Annotation of www/security.html, Revision 1.190
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1.20 deraadt 4: <title>OpenBSD Security</title>
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1.77 deraadt 14: <img alt="[OpenBSD]" height=30 width=141 SRC="images/smalltitle.gif">
1.106 deraadt 15: <p>
1.110 deraadt 16: <h2><font color=#e00000>Security</font><hr></h2>
1.1 deraadt 17:
1.114 philen 18: <table width="100%">
19: <tr>
20: <td colspan="2">
21: <strong>Index</strong>
22: </td>
23: </tr>
24: <tr>
25: <td valign="top">
1.106 deraadt 26: <a href=#goals>Security goals of the Project</a>.<br>
27: <a href=#disclosure>Full Disclosure policy</a>.<br>
28: <a href=#process>Source code auditing process</a>.<br>
1.111 aaron 29: <a href=#default>"Secure by Default"</a>.<br>
1.106 deraadt 30: <a href=#crypto>Use of Cryptography</a>.<br>
31: <p>
32: <a href=#watching>Watching changes</a>.<br>
33: <a href=#reporting>Reporting security issues</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 34: <a href=#papers>Further Reading</a><br>
1.106 deraadt 35: <p>
1.114 philen 36: </td>
37: <td valign="top">
1.187 deraadt 38: <a href="#30">For 3.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.173 deraadt 39: <a href="#29">For 2.9 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.152 deraadt 40: <a href="#28">For 2.8 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.124 deraadt 41: <a href="#27">For 2.7 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.119 deraadt 42: <a href="#26">For 2.6 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.114 philen 43: <a href="#25">For 2.5 security advisories</a>.<br>
44: <a href="#24">For 2.4 security advisories</a>.<br>
45: <a href="#23">For 2.3 security advisories</a>.<br>
46: <a href="#22">For 2.2 security advisories</a>.<br>
47: <a href="#21">For 2.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
48: <a href="#20">For 2.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
49: </td>
50: </tr>
51: </table>
1.56 deraadt 52: <hr>
53:
1.106 deraadt 54: <dl>
55: <a name=goals></a>
1.110 deraadt 56: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Goal</font></h3><p>
1.22 deraadt 57:
1.14 deraadt 58: OpenBSD believes in strong security. Our aspiration is to be NUMBER
1.22 deraadt 59: ONE in the industry for security (if we are not already there). Our
60: open software development model permits us to take a more
61: uncompromising view towards increased security than Sun, SGI, IBM, HP,
62: or other vendors are able to. We can make changes the vendors would
1.27 deraadt 63: not make. Also, since OpenBSD is exported with <a href=crypto.html>
1.45 deraadt 64: cryptography</a>, we are able to take cryptographic approaches towards
65: fixing security problems.<p>
1.18 deraadt 66:
1.106 deraadt 67: <a name=disclosure></a>
1.110 deraadt 68: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Full Disclosure</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 69:
1.45 deraadt 70: Like many readers of the
1.102 deraadt 71: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>
1.18 deraadt 72: BUGTRAQ mailing list</a>,
1.106 deraadt 73: we believe in full disclosure of security problems. In the
74: operating system arena, we were probably the first to embrace
75: the concept. Many vendors, even of free software, still try
76: to hide issues from their users.<p>
77:
78: Security information moves very fast in cracker circles. On the other
79: hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security
80: fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix
81: turnaround is possible. Thus we think that full disclosure helps the
82: people who really care about security.<p>
83:
1.153 jufi 84: <a name=process></a>
1.110 deraadt 85: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Audit Process</font></h3><p>
1.15 deraadt 86:
1.12 deraadt 87: Our security auditing team typically has between six and twelve
1.45 deraadt 88: members who continue to search for and fix new security holes. We
89: have been auditing since the summer of 1996. The process we follow to
90: increase security is simply a comprehensive file-by-file analysis of
1.106 deraadt 91: every critical software component. We are not so much looking for
92: security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if
1.138 deraadt 93: years later someone discovers the problem used to be a security
1.106 deraadt 94: issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the
95: better. Flaws have been found in just about every area of the system.
96: Entire new classes of security problems have been found during our
97: audit, and often source code which had been audited earlier needs
98: re-auditing with these new flaws in mind. Code often gets audited
99: multiple times, and by multiple people with different auditing
100: skills.<p>
1.12 deraadt 101:
1.94 deraadt 102: Some members of our security auditing team worked for Secure Networks,
103: the company that made the industry's premier network security scanning
104: software package Ballista (Secure Networks got purchased by Network
105: Associates, Ballista got renamed to Cybercop Scanner, and well...)
106: That company did a lot of security research, and thus fit in well
1.106 deraadt 107: with the OpenBSD stance. OpenBSD passed Ballista's tests with flying
108: colours since day 1.<p>
1.31 deraadt 109:
1.34 deraadt 110: Another facet of our security auditing process is its proactiveness.
1.45 deraadt 111: In most cases we have found that the determination of exploitability
112: is not an issue. During our ongoing auditing process we find many
113: bugs, and endeavor to fix them even though exploitability is not
114: proven. We fix the bug, and we move on to find other bugs to fix. We
115: have fixed many simple and obvious careless programming errors in code
116: and only months later discovered that the problems were in fact
117: exploitable. (Or, more likely someone on
1.102 deraadt 118: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>
1.45 deraadt 119: would report that other operating systems were vulnerable to a `newly
120: discovered problem', and then it would be discovered that OpenBSD had
121: been fixed in a previous release). In other cases we have been saved
122: from full exploitability of complex step-by-step attacks because we
123: had fixed one of the intermediate steps. An example of where we
1.94 deraadt 124: managed such a success is the lpd advisory that Secure Networks put out.
125: <p>
1.29 deraadt 126:
1.110 deraadt 127: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>The Reward</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 128:
1.45 deraadt 129: Our proactive auditing process has really paid off. Statements like
1.35 deraadt 130: ``This problem was fixed in OpenBSD about 6 months ago'' have become
1.45 deraadt 131: commonplace in security forums like
1.102 deraadt 132: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>.<p>
1.35 deraadt 133:
1.45 deraadt 134: The most intense part of our security auditing happened immediately
1.80 espie 135: before the OpenBSD 2.0 release and during the 2.0->2.1 transition,
1.45 deraadt 136: over the last third of 1996 and first half of 1997. Thousands (yes,
137: thousands) of security issues were fixed rapidly over this year-long
138: period; bugs like the standard buffer overflows, protocol
139: implementation weaknesses, information gathering, and filesystem
140: races. Hence most of the security problems that we encountered were
141: fixed before our 2.1 release, and then a far smaller number needed
142: fixing for our 2.2 release. We do not find as many problems anymore,
143: it is simply a case of diminishing returns. Recently the security
144: problems we find and fix tend to be significantly more obscure or
145: complicated. Still we will persist for a number of reasons:<p>
1.36 deraadt 146:
1.35 deraadt 147: <ul>
1.45 deraadt 148: <li>Occasionally we find a simple problem we missed earlier. Doh!
1.35 deraadt 149: <li>Security is like an arms race; the best attackers will continue
1.45 deraadt 150: to search for more complicated exploits, so we will too.
151: <li>Finding and fixing subtle flaws in complicated software is
152: a lot of fun.
1.35 deraadt 153: </ul>
1.106 deraadt 154: <p>
1.15 deraadt 155:
1.14 deraadt 156: The auditing process is not over yet, and as you can see we continue
1.28 deraadt 157: to find and fix new security flaws.<p>
1.12 deraadt 158:
1.106 deraadt 159: <a name=default></a>
1.110 deraadt 160: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>"Secure by Default"</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 161:
162: To ensure that novice users of OpenBSD do not need to become security
163: experts overnight (a viewpoint which other vendors seem to have), we
164: ship the operating system in a Secure by Default mode. All non-essential
165: services are disabled. As the user/administrator becomes more familiar
166: with the system, he will discover that he has to enable daemons and other
167: parts of the system. During the process of learning how to enable a new
168: service, the novice is more likely to learn of security considerations.<p>
169:
170: This is in stark contrast to the increasing number of systems that
171: ship with NFS, mountd, web servers, and various other services enabled
172: by default, creating instantaneous security problems for their users
173: within minutes after their first install.<p>
174:
1.153 jufi 175: <a name=crypto></a>
1.110 deraadt 176: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Cryptography</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 177:
178: And of course, since the OpenBSD project is based in Canada, it is possible
179: for us to integrate cryptography. For more information, read the page
1.116 deraadt 180: outlining <a href=crypto.html>what we have done with cryptography</a>.</p>
1.106 deraadt 181:
1.110 deraadt 182: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Advisories</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 183:
184: <dl>
185:
186: <li>
1.187 deraadt 187: <a name=30></a>
188:
189: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 3.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
190: These are the OpenBSD 3.0 advisories -- all these problems are solved
191: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
192: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
193:
194: <p>
195: <ul>
1.189 millert 196: <li><a href=errata.html#lpd>November 28, 2001:
197: An attacker can trick a machine running the lpd daemon into
198: creating new files in the root directory from a machine with
199: remote line printer access.</a>
1.188 millert 200: <li><a href=errata.html#vi.recover>November 13, 2001:
201: The vi.recover script can be abused in such a way as
202: to cause arbitrary zero-length files to be removed.</a>
1.190 ! mpech 203: <li><a href=errata.html#pf>November 13, 2001:
! 204: pf(4) was incapable of dealing with certain ipv6 icmp packets,
! 205: resulting in a crash.</a>
! 206: <li><a href=errata.html#sshd>November 12, 2001:
! 207: A security hole that may allow an attacker to partially authenticate
! 208: if -- and only if -- the administrator has enabled KerberosV.</a>
1.187 deraadt 209: </ul>
210:
211: <p>
212: <li>
1.173 deraadt 213: <a name=29></a>
214:
215: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.9 Security Advisories</font></h3>
216: These are the OpenBSD 2.9 advisories -- all these problems are solved
217: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
1.179 jufi 218: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
1.173 deraadt 219:
220: <p>
221: <ul>
1.189 millert 222: <li><a href=errata29.html#lpd2>November 28, 2001:
223: An attacker can trick a machine running the lpd daemon into
224: creating new files in the root directory from a machine with
225: remote line printer access.</a>
1.190 ! mpech 226: <li><a href=errata29.html#vi.recover>November 13, 2001:
! 227: The vi.recover script can be abused in such a way as
! 228: to cause arbitrary zero-length files to be removed.</a>
1.185 deraadt 229: <li><a href=errata29.html#uucp>September 11, 2001:
1.184 millert 230: A security hole exists in uuxqt(8) that may allow an
231: attacker to gain root privileges.</a>
1.185 deraadt 232: <li><a href=errata29.html#lpd>August 29, 2001:
1.183 millert 233: A security hole exists in lpd(8) that may allow an
234: attacker to gain root privileges if lpd is running.</a>
1.185 deraadt 235: <li><a href=errata29.html#sendmail2>August 21, 2001:
1.181 millert 236: A security hole exists in sendmail(8) that may allow an
237: attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.185 deraadt 238: <li><a href=errata29.html#nfs>July 30, 2001:
1.180 jason 239: A kernel buffer overflow in the NFS code can be used to execute
240: arbitrary code by users with mount privileges (only root by
1.181 millert 241: default).</a>
1.185 deraadt 242: <li><a href=errata29.html#kernexec>June 15, 2001:
1.178 aaron 243: A race condition in the kernel can lead to local root compromise.</a>
1.185 deraadt 244: <li><a href=errata29.html#sshcookie>June 12, 2001:
1.177 markus 245: sshd(8) allows users to delete arbitrary files named "cookies"
246: if X11 forwarding is enabled. X11 forwarding is disabled
247: by default.</a>
1.185 deraadt 248: <li><a href=errata29.html#fts>May 30, 2001:
1.176 millert 249: Programs using the fts routines can be tricked into changing
250: into the wrong directory.</a>
1.185 deraadt 251: <li><a href=errata29.html#sendmail>May 29, 2001:
1.174 millert 252: Sendmail signal handlers contain unsafe code,
253: leading to numerous race conditions.</a>
1.173 deraadt 254: </ul>
255:
256: <p>
257: <li>
1.152 deraadt 258: <a name=28></a>
259:
260: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.8 Security Advisories</font></h3>
261: These are the OpenBSD 2.8 advisories -- all these problems are solved
1.154 millert 262: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
1.179 jufi 263: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
1.152 deraadt 264:
265: <p>
266: <ul>
1.184 millert 267: <li><a href=errata28.html#uucp>September 11, 2001:
268: A security hole exists in uuxqt(8) that may allow an
269: attacker to gain root privileges.</a>
1.183 millert 270: <li><a href=errata28.html#lpd>August 29, 2001:
271: A security hole exists in lpd(8) that may allow an
272: attacker to gain root privileges if lpd is running.</a>
1.181 millert 273: <li><a href=errata28.html#sendmail2>August 21, 2001:
274: A security hole exists in sendmail(8) that may allow an
275: attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.178 aaron 276: <li><a href=errata28.html#kernexec>June 15, 2001:
277: A race condition in the kernel can lead to local root compromise.</a>
1.176 millert 278: <li><a href=errata28.html#fts>May 30, 2001:
279: Programs using the fts routines can be tricked into changing
280: into the wrong directory.</a>
1.175 millert 281: <li><a href=errata28.html#sendmail>May 29, 2001:
282: Sendmail signal handlers contain unsafe code,
283: leading to numerous race conditions.</a>
1.173 deraadt 284: <li><a href=errata28.html#ipf_frag>Apr 23, 2001:
1.172 ericj 285: IPF contains a serious bug with its handling of fragment cacheing.</a>
1.173 deraadt 286: <li><a href=errata28.html#glob_limit>Apr 23, 2001:
1.172 ericj 287: ftpd(8) contains a potential DoS relating to glob(3).</a>
1.173 deraadt 288: <li><a href=errata28.html#glob>Apr 10, 2001:
1.170 ericj 289: The glob(3) library call contains multiple buffer overflows.</a>
1.173 deraadt 290: <li><a href=errata28.html#readline>Mar 18, 2001:
1.169 millert 291: The readline library creates history files with permissive modes based on the user's umask.</a>
1.173 deraadt 292: <li><a href=errata28.html#ipsec_ah>Mar 2, 2001:
1.167 ericj 293: Insufficient checks in the IPSEC AH IPv4 option handling code can lead to a buffer overrun in the kernel.</a>
1.173 deraadt 294: <li><a href=errata28.html#userldt>Mar 2, 2001:
1.168 horacio 295: The <b>USER_LDT</b> kernel option allows an attacker to gain access to privileged areas of kernel memory.</a>
1.173 deraadt 296: <li><a href=errata28.html#sudo>Feb 22, 2001:
1.171 millert 297: a non-exploitable buffer overflow was fixed in sudo(8).</a>
1.173 deraadt 298: <li><a href=errata28.html#named>Jan 29, 2001:
1.163 jason 299: merge named(8) with ISC BIND 4.9.8-REL, which fixes some buffer vulnerabilities.</a>
1.173 deraadt 300: <li><a href=errata28.html#rnd>Jan 22, 2001:
1.162 jason 301: rnd(4) did not use all of its input when written to.</a>
1.173 deraadt 302: <li><a href=errata28.html#xlock>Dec 22, 2000:
1.159 ericj 303: xlock(1)'s authentication was re-done to authenticate via a named pipe. (patch and new xlock binaries included).</a>
1.173 deraadt 304: <li><a href=errata28.html#procfs>Dec 18, 2000:
1.157 ericj 305: Procfs contains numerous overflows. Procfs is not used by default in OpenBSD. (patch included).</a>
1.173 deraadt 306: <li><a href=errata28.html#kerberos2>Dec 10, 2000:
1.156 deraadt 307: Another problem exists in KerberosIV libraries (patch included).</a>
1.173 deraadt 308: <li><a href=errata28.html#kerberos>Dec 7, 2000:
1.155 deraadt 309: A set of problems in KerberosIV exist (patch included).</a>
1.173 deraadt 310: <li><a href=errata28.html#ftpd>Dec 4, 2000:
1.154 millert 311: A single-byte buffer overflow exists in ftpd (patch included).</a>
1.152 deraadt 312: </ul>
313:
314: <p>
315: <li>
1.124 deraadt 316: <a name=27></a>
317:
318: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.7 Security Advisories</font></h3>
319: These are the OpenBSD 2.7 advisories -- all these problems are solved
320: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
321: OpenBSD 2.6 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.7.
322:
323: <p>
324: <ul>
1.169 millert 325: <li><a href=errata27.html#readline>Mar 18, 2001:
326: The readline library creates history files with permissive modes based on the user's umask.</a>
327: <li><a href=errata27.html#sudo>Feb 22, 2001:
328: a buffer overflow was fixed in sudo(8).</a>
1.154 millert 329: <li><a href=errata27.html#ftpd>Dec 4, 2000:
330: A single-byte buffer overflow exists in ftpd (patch included).</a>
1.152 deraadt 331: <li><a href=errata27.html#sshforwarding>Nov 10, 2000:
332: Hostile servers can force OpenSSH clients to do agent or X11 forwarding.
333: (patch included)</a>
334: <li><a href=errata27.html#xtrans>Oct 26, 2000:
1.151 matthieu 335: X11 libraries have 2 potential overflows in xtrans code.
336: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 337: <li><a href=errata27.html#httpd>Oct 18, 2000:
1.150 beck 338: Apache mod_rewrite and mod_vhost_alias modules could expose files
339: on the server in certain configurations if used.
340: (patch included)</a>
1.164 deraadt 341: <li><a href=errata27.html#telnetd>Oct 10, 2000:
1.149 millert 342: The telnet daemon does not strip out the TERMINFO, TERMINFO_DIRS,
343: TERMPATH and TERMCAP environment variables as it should.
344: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 345: <li><a href=errata27.html#format_strings>Oct 6, 2000:
1.148 millert 346: There are printf-style format string bugs in several privileged
347: programs. (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 348: <li><a href=errata27.html#curses>Oct 6, 2000:
1.147 millert 349: libcurses honored terminal descriptions in the $HOME/.terminfo
350: directory as well as in the TERMCAP environment variable for
351: setuid and setgid applications.
1.146 deraadt 352: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 353: <li><a href=errata27.html#talkd>Oct 6, 2000:
1.146 deraadt 354: A format string vulnerability exists in talkd(8).
355: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 356: <li><a href=errata27.html#pw_error>Oct 3, 2000:
1.145 aaron 357: A format string vulnerability exists in the pw_error() function of the
358: libutil library, yielding localhost root through chpass(1).
359: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 360: <li><a href=errata27.html#ipsec>Sep 18, 2000:
1.144 jason 361: Bad ESP/AH packets could cause a crash under certain conditions.
362: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 363: <li><a href=errata27.html#xlock>Aug 16, 2000:
1.141 deraadt 364: A format string vulnerability (localhost root) exists in xlock(1).
365: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 366: <li><a href=errata27.html#X11_libs>July 14, 2000:
1.139 deraadt 367: Various bugs found in X11 libraries have various side effects, almost
368: completely denial of service in OpenBSD.
369: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 370: <li><a href=errata27.html#ftpd>July 5, 2000:
1.136 deraadt 371: Just like pretty much all the other unix ftp daemons
372: on the planet, ftpd had a remote root hole in it.
373: Luckily, ftpd was not enabled by default.
1.137 deraadt 374: The problem exists if anonymous ftp is enabled.
1.136 deraadt 375: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 376: <li><a href=errata27.html#mopd>July 5, 2000:
1.136 deraadt 377: Mopd, very rarely used, contained some buffer overflows.
378: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 379: <li><a href=errata27.html#libedit>June 28, 2000:
1.135 deraadt 380: libedit would check for a <b>.editrc</b> file in the current
381: directory. Not known to be a real security issue, but a patch
382: is available anyways.
383: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 384: <li><a href=errata27.html#dhclient>June 24, 2000:
1.134 deraadt 385: A serious bug in dhclient(8) could allow strings from a
386: malicious dhcp server to be executed in the shell as root.
387: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 388: <li><a href=errata27.html#isakmpd>June 9, 2000:
1.133 deraadt 389: A serious bug in isakmpd(8) policy handling wherein
390: policy verification could be completely bypassed in isakmpd.
391: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 392: <li><a href=errata27.html#uselogin>June 6, 2000:
1.132 deraadt 393: The non-default flag UseLogin in <b>/etc/sshd_config</b> is broken,
394: should not be used, and results in security problems on
395: other operating systems.</a>
1.152 deraadt 396: <li><a href=errata27.html#bridge>May 26, 2000:
1.129 deraadt 397: The bridge(4) <i>learning</i> flag may be bypassed.
1.128 deraadt 398: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 399: <li><a href=errata27.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
1.127 kjell 400: Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
401: in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
402:
1.124 deraadt 403: </ul>
404:
405: <p>
406: <li>
1.119 deraadt 407: <a name=26></a>
408:
409: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.6 Security Advisories</font></h3>
410: These are the OpenBSD 2.6 advisories -- all these problems are solved
411: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
412: OpenBSD 2.5 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.6.
413:
414: <p>
415: <ul>
1.130 deraadt 416: <li><a href=errata26.html#semconfig>May 26, 2000:
417: SYSV semaphore support contained an undocumented system call
1.131 deraadt 418: which could wedge semaphore-using processes from exiting. (patch included)</a>
1.127 kjell 419: <li><a href=errata26.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
420: Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
421: in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
1.126 deraadt 422: <li><a href=errata26.html#xlockmore>May 25, 2000:
1.125 deraadt 423: xlockmore has a bug which a localhost attacker can use to gain
424: access to the encrypted root password hash (which is normally
425: encoded using blowfish (see
426: <a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=crypt&sektion=3">
427: crypt(3)</a>)
428: (patch included).</a>
1.126 deraadt 429: <li><a href=errata26.html#procfs>Jan 20, 2000:
1.123 deraadt 430: Systems running with procfs enabled and mounted are
431: vulnerable to a very tricky exploit. procfs is not
432: mounted by default.
433: (patch included).</a>
1.190 ! mpech 434: <li><a href=errata26.html#sendmail>Dec 4, 1999:
! 435: Sendmail permitted any user to cause a aliases file wrap,
! 436: thus exposing the system to a race where the aliases file
! 437: did not exist.
1.119 deraadt 438: (patch included).</a>
1.190 ! mpech 439: <li><a href=errata26.html#poll>Dec 4, 1999:
! 440: Various bugs in poll(2) may cause a kernel crash.</a>
1.126 deraadt 441: <li><a href=errata26.html#sslUSA>Dec 2, 1999:
1.120 deraadt 442: A buffer overflow in the RSAREF code included in the
443: USA version of libssl, is possibly exploitable in
444: httpd, ssh, or isakmpd, if SSL/RSA features are enabled.
1.124 deraadt 445: (patch included).<br></a>
446: <strong>Update:</strong> Turns out that this was not exploitable
447: in any of the software included in OpenBSD 2.6.
1.190 ! mpech 448: <li><a href=errata26.html#ifmedia>Nov 9, 1999:
! 449: Any user could change interface media configurations, resulting in
! 450: a localhost denial of service attack.
1.121 deraadt 451: (patch included).</a>
1.119 deraadt 452: </ul>
453:
454: <p>
455: <li>
456:
1.93 deraadt 457: <a name=25></a>
1.106 deraadt 458:
1.110 deraadt 459: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.5 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.93 deraadt 460: These are the OpenBSD 2.5 advisories -- all these problems are solved
461: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
462: OpenBSD 2.4 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.5.
463:
1.96 deraadt 464: <p>
1.104 deraadt 465: <ul>
1.117 deraadt 466: <li><a href=errata25.html#cron>Aug 30, 1999:
1.103 deraadt 467: In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the
468: fake popen() and run sendmail as the user, not as root.
469: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 470: <li><a href=errata25.html#miscfs>Aug 12, 1999: The procfs and fdescfs
1.101 deraadt 471: filesystems had an overrun in their handling of uio_offset
472: in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
473: enabled by default). (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 474: <li><a href=errata25.html#profil>Aug 9, 1999: Stop profiling (see profil(2))
1.100 deraadt 475: when we execve() a new process. (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 476: <li><a href=errata25.html#ipsec_in_use>Aug 6, 1999: Packets that should have
1.98 deraadt 477: been handled by IPsec may be transmitted as cleartext.
478: PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
479: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 480: <li><a href=errata25.html#rc>Aug 5, 1999: In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for
1.97 deraadt 481: motd re-writing and change the find(1) to use -execdir
482: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 483: <li><a href=errata25.html#chflags>Jul 30, 1999: Do not permit regular
1.95 deraadt 484: users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or block devices
485: which they may currently be the owner of (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 486: <li><a href=errata25.html#nroff>Jul 27, 1999: Cause groff(1) to be invoked
1.95 deraadt 487: with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1) (patch included).</a>
1.93 deraadt 488: </ul>
489:
1.106 deraadt 490: <p>
491: <li>
1.75 deraadt 492: <a name=24></a>
1.110 deraadt 493: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.4 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.75 deraadt 494: These are the OpenBSD 2.4 advisories -- all these problems are solved
495: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
496: OpenBSD 2.3 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.4.
497:
1.96 deraadt 498: <p>
1.75 deraadt 499: <ul>
1.92 deraadt 500: <li><a href=errata24.html#poll>Mar 22, 1999: The nfds argument for poll(2) needs
1.91 deraadt 501: to be constrained, to avoid kvm starvation (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 502: <li><a href=errata24.html#tss>Mar 21, 1999: A change in TSS handling stops
1.91 deraadt 503: another kernel crash case caused by the <strong>crashme</strong>
504: program (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 505: <li><a href=errata24.html#nlink>Feb 25, 1999: An unbounded increment on the
1.90 deraadt 506: nlink value in FFS and EXT2FS filesystems can cause a system crash.
1.89 deraadt 507: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 508: <li><a href=errata24.html#ping>Feb 23, 1999: Yet another buffer overflow
1.88 deraadt 509: existed in ping(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 510: <li><a href=errata24.html#ipqrace>Feb 19, 1999: ipintr() had a race in use of
1.87 deraadt 511: the ipq, which could permit an attacker to cause a crash.
512: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 513: <li><a href=errata24.html#accept>Feb 17, 1999: A race condition in the
1.86 deraadt 514: kernel between accept(2) and select(2) could permit an attacker
515: to hang sockets from remote.
516: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 517: <li><a href=errata24.html#maxqueue>Feb 17, 1999: IP fragment assembly can
1.85 deraadt 518: bog the machine excessively and cause problems.
519: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 520: <li><a href=errata24.html#trctrap>Feb 12, 1999: i386 T_TRCTRAP handling and
1.84 deraadt 521: DDB interacted to possibly cause a crash.
522: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 523: <li><a href=errata24.html#rst>Feb 11, 1999: TCP/IP RST handling was sloppy.
1.83 deraadt 524: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 525: <li><a href=errata24.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
1.81 deraadt 526: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 527: <li><a href=errata24.html#termcap>Nov 19, 1998: There is a possibly locally
1.82 deraadt 528: exploitable problem relating to environment variables in termcap
529: and curses. (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 530: <li><a href=errata24.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
1.78 deraadt 531: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.75 deraadt 532: </ul>
533:
1.106 deraadt 534: <p>
535: <li>
1.58 deraadt 536: <a name=23></a>
1.110 deraadt 537: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.3 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.73 deraadt 538: These are the OpenBSD 2.3 advisories -- all these problems are solved
539: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
540: OpenBSD 2.2 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.3.
1.53 matthieu 541:
1.96 deraadt 542: <p>
1.53 matthieu 543: <ul>
1.81 deraadt 544: <li><a href=errata23.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
545: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.78 deraadt 546: <li><a href=errata23.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
547: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.190 ! mpech 548: <li><a href=errata23.html#resolver>August 31, 1998: A benign looking resolver
! 549: buffer overflow bug was re-introduced accidentally (patches included).</a>
! 550: <li><a href=errata23.html#chpass>Aug 2, 1998:
! 551: chpass(1) has a file descriptor leak which allows an
! 552: attacker to modify /etc/master.passwd.</a>
! 553: <li><a href=errata23.html#inetd>July 15, 1998: Inetd had a file descriptor leak.</a>
1.76 aaron 554: <li><a href=errata23.html#fdalloc>Jul 2, 1998: setuid and setgid processes
1.72 deraadt 555: should not be executed with fd slots 0, 1, or 2 free.
556: (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 557: <li><a href=errata23.html#xlib>June 6, 1998: Further problems with the X
1.71 deraadt 558: libraries (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 559: <li><a href=errata23.html#kill>May 17, 1998: kill(2) of setuid/setgid target
1.66 deraadt 560: processes too permissive (4th revision patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 561: <li><a href=errata23.html#immutable>May 11, 1998: mmap() permits partial bypassing
1.60 deraadt 562: of immutable and append-only file flags. (patch included).</a>
1.190 ! mpech 563: <li><a href=errata23.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC packets
! 564: if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 565: <li><a href=errata23.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm and Xaw
1.58 deraadt 566: (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
1.53 matthieu 567: </ul>
1.9 deraadt 568:
1.106 deraadt 569: <p>
570: <li>
1.58 deraadt 571: <a name=22></a>
1.110 deraadt 572: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.2 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.45 deraadt 573: These are the OpenBSD 2.2 advisories. All these problems are solved
1.55 deraadt 574: in <a href=23.html>OpenBSD 2.3</a>. Some of these problems
1.45 deraadt 575: still exist in other operating systems. (The supplied patches are for
576: OpenBSD 2.2; they may or may not work on OpenBSD 2.1).
1.9 deraadt 577:
1.96 deraadt 578: <p>
1.9 deraadt 579: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 580: <li><a href=errata22.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC
581: packets if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
582: <li><a href=errata22.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm
583: and Xaw (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
584: <li><a href=errata22.html#uucpd>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer overflow in uucpd
585: (patch included).</a>
586: <li><a href=errata22.html#rmjob>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer mismanagement in lprm
587: (patch included).</a>
588: <li><a href=errata22.html#ping>Mar 31, 1998: Overflow in ping -R (patch included).</a>
589: <li><a href=errata22.html#named>Mar 30, 1998: Overflow in named fake-iquery
1.59 deraadt 590: (patch included).</a>
1.72 deraadt 591: <li><a href=errata22.html#mountd>Mar 2, 1998: Accidental NFS filesystem
592: export (patch included).</a>
1.112 philen 593: <li><a href="advisories/mmap.txt">Feb 26, 1998: Read-write mmap() flaw.</a>
1.72 deraadt 594: Revision 3 of the patch is available <a href=errata22.html#mmap>here</a>
1.112 philen 595: <li><a href="advisories/sourceroute.txt">Feb 19, 1998: Sourcerouted Packet
1.59 deraadt 596: Acceptance.</a>
1.50 deraadt 597: A patch is available <a href=errata22.html#sourceroute>here</a>.
1.122 rohee 598: <li><a href=errata22.html#ruserok>Feb 13, 1998: Setuid coredump & Ruserok()
1.72 deraadt 599: flaw (patch included).</a>
600: <li><a href=errata22.html#ldso>Feb 9, 1998: MIPS ld.so flaw (patch included).</a>
1.1 deraadt 601: </ul>
602:
1.106 deraadt 603: <p>
604: <li>
1.58 deraadt 605: <a name=21></a>
1.110 deraadt 606: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.1 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.52 deraadt 607: These are the OpenBSD 2.1 advisories. All these problems are solved
608: in <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>. Some of these problems still
609: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.1, we
610: would strongly recommend an upgrade to the newest release, as this
611: patch list only attempts at fixing the most important security
612: problems. In particular, OpenBSD 2.2 fixes numerous localhost
613: security problems. Many of those problems were solved in ways which
614: make it hard for us to provide patches).
615:
1.96 deraadt 616: <p>
1.52 deraadt 617: <ul>
1.112 philen 618: <li><a href="advisories/signals.txt">Sep 15, 1997: Deviant Signals (patch included)</a>
619: <li><a href="advisories/rfork.txt">Aug 2, 1997: Rfork() system call flaw
1.59 deraadt 620: (patch included)</a>
1.112 philen 621: <li><a href="advisories/procfs.txt">Jun 24, 1997: Procfs flaws (patch included)</a>
1.52 deraadt 622: </ul>
1.51 deraadt 623:
1.106 deraadt 624: <p>
625: <li>
626: <a name=20></a>
1.110 deraadt 627: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.99 deraadt 628: These are the OpenBSD 2.0 advisories. All these problems are solved
629: in <a href=21.html>OpenBSD 2.1</a>. Some of these problems still
630: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.0, we
631: commend you for being there back in the old days!, but you're really
632: missing out if you don't install a new version!)
633:
634: <p>
635: <ul>
1.112 philen 636: <li><a href="advisories/res_random.txt">April 22, 1997: Predictable IDs in the
1.99 deraadt 637: resolver (patch included)</a>
638: <li>Many others... if people can hunt them down, please let me know
639: and we'll put them up here.
640: </ul>
641:
1.106 deraadt 642: </dl>
1.51 deraadt 643: <p>
1.106 deraadt 644:
645: <a name=watching></a>
1.110 deraadt 646: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Watching our Changes</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 647:
1.21 deraadt 648: Since we take a proactive stance with security, we are continually
649: finding and fixing new security problems. Not all of these problems
1.80 espie 650: get widely reported because (as stated earlier) many of them are not
1.45 deraadt 651: confirmed to be exploitable; many simple bugs we fix do turn out to
652: have security consequences we could not predict. We do not have the
653: time resources to make these changes available in the above format.<p>
1.21 deraadt 654:
655: Thus there are usually minor security fixes in the current source code
656: beyond the previous major OpenBSD release. We make a limited
1.45 deraadt 657: guarantee that these problems are of minimal impact and unproven
1.44 ian 658: exploitability. If we discover that a problem definitely matters for
1.45 deraadt 659: security, patches will show up here <strong>VERY</strong> quickly.<p>
1.21 deraadt 660:
1.45 deraadt 661: People who are really concerned with security can do a number of
662: things:<p>
1.21 deraadt 663:
664: <ul>
665: <li>If you understand security issues, watch our
1.27 deraadt 666: <a href=mail.html>source-changes mailing list</a> and keep an
1.23 deraadt 667: eye out for things which appear security related. Since
1.21 deraadt 668: exploitability is not proven for many of the fixes we make,
669: do not expect the relevant commit message to say "SECURITY FIX!".
670: If a problem is proven and serious, a patch will be available
671: here very shortly after.
1.161 horacio 672: <li>In addition to source changes, you can watch our <a href="mail.html">
1.160 ericj 673: security-announce mailing list</a> which will notify you for every
1.186 ian 674: security related item that the OpenBSD team deems as a possible threat,
1.160 ericj 675: and instruct you on how to patch the problem.
1.21 deraadt 676: <li>Track our current source code tree, and teach yourself how to do a
1.29 deraadt 677: complete system build from time to time (read /usr/src/Makefile
678: carefully). Users can make the assumption that the current
679: source tree always has stronger security than the previous release.
1.45 deraadt 680: However, building your own system from source code is not trivial;
681: it is nearly 300MB of source code, and problems do occur as we
682: transition between major releases.
1.115 ericj 683: <li>Install a binary snapshot for your
1.80 espie 684: architecture, which are made available fairly often. For
1.29 deraadt 685: instance, an i386 snapshot is typically made available weekly.
1.21 deraadt 686: </ul>
687:
1.9 deraadt 688: <p>
1.153 jufi 689: <a name=reporting></a>
1.110 deraadt 690: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Reporting problems</font></h3><p>
1.3 deraadt 691:
1.5 deraadt 692: <p> If you find a new security problem, you can mail it to
1.6 deraadt 693: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>deraadt@openbsd.org</a>.
1.7 deraadt 694: <br>
1.5 deraadt 695: If you wish to PGP encode it (but please only do so if privacy is very
1.112 philen 696: urgent, since it is inconvenient) use this <a href="advisories/pgpkey.txt">pgp key</a>.
1.5 deraadt 697:
1.107 deraadt 698: <p>
699: <a name=papers></a>
1.110 deraadt 700: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Further Reading</font></h3><p>
1.107 deraadt 701:
702: A number of papers have been written by OpenBSD team members, about security
703: related changes they have done in OpenBSD. The postscript versions of these
1.108 deraadt 704: documents are available as follows.<p>
1.107 deraadt 705:
706: <ul>
1.113 deraadt 707: <li>A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme.<br>
1.118 deraadt 708: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.153 jufi 709: by <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>,
1.113 deraadt 710: <a href=mailto:dm@openbsd.org>David Mazieres</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 711: <a href=papers/bcrypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
712: <a href=papers/bcrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 713: <p>
714: <li>Cryptography in OpenBSD: An Overview.<br>
1.118 deraadt 715: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 716: by <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>,
717: <a href=mailto:niklas@openbsd.org>Niklas Hallqvist</a>,
718: <a href=mailto:art@openbsd.org>Artur Grabowski</a>,
719: <a href=mailto:angelos@openbsd.org>Angelos D. Keromytis</a>,
720: <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 721: <a href=papers/crypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
722: <a href=papers/crypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 723: <p>
724: <li>strlcpy and strlcat -- consistent, safe, string copy and concatenation.<br>
1.118 deraadt 725: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 726: by <a href=mailto:millert@openbsd.org>Todd C. Miller</a>,
727: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>.<br>
1.109 deraadt 728: <a href=papers/strlcpy-paper.ps>paper</a> and
729: <a href=papers/strlcpy-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 730: <p>
1.118 deraadt 731: <li>Dealing with Public Ethernet Jacks-Switches, Gateways, and Authentication.<br>
732: <a href=events.html#lisa99>LISA 1999</a>,
733: by <a href=mailto:beck@openbsd.org>Bob Beck</a>.<br>
734: <a href=papers/authgw-paper.ps>paper</a> and
735: <a href=papers/authgw-slides.ps>slides</a>.
736: <p>
1.153 jufi 737: <li>Encrypting Virtual Memory<br>
1.142 deraadt 738: <a href=events.html#sec2000>Usenix Security 2000</a>,
739: <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.143 provos 740: <a href=papers/swapencrypt.ps>paper</a> and
741: <a href=papers/swapencrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.142 deraadt 742: <p>
1.107 deraadt 743: </ul>
744:
1.106 deraadt 745: </dl>
746:
1.2 deraadt 747: <hr>
1.68 pauls 748: <a href=index.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.24 deraadt 749: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
750: <br>
1.190 ! mpech 751: <small>$OpenBSD: security.html,v 1.189 2001/12/04 02:53:13 millert Exp $</small>
1.1 deraadt 752:
1.24 deraadt 753: </body>
754: </html>
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