulting in
322: a localhost denial of service attack.
1.119 deraadt 323: (patch included).</a>
1.126 deraadt 324: <li><a href=errata26.html#sslUSA>Dec 2, 1999:
1.120 deraadt 325: A buffer overflow in the RSAREF code included in the
326: USA version of libssl, is possibly exploitable in
327: httpd, ssh, or isakmpd, if SSL/RSA features are enabled.
1.124 deraadt 328: (patch included).<br></a>
329: <strong>Update:</strong> Turns out that this was not exploitable
330: in any of the software included in OpenBSD 2.6.
1.126 deraadt 331: <li><a href=errata26.html#sendmail>Dec 4, 1999:
1.121 deraadt 332: Sendmail permitted any user to cause a aliases file wrap,
333: thus exposing the system to a race where the aliases file
334: did not exist.
335: (patch included).</a>
1.119 deraadt 336: </ul>
337:
338: <p>
339: <li>
340:
1.93 deraadt 341: <a name=25></a>
1.106 deraadt 342:
1.110 deraadt 343: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.5 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.93 deraadt 344: These are the OpenBSD 2.5 advisories -- all these problems are solved
345: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
346: OpenBSD 2.4 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.5.
347:
1.96 deraadt 348: <p>
1.104 deraadt 349: <ul>
1.117 deraadt 350: <li><a href=errata25.html#cron>Aug 30, 1999:
1.103 deraadt 351: In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the
352: fake popen() and run sendmail as the user, not as root.
353: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 354: <li><a href=errata25.html#miscfs>Aug 12, 1999: The procfs and fdescfs
1.101 deraadt 355: filesystems had an overrun in their handling of uio_offset
356: in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
357: enabled by default). (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 358: <li><a href=errata25.html#profil>Aug 9, 1999: Stop profiling (see profil(2))
1.100 deraadt 359: when we execve() a new process. (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 360: <li><a href=errata25.html#ipsec_in_use>Aug 6, 1999: Packets that should have
1.98 deraadt 361: been handled by IPsec may be transmitted as cleartext.
362: PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
363: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 364: <li><a href=errata25.html#rc>Aug 5, 1999: In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for
1.97 deraadt 365: motd re-writing and change the find(1) to use -execdir
366: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 367: <li><a href=errata25.html#chflags>Jul 30, 1999: Do not permit regular
1.95 deraadt 368: users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or block devices
369: which they may currently be the owner of (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 370: <li><a href=errata25.html#nroff>Jul 27, 1999: Cause groff(1) to be invoked
1.95 deraadt 371: with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1) (patch included).</a>
1.93 deraadt 372: </ul>
373:
1.106 deraadt 374: <p>
375: <li>
1.75 deraadt 376: <a name=24></a>
1.110 deraadt 377: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.4 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.75 deraadt 378: These are the OpenBSD 2.4 advisories -- all these problems are solved
379: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
380: OpenBSD 2.3 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.4.
381:
1.96 deraadt 382: <p>
1.75 deraadt 383: <ul>
1.92 deraadt 384: <li><a href=errata24.html#poll>Mar 22, 1999: The nfds argument for poll(2) needs
1.91 deraadt 385: to be constrained, to avoid kvm starvation (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 386: <li><a href=errata24.html#tss>Mar 21, 1999: A change in TSS handling stops
1.91 deraadt 387: another kernel crash case caused by the <strong>crashme</strong>
388: program (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 389: <li><a href=errata24.html#nlink>Feb 25, 1999: An unbounded increment on the
1.90 deraadt 390: nlink value in FFS and EXT2FS filesystems can cause a system crash.
1.89 deraadt 391: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 392: <li><a href=errata24.html#ping>Feb 23, 1999: Yet another buffer overflow
1.88 deraadt 393: existed in ping(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 394: <li><a href=errata24.html#ipqrace>Feb 19, 1999: ipintr() had a race in use of
1.87 deraadt 395: the ipq, which could permit an attacker to cause a crash.
396: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 397: <li><a href=errata24.html#accept>Feb 17, 1999: A race condition in the
1.86 deraadt 398: kernel between accept(2) and select(2) could permit an attacker
399: to hang sockets from remote.
400: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 401: <li><a href=errata24.html#maxqueue>Feb 17, 1999: IP fragment assembly can
1.85 deraadt 402: bog the machine excessively and cause problems.
403: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 404: <li><a href=errata24.html#trctrap>Feb 12, 1999: i386 T_TRCTRAP handling and
1.84 deraadt 405: DDB interacted to possibly cause a crash.
406: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 407: <li><a href=errata24.html#rst>Feb 11, 1999: TCP/IP RST handling was sloppy.
1.83 deraadt 408: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 409: <li><a href=errata24.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
1.81 deraadt 410: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 411: <li><a href=errata24.html#termcap>Nov 19, 1998: There is a possibly locally
1.82 deraadt 412: exploitable problem relating to environment variables in termcap
413: and curses. (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 414: <li><a href=errata24.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
1.78 deraadt 415: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.75 deraadt 416: </ul>
417:
1.106 deraadt 418: <p>
419: <li>
1.58 deraadt 420: <a name=23></a>
1.110 deraadt 421: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.3 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.73 deraadt 422: These are the OpenBSD 2.3 advisories -- all these problems are solved
423: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
424: OpenBSD 2.2 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.3.
1.53 matthieu 425:
1.96 deraadt 426: <p>
1.53 matthieu 427: <ul>
1.81 deraadt 428: <li><a href=errata23.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
429: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.78 deraadt 430: <li><a href=errata23.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
431: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 432: <li><a href=errata23.html#fdalloc>Jul 2, 1998: setuid and setgid processes
1.72 deraadt 433: should not be executed with fd slots 0, 1, or 2 free.
434: (patch included).</a>
1.79 deraadt 435: <li><a href=errata23.html#resolver>August 31, 1998: A benign looking resolver buffer overflow bug was re-introduced accidentally (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 436: <li><a href=errata23.html#xlib>June 6, 1998: Further problems with the X
1.71 deraadt 437: libraries (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 438: <li><a href=errata23.html#pctr>June 4, 1998: on non-Intel i386 machines, any user
1.72 deraadt 439: can use pctr(4) to crash the machine.</a>
1.76 aaron 440: <li><a href=errata23.html#kill>May 17, 1998: kill(2) of setuid/setgid target
1.66 deraadt 441: processes too permissive (4th revision patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 442: <li><a href=errata23.html#immutable>May 11, 1998: mmap() permits partial bypassing
1.60 deraadt 443: of immutable and append-only file flags. (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 444: <li><a href=errata23.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm and Xaw
1.58 deraadt 445: (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 446: <li><a href=errata23.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC packets
1.59 deraadt 447: if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
1.53 matthieu 448: </ul>
1.9 deraadt 449:
1.106 deraadt 450: <p>
451: <li>
1.58 deraadt 452: <a name=22></a>
1.110 deraadt 453: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.2 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.45 deraadt 454: These are the OpenBSD 2.2 advisories. All these problems are solved
1.55 deraadt 455: in <a href=23.html>OpenBSD 2.3</a>. Some of these problems
1.45 deraadt 456: still exist in other operating systems. (The supplied patches are for
457: OpenBSD 2.2; they may or may not work on OpenBSD 2.1).
1.9 deraadt 458:
1.96 deraadt 459: <p>
1.9 deraadt 460: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 461: <li><a href=errata22.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC
462: packets if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
463: <li><a href=errata22.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm
464: and Xaw (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
465: <li><a href=errata22.html#uucpd>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer overflow in uucpd
466: (patch included).</a>
467: <li><a href=errata22.html#rmjob>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer mismanagement in lprm
468: (patch included).</a>
469: <li><a href=errata22.html#ping>Mar 31, 1998: Overflow in ping -R (patch included).</a>
470: <li><a href=errata22.html#named>Mar 30, 1998: Overflow in named fake-iquery
1.59 deraadt 471: (patch included).</a>
1.72 deraadt 472: <li><a href=errata22.html#mountd>Mar 2, 1998: Accidental NFS filesystem
473: export (patch included).</a>
1.112 philen 474: <li><a href="advisories/mmap.txt">Feb 26, 1998: Read-write mmap() flaw.</a>
1.72 deraadt 475: Revision 3 of the patch is available <a href=errata22.html#mmap>here</a>
1.112 philen 476: <li><a href="advisories/sourceroute.txt">Feb 19, 1998: Sourcerouted Packet
1.59 deraadt 477: Acceptance.</a>
1.50 deraadt 478: A patch is available <a href=errata22.html#sourceroute>here</a>.
1.122 rohee 479: <li><a href=errata22.html#ruserok>Feb 13, 1998: Setuid coredump & Ruserok()
1.72 deraadt 480: flaw (patch included).</a>
481: <li><a href=errata22.html#ldso>Feb 9, 1998: MIPS ld.so flaw (patch included).</a>
482: <li><a href=errata22.html#f00f>Dec 10, 1997: Intel P5 f00f lockup
1.59 deraadt 483: (patch included).</a>
1.1 deraadt 484: </ul>
485:
1.106 deraadt 486: <p>
487: <li>
1.58 deraadt 488: <a name=21></a>
1.110 deraadt 489: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.1 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.52 deraadt 490: These are the OpenBSD 2.1 advisories. All these problems are solved
491: in <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>. Some of these problems still
492: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.1, we
493: would strongly recommend an upgrade to the newest release, as this
494: patch list only attempts at fixing the most important security
495: problems. In particular, OpenBSD 2.2 fixes numerous localhost
496: security problems. Many of those problems were solved in ways which
497: make it hard for us to provide patches).
498:
1.96 deraadt 499: <p>
1.52 deraadt 500: <ul>
1.112 philen 501: <li><a href="advisories/signals.txt">Sep 15, 1997: Deviant Signals (patch included)</a>
502: <li><a href="advisories/rfork.txt">Aug 2, 1997: Rfork() system call flaw
1.59 deraadt 503: (patch included)</a>
1.112 philen 504: <li><a href="advisories/procfs.txt">Jun 24, 1997: Procfs flaws (patch included)</a>
1.52 deraadt 505: </ul>
1.51 deraadt 506:
1.106 deraadt 507: <p>
508: <li>
509: <a name=20></a>
1.110 deraadt 510: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.99 deraadt 511: These are the OpenBSD 2.0 advisories. All these problems are solved
512: in <a href=21.html>OpenBSD 2.1</a>. Some of these problems still
513: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.0, we
514: commend you for being there back in the old days!, but you're really
515: missing out if you don't install a new version!)
516:
517: <p>
518: <ul>
1.112 philen 519: <li><a href="advisories/res_random.txt">April 22, 1997: Predictable IDs in the
1.99 deraadt 520: resolver (patch included)</a>
521: <li>Many others... if people can hunt them down, please let me know
522: and we'll put them up here.
523: </ul>
524:
1.106 deraadt 525: </dl>
1.51 deraadt 526: <p>
1.106 deraadt 527:
528: <a name=watching></a>
1.110 deraadt 529: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Watching our Changes</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 530:
1.21 deraadt 531: Since we take a proactive stance with security, we are continually
532: finding and fixing new security problems. Not all of these problems
1.80 espie 533: get widely reported because (as stated earlier) many of them are not
1.45 deraadt 534: confirmed to be exploitable; many simple bugs we fix do turn out to
535: have security consequences we could not predict. We do not have the
536: time resources to make these changes available in the above format.<p>
1.21 deraadt 537:
538: Thus there are usually minor security fixes in the current source code
539: beyond the previous major OpenBSD release. We make a limited
1.45 deraadt 540: guarantee that these problems are of minimal impact and unproven
1.44 ian 541: exploitability. If we discover that a problem definitely matters for
1.45 deraadt 542: security, patches will show up here <strong>VERY</strong> quickly.<p>
1.21 deraadt 543:
1.45 deraadt 544: People who are really concerned with security can do a number of
545: things:<p>
1.21 deraadt 546:
547: <ul>
548: <li>If you understand security issues, watch our
1.27 deraadt 549: <a href=mail.html>source-changes mailing list</a> and keep an
1.23 deraadt 550: eye out for things which appear security related. Since
1.21 deraadt 551: exploitability is not proven for many of the fixes we make,
552: do not expect the relevant commit message to say "SECURITY FIX!".
553: If a problem is proven and serious, a patch will be available
554: here very shortly after.
555: <li>Track our current source code tree, and teach yourself how to do a
1.29 deraadt 556: complete system build from time to time (read /usr/src/Makefile
557: carefully). Users can make the assumption that the current
558: source tree always has stronger security than the previous release.
1.45 deraadt 559: However, building your own system from source code is not trivial;
560: it is nearly 300MB of source code, and problems do occur as we
561: transition between major releases.
1.115 ericj 562: <li>Install a binary snapshot for your
1.80 espie 563: architecture, which are made available fairly often. For
1.29 deraadt 564: instance, an i386 snapshot is typically made available weekly.
1.21 deraadt 565: </ul>
566:
1.9 deraadt 567: <p>
1.153 jufi 568: <a name=reporting></a>
1.110 deraadt 569: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Reporting problems</font></h3><p>
1.3 deraadt 570:
1.5 deraadt 571: <p> If you find a new security problem, you can mail it to
1.6 deraadt 572: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>deraadt@openbsd.org</a>.
1.7 deraadt 573: <br>
1.5 deraadt 574: If you wish to PGP encode it (but please only do so if privacy is very
1.112 philen 575: urgent, since it is inconvenient) use this <a href="advisories/pgpkey.txt">pgp key</a>.
1.5 deraadt 576:
1.107 deraadt 577: <p>
578: <a name=papers></a>
1.110 deraadt 579: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Further Reading</font></h3><p>
1.107 deraadt 580:
581: A number of papers have been written by OpenBSD team members, about security
582: related changes they have done in OpenBSD. The postscript versions of these
1.108 deraadt 583: documents are available as follows.<p>
1.107 deraadt 584:
585: <ul>
1.113 deraadt 586: <li>A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme.<br>
1.118 deraadt 587: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.153 jufi 588: by <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>,
1.113 deraadt 589: <a href=mailto:dm@openbsd.org>David Mazieres</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 590: <a href=papers/bcrypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
591: <a href=papers/bcrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 592: <p>
593: <li>Cryptography in OpenBSD: An Overview.<br>
1.118 deraadt 594: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 595: by <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>,
596: <a href=mailto:niklas@openbsd.org>Niklas Hallqvist</a>,
597: <a href=mailto:art@openbsd.org>Artur Grabowski</a>,
598: <a href=mailto:angelos@openbsd.org>Angelos D. Keromytis</a>,
599: <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 600: <a href=papers/crypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
601: <a href=papers/crypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 602: <p>
603: <li>strlcpy and strlcat -- consistent, safe, string copy and concatenation.<br>
1.118 deraadt 604: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 605: by <a href=mailto:millert@openbsd.org>Todd C. Miller</a>,
606: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>.<br>
1.109 deraadt 607: <a href=papers/strlcpy-paper.ps>paper</a> and
608: <a href=papers/strlcpy-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 609: <p>
1.118 deraadt 610: <li>Dealing with Public Ethernet Jacks-Switches, Gateways, and Authentication.<br>
611: <a href=events.html#lisa99>LISA 1999</a>,
612: by <a href=mailto:beck@openbsd.org>Bob Beck</a>.<br>
613: <a href=papers/authgw-paper.ps>paper</a> and
614: <a href=papers/authgw-slides.ps>slides</a>.
615: <p>
1.153 jufi 616: <li>Encrypting Virtual Memory<br>
1.142 deraadt 617: <a href=events.html#sec2000>Usenix Security 2000</a>,
618: <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.143 provos 619: <a href=papers/swapencrypt.ps>paper</a> and
620: <a href=papers/swapencrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.142 deraadt 621: <p>
1.107 deraadt 622: </ul>
623:
1.106 deraadt 624: </dl>
625:
1.2 deraadt 626: <hr>
1.68 pauls 627: <a href=index.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.24 deraadt 628: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
629: <br>
1.158 ! aaron 630: <small>$OpenBSD: security.html,v 1.157 2000/12/19 20:21:41 ericj Exp $</small>
1.1 deraadt 631:
1.24 deraadt 632: </body>
633: </html>
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