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1.1       deraadt     1: <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC  "-//IETF//DTD HTML Strict//EN">
                      2: <html>
                      3: <head>
1.20      deraadt     4: <title>OpenBSD Security</title>
1.1       deraadt     5: <link rev=made href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>
                      6: <meta name="resource-type" content="document">
                      7: <meta name="description" content="OpenBSD advisories">
                      8: <meta name="keywords" content="openbsd,main">
                      9: <meta name="distribution" content="global">
1.45      deraadt    10: <meta name="copyright" content="This document copyright 1997,1998 by OpenBSD.">
1.1       deraadt    11: </head>
                     12:
                     13: <BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF" TEXT="#000000" LINK="#23238E">
1.77      deraadt    14: <img alt="[OpenBSD]" height=30 width=141 SRC="images/smalltitle.gif">
1.106     deraadt    15: <p>
1.110     deraadt    16: <h2><font color=#e00000>Security</font><hr></h2>
1.1       deraadt    17:
1.114     philen     18: <table width="100%">
                     19: <tr>
                     20: <td colspan="2">
                     21: <strong>Index</strong>
                     22: </td>
                     23: </tr>
                     24: <tr>
                     25: <td valign="top">
1.106     deraadt    26: <a href=#goals>Security goals of the Project</a>.<br>
                     27: <a href=#disclosure>Full Disclosure policy</a>.<br>
                     28: <a href=#process>Source code auditing process</a>.<br>
1.111     aaron      29: <a href=#default>"Secure by Default"</a>.<br>
1.106     deraadt    30: <a href=#crypto>Use of Cryptography</a>.<br>
                     31: <p>
                     32: <a href=#watching>Watching changes</a>.<br>
                     33: <a href=#reporting>Reporting security issues</a>.<br>
1.107     deraadt    34: <a href=#papers>Further Reading</a><br>
1.106     deraadt    35: <p>
1.114     philen     36: </td>
                     37: <td valign="top">
1.152     deraadt    38: <a href="#28">For 2.8 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.124     deraadt    39: <a href="#27">For 2.7 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.119     deraadt    40: <a href="#26">For 2.6 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.114     philen     41: <a href="#25">For 2.5 security advisories</a>.<br>
                     42: <a href="#24">For 2.4 security advisories</a>.<br>
                     43: <a href="#23">For 2.3 security advisories</a>.<br>
                     44: <a href="#22">For 2.2 security advisories</a>.<br>
                     45: <a href="#21">For 2.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
                     46: <a href="#20">For 2.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
                     47: </td>
                     48: </tr>
                     49: </table>
1.56      deraadt    50: <hr>
                     51:
1.106     deraadt    52: <dl>
                     53: <a name=goals></a>
1.110     deraadt    54: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Goal</font></h3><p>
1.22      deraadt    55:
1.14      deraadt    56: OpenBSD believes in strong security.  Our aspiration is to be NUMBER
1.22      deraadt    57: ONE in the industry for security (if we are not already there).  Our
                     58: open software development model permits us to take a more
                     59: uncompromising view towards increased security than Sun, SGI, IBM, HP,
                     60: or other vendors are able to.  We can make changes the vendors would
1.27      deraadt    61: not make.  Also, since OpenBSD is exported with <a href=crypto.html>
1.45      deraadt    62: cryptography</a>, we are able to take cryptographic approaches towards
                     63: fixing security problems.<p>
1.18      deraadt    64:
1.106     deraadt    65: <a name=disclosure></a>
1.110     deraadt    66: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Full Disclosure</font></h3><p>
1.106     deraadt    67:
1.45      deraadt    68: Like many readers of the
1.102     deraadt    69: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>
1.18      deraadt    70: BUGTRAQ mailing list</a>,
1.106     deraadt    71: we believe in full disclosure of security problems.  In the
                     72: operating system arena, we were probably the first to embrace
                     73: the concept.  Many vendors, even of free software, still try
                     74: to hide issues from their users.<p>
                     75:
                     76: Security information moves very fast in cracker circles.  On the other
                     77: hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security
                     78: fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix
                     79: turnaround is possible.  Thus we think that full disclosure helps the
                     80: people who really care about security.<p>
                     81:
1.153     jufi       82: <a name=process></a>
1.110     deraadt    83: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Audit Process</font></h3><p>
1.15      deraadt    84:
1.12      deraadt    85: Our security auditing team typically has between six and twelve
1.45      deraadt    86: members who continue to search for and fix new security holes.  We
                     87: have been auditing since the summer of 1996.  The process we follow to
                     88: increase security is simply a comprehensive file-by-file analysis of
1.106     deraadt    89: every critical software component.  We are not so much looking for
                     90: security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if
1.138     deraadt    91: years later someone discovers the problem used to be a security
1.106     deraadt    92: issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the
                     93: better.  Flaws have been found in just about every area of the system.
                     94: Entire new classes of security problems have been found during our
                     95: audit, and often source code which had been audited earlier needs
                     96: re-auditing with these new flaws in mind.  Code often gets audited
                     97: multiple times, and by multiple people with different auditing
                     98: skills.<p>
1.12      deraadt    99:
1.94      deraadt   100: Some members of our security auditing team worked for Secure Networks,
                    101: the company that made the industry's premier network security scanning
                    102: software package Ballista (Secure Networks got purchased by Network
                    103: Associates, Ballista got renamed to Cybercop Scanner, and well...)
                    104: That company did a lot of security research, and thus fit in well
1.106     deraadt   105: with the OpenBSD stance.  OpenBSD passed Ballista's tests with flying
                    106: colours since day 1.<p>
1.31      deraadt   107:
1.34      deraadt   108: Another facet of our security auditing process is its proactiveness.
1.45      deraadt   109: In most cases we have found that the determination of exploitability
                    110: is not an issue.  During our ongoing auditing process we find many
                    111: bugs, and endeavor to fix them even though exploitability is not
                    112: proven.  We fix the bug, and we move on to find other bugs to fix.  We
                    113: have fixed many simple and obvious careless programming errors in code
                    114: and only months later discovered that the problems were in fact
                    115: exploitable.  (Or, more likely someone on
1.102     deraadt   116: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>
1.45      deraadt   117: would report that other operating systems were vulnerable to a `newly
                    118: discovered problem', and then it would be discovered that OpenBSD had
                    119: been fixed in a previous release).  In other cases we have been saved
                    120: from full exploitability of complex step-by-step attacks because we
                    121: had fixed one of the intermediate steps.  An example of where we
1.94      deraadt   122: managed such a success is the lpd advisory that Secure Networks put out.
                    123: <p>
1.29      deraadt   124:
1.110     deraadt   125: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>The Reward</font></h3><p>
1.106     deraadt   126:
1.45      deraadt   127: Our proactive auditing process has really paid off.  Statements like
1.35      deraadt   128: ``This problem was fixed in OpenBSD about 6 months ago'' have become
1.45      deraadt   129: commonplace in security forums like
1.102     deraadt   130: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>.<p>
1.35      deraadt   131:
1.45      deraadt   132: The most intense part of our security auditing happened immediately
1.80      espie     133: before the OpenBSD 2.0 release and during the 2.0-&gt;2.1 transition,
1.45      deraadt   134: over the last third of 1996 and first half of 1997.  Thousands (yes,
                    135: thousands) of security issues were fixed rapidly over this year-long
                    136: period; bugs like the standard buffer overflows, protocol
                    137: implementation weaknesses, information gathering, and filesystem
                    138: races.  Hence most of the security problems that we encountered were
                    139: fixed before our 2.1 release, and then a far smaller number needed
                    140: fixing for our 2.2 release.  We do not find as many problems anymore,
                    141: it is simply a case of diminishing returns.  Recently the security
                    142: problems we find and fix tend to be significantly more obscure or
                    143: complicated.  Still we will persist for a number of reasons:<p>
1.36      deraadt   144:
1.35      deraadt   145: <ul>
1.45      deraadt   146: <li>Occasionally we find a simple problem we missed earlier. Doh!
1.35      deraadt   147: <li>Security is like an arms race; the best attackers will continue
1.45      deraadt   148:        to search for more complicated exploits, so we will too.
                    149: <li>Finding and fixing subtle flaws in complicated software is
                    150:        a lot of fun.
1.35      deraadt   151: </ul>
1.106     deraadt   152: <p>
1.15      deraadt   153:
1.14      deraadt   154: The auditing process is not over yet, and as you can see we continue
1.28      deraadt   155: to find and fix new security flaws.<p>
1.12      deraadt   156:
1.106     deraadt   157: <a name=default></a>
1.110     deraadt   158: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>"Secure by Default"</font></h3><p>
1.106     deraadt   159:
                    160: To ensure that novice users of OpenBSD do not need to become security
                    161: experts overnight (a viewpoint which other vendors seem to have), we
                    162: ship the operating system in a Secure by Default mode.  All non-essential
                    163: services are disabled.  As the user/administrator becomes more familiar
                    164: with the system, he will discover that he has to enable daemons and other
                    165: parts of the system.  During the process of learning how to enable a new
                    166: service, the novice is more likely to learn of security considerations.<p>
                    167:
                    168: This is in stark contrast to the increasing number of systems that
                    169: ship with NFS, mountd, web servers, and various other services enabled
                    170: by default, creating instantaneous security problems for their users
                    171: within minutes after their first install.<p>
                    172:
1.153     jufi      173: <a name=crypto></a>
1.110     deraadt   174: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Cryptography</font></h3><p>
1.106     deraadt   175:
                    176: And of course, since the OpenBSD project is based in Canada, it is possible
                    177: for us to integrate cryptography.  For more information, read the page
1.116     deraadt   178: outlining <a href=crypto.html>what we have done with cryptography</a>.</p>
1.106     deraadt   179:
1.110     deraadt   180: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Advisories</font></h3><p>
1.106     deraadt   181:
                    182: <dl>
                    183:
                    184: <li>
1.152     deraadt   185: <a name=28></a>
                    186:
                    187: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.8 Security Advisories</font></h3>
                    188: These are the OpenBSD 2.8 advisories -- all these problems are solved
1.154     millert   189: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
                    190: <a href=anoncvs.html#using>patch branch</a>.
1.152     deraadt   191:
                    192: <p>
                    193: <ul>
1.159     ericj     194: <li><a href=errata.html#xlock>Dec 22, 2000:
                    195:        xlock(1)'s authentication was re-done to authenticate via a named pipe. (patch and new xlock binaries included).</a>
1.157     ericj     196: <li><a href=errata.html#procfs>Dec 18, 2000:
                    197:        Procfs contains numerous overflows. Procfs is not used by default in OpenBSD. (patch included).</a>
1.156     deraadt   198: <li><a href=errata.html#kerberos2>Dec 10, 2000:
                    199:        Another problem exists in KerberosIV libraries (patch included).</a>
1.155     deraadt   200: <li><a href=errata.html#kerberos>Dec 7, 2000:
                    201:        A set of problems in KerberosIV exist (patch included).</a>
1.154     millert   202: <li><a href=errata.html#ftpd>Dec 4, 2000:
                    203:        A single-byte buffer overflow exists in ftpd (patch included).</a>
1.152     deraadt   204: </ul>
                    205:
                    206: <p>
                    207: <li>
1.124     deraadt   208: <a name=27></a>
                    209:
                    210: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.7 Security Advisories</font></h3>
                    211: These are the OpenBSD 2.7 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    212: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>.  Obviously, all the
                    213: OpenBSD 2.6 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.7.
                    214:
                    215: <p>
                    216: <ul>
1.154     millert   217: <li><a href=errata27.html#ftpd>Dec 4, 2000:
                    218:        A single-byte buffer overflow exists in ftpd (patch included).</a>
1.152     deraadt   219: <li><a href=errata27.html#sshforwarding>Nov 10, 2000:
                    220:        Hostile servers can force OpenSSH clients to do agent or X11 forwarding.
                    221:        (patch included)</a>
                    222: <li><a href=errata27.html#xtrans>Oct 26, 2000:
1.151     matthieu  223:        X11 libraries have 2 potential overflows in xtrans code.
                    224:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   225: <li><a href=errata27.html#httpd>Oct 18, 2000:
1.150     beck      226:        Apache mod_rewrite and mod_vhost_alias modules could expose files
                    227:        on the server in certain configurations if used.
                    228:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   229: <li><a href=errata27.html#format_strings>Oct 10, 2000:
1.149     millert   230:        The telnet daemon does not strip out the TERMINFO, TERMINFO_DIRS,
                    231:        TERMPATH and TERMCAP environment variables as it should.
                    232:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   233: <li><a href=errata27.html#format_strings>Oct 6, 2000:
1.148     millert   234:        There are printf-style format string bugs in several privileged
                    235:        programs.  (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   236: <li><a href=errata27.html#curses>Oct 6, 2000:
1.147     millert   237:        libcurses honored terminal descriptions in the $HOME/.terminfo
                    238:        directory as well as in the TERMCAP environment variable for
                    239:        setuid and setgid applications.
1.146     deraadt   240:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   241: <li><a href=errata27.html#talkd>Oct 6, 2000:
1.146     deraadt   242:        A format string vulnerability exists in talkd(8).
                    243:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   244: <li><a href=errata27.html#pw_error>Oct 3, 2000:
1.145     aaron     245:        A format string vulnerability exists in the pw_error() function of the
                    246:        libutil library, yielding localhost root through chpass(1).
                    247:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   248: <li><a href=errata27.html#ipsec>Sep 18, 2000:
1.144     jason     249:        Bad ESP/AH packets could cause a crash under certain conditions.
                    250:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   251: <li><a href=errata27.html#xlock>Aug 16, 2000:
1.141     deraadt   252:        A format string vulnerability (localhost root) exists in xlock(1).
                    253:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   254: <li><a href=errata27.html#X11_libs>July 14, 2000:
1.139     deraadt   255:        Various bugs found in X11 libraries have various side effects, almost
                    256:        completely denial of service in OpenBSD.
                    257:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   258: <li><a href=errata27.html#ftpd>July 5, 2000:
1.136     deraadt   259:        Just like pretty much all the other unix ftp daemons
                    260:        on the planet, ftpd had a remote root hole in it.
                    261:        Luckily, ftpd was not enabled by default.
1.137     deraadt   262:        The problem exists if anonymous ftp is enabled.
1.136     deraadt   263:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   264: <li><a href=errata27.html#mopd>July 5, 2000:
1.136     deraadt   265:        Mopd, very rarely used, contained some buffer overflows.
                    266:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   267: <li><a href=errata27.html#libedit>June 28, 2000:
1.135     deraadt   268:        libedit would check for a <b>.editrc</b> file in the current
                    269:        directory.  Not known to be a real security issue, but a patch
                    270:        is available anyways.
                    271:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   272: <li><a href=errata27.html#dhclient>June 24, 2000:
1.134     deraadt   273:        A serious bug in dhclient(8) could allow strings from a
                    274:        malicious dhcp server to be executed in the shell as root.
                    275:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   276: <li><a href=errata27.html#isakmpd>June 9, 2000:
1.133     deraadt   277:        A serious bug in isakmpd(8) policy handling wherein
                    278:        policy verification could be completely bypassed in isakmpd.
                    279:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   280: <li><a href=errata27.html#uselogin>June 6, 2000:
1.132     deraadt   281:        The non-default flag UseLogin in <b>/etc/sshd_config</b> is broken,
                    282:        should not be used, and results in security problems on
                    283:        other operating systems.</a>
1.152     deraadt   284: <li><a href=errata27.html#bridge>May 26, 2000:
1.129     deraadt   285:        The bridge(4) <i>learning</i> flag may be bypassed.
1.128     deraadt   286:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   287: <li><a href=errata27.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
1.127     kjell     288:        Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
                    289:        in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
                    290:
1.124     deraadt   291: </ul>
                    292:
                    293: <p>
                    294: <li>
1.119     deraadt   295: <a name=26></a>
                    296:
                    297: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.6 Security Advisories</font></h3>
                    298: These are the OpenBSD 2.6 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    299: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>.  Obviously, all the
                    300: OpenBSD 2.5 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.6.
                    301:
                    302: <p>
                    303: <ul>
1.130     deraadt   304: <li><a href=errata26.html#semconfig>May 26, 2000:
                    305:        SYSV semaphore support contained an undocumented system call
1.131     deraadt   306:        which could wedge semaphore-using processes from exiting. (patch included)</a>
1.127     kjell     307: <li><a href=errata26.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
                    308:        Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
                    309:        in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
1.126     deraadt   310: <li><a href=errata26.html#xlockmore>May 25, 2000:
1.125     deraadt   311:        xlockmore has a bug which a localhost attacker can use to gain
                    312:        access to the encrypted root password hash (which is normally
                    313:        encoded using blowfish (see
                    314:        <a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=crypt&sektion=3">
                    315:        crypt(3)</a>)
                    316:        (patch included).</a>
1.126     deraadt   317: <li><a href=errata26.html#procfs>Jan 20, 2000:
1.123     deraadt   318:        Systems running with procfs enabled and mounted are
                    319:        vulnerable to a very tricky exploit.  procfs is not
                    320:        mounted by default.
                    321:        (patch included).</a>
1.126     deraadt   322: <li><a href=errata26.html#ifmedia>Nov 9, 1999:
1.125     deraadt   323:        Any user could change interface media configurations, resulting in
                    324:        a localhost denial of service attack.
1.119     deraadt   325:        (patch included).</a>
1.126     deraadt   326: <li><a href=errata26.html#sslUSA>Dec 2, 1999:
1.120     deraadt   327:        A buffer overflow in the RSAREF code included in the
                    328:        USA version of libssl, is possibly exploitable in
                    329:        httpd, ssh, or isakmpd, if SSL/RSA features are enabled.
1.124     deraadt   330:        (patch included).<br></a>
                    331:        <strong>Update:</strong> Turns out that this was not exploitable
                    332:        in any of the software included in OpenBSD 2.6.
1.126     deraadt   333: <li><a href=errata26.html#sendmail>Dec 4, 1999:
1.121     deraadt   334:        Sendmail permitted any user to cause a aliases file wrap,
                    335:        thus exposing the system to a race where the aliases file
                    336:        did not exist.
                    337:        (patch included).</a>
1.119     deraadt   338: </ul>
                    339:
                    340: <p>
                    341: <li>
                    342:
1.93      deraadt   343: <a name=25></a>
1.106     deraadt   344:
1.110     deraadt   345: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.5 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.93      deraadt   346: These are the OpenBSD 2.5 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    347: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>.  Obviously, all the
                    348: OpenBSD 2.4 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.5.
                    349:
1.96      deraadt   350: <p>
1.104     deraadt   351: <ul>
1.117     deraadt   352: <li><a href=errata25.html#cron>Aug 30, 1999:
1.103     deraadt   353:        In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the
                    354:        fake popen() and run sendmail as the user, not as root.
                    355:        (patch included).</a>
1.117     deraadt   356: <li><a href=errata25.html#miscfs>Aug 12, 1999: The procfs and fdescfs
1.101     deraadt   357:        filesystems had an overrun in their handling of uio_offset
                    358:        in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
                    359:        enabled by default). (patch included).</a>
1.117     deraadt   360: <li><a href=errata25.html#profil>Aug 9, 1999: Stop profiling (see profil(2))
1.100     deraadt   361:        when we execve() a new process. (patch included).</a>
1.117     deraadt   362: <li><a href=errata25.html#ipsec_in_use>Aug 6, 1999: Packets that should have
1.98      deraadt   363:        been handled by IPsec may be transmitted as cleartext.
                    364:        PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
                    365:        (patch included).</a>
1.117     deraadt   366: <li><a href=errata25.html#rc>Aug 5, 1999: In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for
1.97      deraadt   367:        motd re-writing and change the find(1) to use -execdir
                    368:        (patch included).</a>
1.117     deraadt   369: <li><a href=errata25.html#chflags>Jul 30, 1999: Do not permit regular
1.95      deraadt   370:        users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or block devices
                    371:        which they may currently be the owner of (patch included).</a>
1.117     deraadt   372: <li><a href=errata25.html#nroff>Jul 27, 1999: Cause groff(1) to be invoked
1.95      deraadt   373:        with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1) (patch included).</a>
1.93      deraadt   374: </ul>
                    375:
1.106     deraadt   376: <p>
                    377: <li>
1.75      deraadt   378: <a name=24></a>
1.110     deraadt   379: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.4 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.75      deraadt   380: These are the OpenBSD 2.4 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    381: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>.  Obviously, all the
                    382: OpenBSD 2.3 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.4.
                    383:
1.96      deraadt   384: <p>
1.75      deraadt   385: <ul>
1.92      deraadt   386: <li><a href=errata24.html#poll>Mar 22, 1999: The nfds argument for poll(2) needs
1.91      deraadt   387:        to be constrained, to avoid kvm starvation (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   388: <li><a href=errata24.html#tss>Mar 21, 1999: A change in TSS handling stops
1.91      deraadt   389:        another kernel crash case caused by the <strong>crashme</strong>
                    390:        program (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   391: <li><a href=errata24.html#nlink>Feb 25, 1999: An unbounded increment on the
1.90      deraadt   392:        nlink value in FFS and EXT2FS filesystems can cause a system crash.
1.89      deraadt   393:        (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   394: <li><a href=errata24.html#ping>Feb 23, 1999: Yet another buffer overflow
1.88      deraadt   395:        existed in ping(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   396: <li><a href=errata24.html#ipqrace>Feb 19, 1999: ipintr() had a race in use of
1.87      deraadt   397:        the ipq, which could permit an attacker to cause a crash.
                    398:        (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   399: <li><a href=errata24.html#accept>Feb 17, 1999: A race condition in the
1.86      deraadt   400:        kernel between accept(2) and select(2) could permit an attacker
                    401:        to hang sockets from remote.
                    402:        (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   403: <li><a href=errata24.html#maxqueue>Feb 17, 1999: IP fragment assembly can
1.85      deraadt   404:        bog the machine excessively and cause problems.
                    405:        (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   406: <li><a href=errata24.html#trctrap>Feb 12, 1999: i386 T_TRCTRAP handling and
1.84      deraadt   407:        DDB interacted to possibly cause a crash.
                    408:        (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   409: <li><a href=errata24.html#rst>Feb 11, 1999: TCP/IP RST handling was sloppy.
1.83      deraadt   410:        (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   411: <li><a href=errata24.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
1.81      deraadt   412:        problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   413: <li><a href=errata24.html#termcap>Nov 19, 1998: There is a possibly locally
1.82      deraadt   414:        exploitable problem relating to environment variables in termcap
                    415:        and curses. (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   416: <li><a href=errata24.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
1.78      deraadt   417:        bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.75      deraadt   418: </ul>
                    419:
1.106     deraadt   420: <p>
                    421: <li>
1.58      deraadt   422: <a name=23></a>
1.110     deraadt   423: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.3 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.73      deraadt   424: These are the OpenBSD 2.3 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    425: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>.  Obviously, all the
                    426: OpenBSD 2.2 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.3.
1.53      matthieu  427:
1.96      deraadt   428: <p>
1.53      matthieu  429: <ul>
1.81      deraadt   430: <li><a href=errata23.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
                    431:        problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.78      deraadt   432: <li><a href=errata23.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
                    433:        bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.76      aaron     434: <li><a href=errata23.html#fdalloc>Jul  2, 1998: setuid and setgid processes
1.72      deraadt   435:        should not be executed with fd slots 0, 1, or 2 free.
                    436:        (patch included).</a>
1.79      deraadt   437: <li><a href=errata23.html#resolver>August 31, 1998: A benign looking resolver buffer overflow bug was re-introduced accidentally (patches included).</a>
1.76      aaron     438: <li><a href=errata23.html#xlib>June 6, 1998: Further problems with the X
1.71      deraadt   439:        libraries (patches included).</a>
1.76      aaron     440: <li><a href=errata23.html#pctr>June  4, 1998: on non-Intel i386 machines, any user
1.72      deraadt   441:        can use pctr(4) to crash the machine.</a>
1.76      aaron     442: <li><a href=errata23.html#kill>May 17, 1998: kill(2) of setuid/setgid target
1.66      deraadt   443:        processes too permissive (4th revision patch included).</a>
1.76      aaron     444: <li><a href=errata23.html#immutable>May 11, 1998: mmap() permits partial bypassing
1.60      deraadt   445:        of immutable and append-only file flags. (patch included).</a>
1.76      aaron     446: <li><a href=errata23.html#xterm-xaw>May  1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm and Xaw
1.58      deraadt   447:        (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
1.76      aaron     448: <li><a href=errata23.html#ipsec>May  5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC packets
1.59      deraadt   449:        if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
1.53      matthieu  450: </ul>
1.9       deraadt   451:
1.106     deraadt   452: <p>
                    453: <li>
1.58      deraadt   454: <a name=22></a>
1.110     deraadt   455: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.2 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.45      deraadt   456: These are the OpenBSD 2.2 advisories.  All these problems are solved
1.55      deraadt   457: in <a href=23.html>OpenBSD 2.3</a>.  Some of these problems
1.45      deraadt   458: still exist in other operating systems.  (The supplied patches are for
                    459: OpenBSD 2.2; they may or may not work on OpenBSD 2.1).
1.9       deraadt   460:
1.96      deraadt   461: <p>
1.9       deraadt   462: <ul>
1.72      deraadt   463: <li><a href=errata22.html#ipsec>May  5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC
                    464:        packets if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
                    465: <li><a href=errata22.html#xterm-xaw>May  1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm
                    466:        and Xaw (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
                    467: <li><a href=errata22.html#uucpd>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer overflow in uucpd
                    468:        (patch included).</a>
                    469: <li><a href=errata22.html#rmjob>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer mismanagement in lprm
                    470:        (patch included).</a>
                    471: <li><a href=errata22.html#ping>Mar 31, 1998: Overflow in ping -R (patch included).</a>
                    472: <li><a href=errata22.html#named>Mar 30, 1998: Overflow in named fake-iquery
1.59      deraadt   473:        (patch included).</a>
1.72      deraadt   474: <li><a href=errata22.html#mountd>Mar  2, 1998: Accidental NFS filesystem
                    475:        export (patch included).</a>
1.112     philen    476: <li><a href="advisories/mmap.txt">Feb 26, 1998: Read-write mmap() flaw.</a>
1.72      deraadt   477:        Revision 3 of the patch is available <a href=errata22.html#mmap>here</a>
1.112     philen    478: <li><a href="advisories/sourceroute.txt">Feb 19, 1998: Sourcerouted Packet
1.59      deraadt   479:        Acceptance.</a>
1.50      deraadt   480:        A patch is available <a href=errata22.html#sourceroute>here</a>.
1.122     rohee     481: <li><a href=errata22.html#ruserok>Feb 13, 1998: Setuid coredump &amp; Ruserok()
1.72      deraadt   482:        flaw (patch included).</a>
                    483: <li><a href=errata22.html#ldso>Feb  9, 1998: MIPS ld.so flaw (patch included).</a>
                    484: <li><a href=errata22.html#f00f>Dec 10, 1997: Intel P5 f00f lockup
1.59      deraadt   485:        (patch included).</a>
1.1       deraadt   486: </ul>
                    487:
1.106     deraadt   488: <p>
                    489: <li>
1.58      deraadt   490: <a name=21></a>
1.110     deraadt   491: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.1 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.52      deraadt   492: These are the OpenBSD 2.1 advisories.  All these problems are solved
                    493: in <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>.  Some of these problems still
                    494: exist in other operating systems.  (If you are running OpenBSD 2.1, we
                    495: would strongly recommend an upgrade to the newest release, as this
                    496: patch list only attempts at fixing the most important security
                    497: problems.  In particular, OpenBSD 2.2 fixes numerous localhost
                    498: security problems.  Many of those problems were solved in ways which
                    499: make it hard for us to provide patches).
                    500:
1.96      deraadt   501: <p>
1.52      deraadt   502: <ul>
1.112     philen    503: <li><a href="advisories/signals.txt">Sep 15, 1997: Deviant Signals (patch included)</a>
                    504: <li><a href="advisories/rfork.txt">Aug  2, 1997: Rfork() system call flaw
1.59      deraadt   505:        (patch included)</a>
1.112     philen    506: <li><a href="advisories/procfs.txt">Jun 24, 1997: Procfs flaws (patch included)</a>
1.52      deraadt   507: </ul>
1.51      deraadt   508:
1.106     deraadt   509: <p>
                    510: <li>
                    511: <a name=20></a>
1.110     deraadt   512: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.99      deraadt   513: These are the OpenBSD 2.0 advisories.  All these problems are solved
                    514: in <a href=21.html>OpenBSD 2.1</a>.  Some of these problems still
                    515: exist in other operating systems.  (If you are running OpenBSD 2.0, we
                    516: commend you for being there back in the old days!, but you're really
                    517: missing out if you don't install a new version!)
                    518:
                    519: <p>
                    520: <ul>
1.112     philen    521: <li><a href="advisories/res_random.txt">April 22, 1997: Predictable IDs in the
1.99      deraadt   522:        resolver (patch included)</a>
                    523: <li>Many others... if people can hunt them down, please let me know
                    524:        and we'll put them up here.
                    525: </ul>
                    526:
1.106     deraadt   527: </dl>
1.51      deraadt   528: <p>
1.106     deraadt   529:
                    530: <a name=watching></a>
1.110     deraadt   531: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Watching our Changes</font></h3><p>
1.106     deraadt   532:
1.21      deraadt   533: Since we take a proactive stance with security, we are continually
                    534: finding and fixing new security problems.  Not all of these problems
1.80      espie     535: get widely reported because (as stated earlier) many of them are not
1.45      deraadt   536: confirmed to be exploitable; many simple bugs we fix do turn out to
                    537: have security consequences we could not predict.  We do not have the
                    538: time resources to make these changes available in the above format.<p>
1.21      deraadt   539:
                    540: Thus there are usually minor security fixes in the current source code
                    541: beyond the previous major OpenBSD release.  We make a limited
1.45      deraadt   542: guarantee that these problems are of minimal impact and unproven
1.44      ian       543: exploitability.  If we discover that a problem definitely matters for
1.45      deraadt   544: security, patches will show up here <strong>VERY</strong> quickly.<p>
1.21      deraadt   545:
1.45      deraadt   546: People who are really concerned with security can do a number of
                    547: things:<p>
1.21      deraadt   548:
                    549: <ul>
                    550: <li>If you understand security issues, watch our
1.27      deraadt   551:        <a href=mail.html>source-changes mailing list</a> and keep an
1.23      deraadt   552:        eye out for things which appear security related.  Since
1.21      deraadt   553:        exploitability is not proven for many of the fixes we make,
                    554:        do not expect the relevant commit message to say "SECURITY FIX!".
                    555:        If a problem is proven and serious, a patch will be available
                    556:        here very shortly after.
1.161   ! horacio   557: <li>In addition to source changes, you can watch our <a href="mail.html">
1.160     ericj     558:        security-announce mailing list</a> which will notify you for every
                    559:        security related item that the OpenBSD team deams as a possible threat,
                    560:        and instruct you on how to patch the problem.
1.21      deraadt   561: <li>Track our current source code tree, and teach yourself how to do a
1.29      deraadt   562:        complete system build from time to time (read /usr/src/Makefile
                    563:        carefully).  Users can make the assumption that the current
                    564:        source tree always has stronger security than the previous release.
1.45      deraadt   565:        However, building your own system from source code is not trivial;
                    566:        it is nearly 300MB of source code, and problems do occur as we
                    567:        transition between major releases.
1.115     ericj     568: <li>Install a binary snapshot for your
1.80      espie     569:        architecture, which are made available fairly often.  For
1.29      deraadt   570:        instance, an i386 snapshot is typically made available weekly.
1.21      deraadt   571: </ul>
                    572:
1.9       deraadt   573: <p>
1.153     jufi      574: <a name=reporting></a>
1.110     deraadt   575: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Reporting problems</font></h3><p>
1.3       deraadt   576:
1.5       deraadt   577: <p> If you find a new security problem, you can mail it to
1.6       deraadt   578: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>deraadt@openbsd.org</a>.
1.7       deraadt   579: <br>
1.5       deraadt   580: If you wish to PGP encode it (but please only do so if privacy is very
1.112     philen    581: urgent, since it is inconvenient) use this <a href="advisories/pgpkey.txt">pgp key</a>.
1.5       deraadt   582:
1.107     deraadt   583: <p>
                    584: <a name=papers></a>
1.110     deraadt   585: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Further Reading</font></h3><p>
1.107     deraadt   586:
                    587: A number of papers have been written by OpenBSD team members, about security
                    588: related changes they have done in OpenBSD.  The postscript versions of these
1.108     deraadt   589: documents are available as follows.<p>
1.107     deraadt   590:
                    591: <ul>
1.113     deraadt   592: <li>A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme.<br>
1.118     deraadt   593:     <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.153     jufi      594:     by <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>,
1.113     deraadt   595:     <a href=mailto:dm@openbsd.org>David Mazieres</a>.<br>
1.107     deraadt   596:     <a href=papers/bcrypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
                    597:     <a href=papers/bcrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113     deraadt   598: <p>
                    599: <li>Cryptography in OpenBSD: An Overview.<br>
1.118     deraadt   600:     <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113     deraadt   601:     by <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>,
                    602:     <a href=mailto:niklas@openbsd.org>Niklas Hallqvist</a>,
                    603:     <a href=mailto:art@openbsd.org>Artur Grabowski</a>,
                    604:     <a href=mailto:angelos@openbsd.org>Angelos D. Keromytis</a>,
                    605:     <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.107     deraadt   606:     <a href=papers/crypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
                    607:     <a href=papers/crypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113     deraadt   608: <p>
                    609: <li>strlcpy and strlcat -- consistent, safe, string copy and concatenation.<br>
1.118     deraadt   610:     <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113     deraadt   611:     by <a href=mailto:millert@openbsd.org>Todd C. Miller</a>,
                    612:     <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>.<br>
1.109     deraadt   613:     <a href=papers/strlcpy-paper.ps>paper</a> and
                    614:     <a href=papers/strlcpy-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113     deraadt   615: <p>
1.118     deraadt   616: <li>Dealing with Public Ethernet Jacks-Switches, Gateways, and Authentication.<br>
                    617:     <a href=events.html#lisa99>LISA 1999</a>,
                    618:     by <a href=mailto:beck@openbsd.org>Bob Beck</a>.<br>
                    619:     <a href=papers/authgw-paper.ps>paper</a> and
                    620:     <a href=papers/authgw-slides.ps>slides</a>.
                    621: <p>
1.153     jufi      622: <li>Encrypting Virtual Memory<br>
1.142     deraadt   623:     <a href=events.html#sec2000>Usenix Security 2000</a>,
                    624:     <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.143     provos    625:     <a href=papers/swapencrypt.ps>paper</a> and
                    626:     <a href=papers/swapencrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.142     deraadt   627: <p>
1.107     deraadt   628: </ul>
                    629:
1.106     deraadt   630: </dl>
                    631:
1.2       deraadt   632: <hr>
1.68      pauls     633: <a href=index.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.24      deraadt   634: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
                    635: <br>
1.161   ! horacio   636: <small>$OpenBSD: security.html,v 1.160 2000/12/26 16:13:44 ericj Exp $</small>
1.1       deraadt   637:
1.24      deraadt   638: </body>
                    639: </html>