Annotation of www/security.html, Revision 1.196
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1.20 deraadt 4: <title>OpenBSD Security</title>
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1.77 deraadt 14: <img alt="[OpenBSD]" height=30 width=141 SRC="images/smalltitle.gif">
1.106 deraadt 15: <p>
1.110 deraadt 16: <h2><font color=#e00000>Security</font><hr></h2>
1.1 deraadt 17:
1.114 philen 18: <table width="100%">
19: <tr>
20: <td colspan="2">
21: <strong>Index</strong>
22: </td>
23: </tr>
24: <tr>
25: <td valign="top">
1.106 deraadt 26: <a href=#goals>Security goals of the Project</a>.<br>
27: <a href=#disclosure>Full Disclosure policy</a>.<br>
28: <a href=#process>Source code auditing process</a>.<br>
1.111 aaron 29: <a href=#default>"Secure by Default"</a>.<br>
1.106 deraadt 30: <a href=#crypto>Use of Cryptography</a>.<br>
31: <p>
32: <a href=#watching>Watching changes</a>.<br>
33: <a href=#reporting>Reporting security issues</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 34: <a href=#papers>Further Reading</a><br>
1.106 deraadt 35: <p>
1.114 philen 36: </td>
37: <td valign="top">
1.187 deraadt 38: <a href="#30">For 3.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.173 deraadt 39: <a href="#29">For 2.9 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.152 deraadt 40: <a href="#28">For 2.8 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.124 deraadt 41: <a href="#27">For 2.7 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.119 deraadt 42: <a href="#26">For 2.6 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.114 philen 43: <a href="#25">For 2.5 security advisories</a>.<br>
44: <a href="#24">For 2.4 security advisories</a>.<br>
45: <a href="#23">For 2.3 security advisories</a>.<br>
46: <a href="#22">For 2.2 security advisories</a>.<br>
47: <a href="#21">For 2.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
48: <a href="#20">For 2.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
49: </td>
50: </tr>
51: </table>
1.56 deraadt 52: <hr>
53:
1.106 deraadt 54: <dl>
55: <a name=goals></a>
1.110 deraadt 56: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Goal</font></h3><p>
1.22 deraadt 57:
1.14 deraadt 58: OpenBSD believes in strong security. Our aspiration is to be NUMBER
1.22 deraadt 59: ONE in the industry for security (if we are not already there). Our
60: open software development model permits us to take a more
61: uncompromising view towards increased security than Sun, SGI, IBM, HP,
62: or other vendors are able to. We can make changes the vendors would
1.27 deraadt 63: not make. Also, since OpenBSD is exported with <a href=crypto.html>
1.45 deraadt 64: cryptography</a>, we are able to take cryptographic approaches towards
65: fixing security problems.<p>
1.18 deraadt 66:
1.106 deraadt 67: <a name=disclosure></a>
1.110 deraadt 68: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Full Disclosure</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 69:
1.45 deraadt 70: Like many readers of the
1.196 ! jufi 71: <a href="http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1">
1.18 deraadt 72: BUGTRAQ mailing list</a>,
1.106 deraadt 73: we believe in full disclosure of security problems. In the
74: operating system arena, we were probably the first to embrace
75: the concept. Many vendors, even of free software, still try
76: to hide issues from their users.<p>
77:
78: Security information moves very fast in cracker circles. On the other
79: hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security
80: fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix
81: turnaround is possible. Thus we think that full disclosure helps the
82: people who really care about security.<p>
83:
1.153 jufi 84: <a name=process></a>
1.110 deraadt 85: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Audit Process</font></h3><p>
1.15 deraadt 86:
1.12 deraadt 87: Our security auditing team typically has between six and twelve
1.45 deraadt 88: members who continue to search for and fix new security holes. We
89: have been auditing since the summer of 1996. The process we follow to
90: increase security is simply a comprehensive file-by-file analysis of
1.106 deraadt 91: every critical software component. We are not so much looking for
92: security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if
1.138 deraadt 93: years later someone discovers the problem used to be a security
1.106 deraadt 94: issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the
95: better. Flaws have been found in just about every area of the system.
96: Entire new classes of security problems have been found during our
97: audit, and often source code which had been audited earlier needs
98: re-auditing with these new flaws in mind. Code often gets audited
99: multiple times, and by multiple people with different auditing
100: skills.<p>
1.12 deraadt 101:
1.94 deraadt 102: Some members of our security auditing team worked for Secure Networks,
103: the company that made the industry's premier network security scanning
104: software package Ballista (Secure Networks got purchased by Network
105: Associates, Ballista got renamed to Cybercop Scanner, and well...)
106: That company did a lot of security research, and thus fit in well
1.106 deraadt 107: with the OpenBSD stance. OpenBSD passed Ballista's tests with flying
108: colours since day 1.<p>
1.31 deraadt 109:
1.34 deraadt 110: Another facet of our security auditing process is its proactiveness.
1.45 deraadt 111: In most cases we have found that the determination of exploitability
112: is not an issue. During our ongoing auditing process we find many
113: bugs, and endeavor to fix them even though exploitability is not
114: proven. We fix the bug, and we move on to find other bugs to fix. We
115: have fixed many simple and obvious careless programming errors in code
116: and only months later discovered that the problems were in fact
117: exploitable. (Or, more likely someone on
1.102 deraadt 118: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>
1.45 deraadt 119: would report that other operating systems were vulnerable to a `newly
120: discovered problem', and then it would be discovered that OpenBSD had
121: been fixed in a previous release). In other cases we have been saved
122: from full exploitability of complex step-by-step attacks because we
123: had fixed one of the intermediate steps. An example of where we
1.94 deraadt 124: managed such a success is the lpd advisory that Secure Networks put out.
125: <p>
1.29 deraadt 126:
1.110 deraadt 127: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>The Reward</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 128:
1.45 deraadt 129: Our proactive auditing process has really paid off. Statements like
1.35 deraadt 130: ``This problem was fixed in OpenBSD about 6 months ago'' have become
1.45 deraadt 131: commonplace in security forums like
1.102 deraadt 132: <a href=http://www.securityfocus.com/bugtraq/archive>BUGTRAQ</a>.<p>
1.35 deraadt 133:
1.45 deraadt 134: The most intense part of our security auditing happened immediately
1.80 espie 135: before the OpenBSD 2.0 release and during the 2.0->2.1 transition,
1.45 deraadt 136: over the last third of 1996 and first half of 1997. Thousands (yes,
137: thousands) of security issues were fixed rapidly over this year-long
138: period; bugs like the standard buffer overflows, protocol
139: implementation weaknesses, information gathering, and filesystem
140: races. Hence most of the security problems that we encountered were
141: fixed before our 2.1 release, and then a far smaller number needed
142: fixing for our 2.2 release. We do not find as many problems anymore,
143: it is simply a case of diminishing returns. Recently the security
144: problems we find and fix tend to be significantly more obscure or
145: complicated. Still we will persist for a number of reasons:<p>
1.36 deraadt 146:
1.35 deraadt 147: <ul>
1.45 deraadt 148: <li>Occasionally we find a simple problem we missed earlier. Doh!
1.35 deraadt 149: <li>Security is like an arms race; the best attackers will continue
1.45 deraadt 150: to search for more complicated exploits, so we will too.
151: <li>Finding and fixing subtle flaws in complicated software is
152: a lot of fun.
1.35 deraadt 153: </ul>
1.106 deraadt 154: <p>
1.15 deraadt 155:
1.14 deraadt 156: The auditing process is not over yet, and as you can see we continue
1.28 deraadt 157: to find and fix new security flaws.<p>
1.12 deraadt 158:
1.106 deraadt 159: <a name=default></a>
1.110 deraadt 160: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>"Secure by Default"</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 161:
162: To ensure that novice users of OpenBSD do not need to become security
163: experts overnight (a viewpoint which other vendors seem to have), we
164: ship the operating system in a Secure by Default mode. All non-essential
165: services are disabled. As the user/administrator becomes more familiar
166: with the system, he will discover that he has to enable daemons and other
167: parts of the system. During the process of learning how to enable a new
168: service, the novice is more likely to learn of security considerations.<p>
169:
170: This is in stark contrast to the increasing number of systems that
171: ship with NFS, mountd, web servers, and various other services enabled
172: by default, creating instantaneous security problems for their users
173: within minutes after their first install.<p>
174:
1.153 jufi 175: <a name=crypto></a>
1.110 deraadt 176: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Cryptography</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 177:
178: And of course, since the OpenBSD project is based in Canada, it is possible
179: for us to integrate cryptography. For more information, read the page
1.116 deraadt 180: outlining <a href=crypto.html>what we have done with cryptography</a>.</p>
1.106 deraadt 181:
1.110 deraadt 182: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Advisories</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 183:
184: <dl>
185:
186: <li>
1.187 deraadt 187: <a name=30></a>
188:
189: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 3.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
190: These are the OpenBSD 3.0 advisories -- all these problems are solved
191: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
192: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
193:
194: <p>
195: <ul>
1.192 jason 196: <li><a href=errata.html#ptrace>January 21, 2002:
197: A race condition between the ptrace(2) and execve(2) system calls
198: allows an attacker to modify the memory contents of suid/sgid
199: processes which could lead to compromise of the super-user account.</a>
1.191 millert 200: <li><a href=errata.html#sudo>January 17, 2002:
201: There is a security hole in sudo(8) that can be exploited
202: when the Postfix sendmail replacement is installed that may
203: allow an attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.189 millert 204: <li><a href=errata.html#lpd>November 28, 2001:
205: An attacker can trick a machine running the lpd daemon into
206: creating new files in the root directory from a machine with
207: remote line printer access.</a>
1.188 millert 208: <li><a href=errata.html#vi.recover>November 13, 2001:
209: The vi.recover script can be abused in such a way as
210: to cause arbitrary zero-length files to be removed.</a>
1.190 mpech 211: <li><a href=errata.html#pf>November 13, 2001:
212: pf(4) was incapable of dealing with certain ipv6 icmp packets,
213: resulting in a crash.</a>
214: <li><a href=errata.html#sshd>November 12, 2001:
215: A security hole that may allow an attacker to partially authenticate
216: if -- and only if -- the administrator has enabled KerberosV.</a>
1.187 deraadt 217: </ul>
218:
219: <p>
220: <li>
1.173 deraadt 221: <a name=29></a>
222:
223: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.9 Security Advisories</font></h3>
224: These are the OpenBSD 2.9 advisories -- all these problems are solved
225: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
1.179 jufi 226: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
1.173 deraadt 227:
228: <p>
229: <ul>
1.191 millert 230: <li><a href=errata29.html#sudo>January 17, 2002:
231: There is a security hole in sudo(8) that can be exploited
232: when the Postfix sendmail replacement is installed that may
233: allow an attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.189 millert 234: <li><a href=errata29.html#lpd2>November 28, 2001:
235: An attacker can trick a machine running the lpd daemon into
236: creating new files in the root directory from a machine with
237: remote line printer access.</a>
1.190 mpech 238: <li><a href=errata29.html#vi.recover>November 13, 2001:
239: The vi.recover script can be abused in such a way as
240: to cause arbitrary zero-length files to be removed.</a>
1.185 deraadt 241: <li><a href=errata29.html#uucp>September 11, 2001:
1.184 millert 242: A security hole exists in uuxqt(8) that may allow an
243: attacker to gain root privileges.</a>
1.185 deraadt 244: <li><a href=errata29.html#lpd>August 29, 2001:
1.183 millert 245: A security hole exists in lpd(8) that may allow an
246: attacker to gain root privileges if lpd is running.</a>
1.185 deraadt 247: <li><a href=errata29.html#sendmail2>August 21, 2001:
1.181 millert 248: A security hole exists in sendmail(8) that may allow an
249: attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.185 deraadt 250: <li><a href=errata29.html#nfs>July 30, 2001:
1.180 jason 251: A kernel buffer overflow in the NFS code can be used to execute
252: arbitrary code by users with mount privileges (only root by
1.181 millert 253: default).</a>
1.185 deraadt 254: <li><a href=errata29.html#kernexec>June 15, 2001:
1.178 aaron 255: A race condition in the kernel can lead to local root compromise.</a>
1.185 deraadt 256: <li><a href=errata29.html#sshcookie>June 12, 2001:
1.177 markus 257: sshd(8) allows users to delete arbitrary files named "cookies"
258: if X11 forwarding is enabled. X11 forwarding is disabled
259: by default.</a>
1.185 deraadt 260: <li><a href=errata29.html#fts>May 30, 2001:
1.176 millert 261: Programs using the fts routines can be tricked into changing
262: into the wrong directory.</a>
1.185 deraadt 263: <li><a href=errata29.html#sendmail>May 29, 2001:
1.174 millert 264: Sendmail signal handlers contain unsafe code,
265: leading to numerous race conditions.</a>
1.173 deraadt 266: </ul>
267:
268: <p>
269: <li>
1.152 deraadt 270: <a name=28></a>
271:
272: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.8 Security Advisories</font></h3>
273: These are the OpenBSD 2.8 advisories -- all these problems are solved
1.154 millert 274: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
1.179 jufi 275: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
1.152 deraadt 276:
277: <p>
278: <ul>
1.184 millert 279: <li><a href=errata28.html#uucp>September 11, 2001:
280: A security hole exists in uuxqt(8) that may allow an
281: attacker to gain root privileges.</a>
1.183 millert 282: <li><a href=errata28.html#lpd>August 29, 2001:
283: A security hole exists in lpd(8) that may allow an
284: attacker to gain root privileges if lpd is running.</a>
1.181 millert 285: <li><a href=errata28.html#sendmail2>August 21, 2001:
286: A security hole exists in sendmail(8) that may allow an
287: attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.178 aaron 288: <li><a href=errata28.html#kernexec>June 15, 2001:
289: A race condition in the kernel can lead to local root compromise.</a>
1.176 millert 290: <li><a href=errata28.html#fts>May 30, 2001:
291: Programs using the fts routines can be tricked into changing
292: into the wrong directory.</a>
1.175 millert 293: <li><a href=errata28.html#sendmail>May 29, 2001:
294: Sendmail signal handlers contain unsafe code,
295: leading to numerous race conditions.</a>
1.173 deraadt 296: <li><a href=errata28.html#ipf_frag>Apr 23, 2001:
1.172 ericj 297: IPF contains a serious bug with its handling of fragment cacheing.</a>
1.173 deraadt 298: <li><a href=errata28.html#glob_limit>Apr 23, 2001:
1.172 ericj 299: ftpd(8) contains a potential DoS relating to glob(3).</a>
1.173 deraadt 300: <li><a href=errata28.html#glob>Apr 10, 2001:
1.170 ericj 301: The glob(3) library call contains multiple buffer overflows.</a>
1.173 deraadt 302: <li><a href=errata28.html#readline>Mar 18, 2001:
1.169 millert 303: The readline library creates history files with permissive modes based on the user's umask.</a>
1.173 deraadt 304: <li><a href=errata28.html#ipsec_ah>Mar 2, 2001:
1.167 ericj 305: Insufficient checks in the IPSEC AH IPv4 option handling code can lead to a buffer overrun in the kernel.</a>
1.173 deraadt 306: <li><a href=errata28.html#userldt>Mar 2, 2001:
1.168 horacio 307: The <b>USER_LDT</b> kernel option allows an attacker to gain access to privileged areas of kernel memory.</a>
1.173 deraadt 308: <li><a href=errata28.html#sudo>Feb 22, 2001:
1.171 millert 309: a non-exploitable buffer overflow was fixed in sudo(8).</a>
1.173 deraadt 310: <li><a href=errata28.html#named>Jan 29, 2001:
1.163 jason 311: merge named(8) with ISC BIND 4.9.8-REL, which fixes some buffer vulnerabilities.</a>
1.173 deraadt 312: <li><a href=errata28.html#rnd>Jan 22, 2001:
1.162 jason 313: rnd(4) did not use all of its input when written to.</a>
1.173 deraadt 314: <li><a href=errata28.html#xlock>Dec 22, 2000:
1.159 ericj 315: xlock(1)'s authentication was re-done to authenticate via a named pipe. (patch and new xlock binaries included).</a>
1.173 deraadt 316: <li><a href=errata28.html#procfs>Dec 18, 2000:
1.157 ericj 317: Procfs contains numerous overflows. Procfs is not used by default in OpenBSD. (patch included).</a>
1.173 deraadt 318: <li><a href=errata28.html#kerberos2>Dec 10, 2000:
1.156 deraadt 319: Another problem exists in KerberosIV libraries (patch included).</a>
1.173 deraadt 320: <li><a href=errata28.html#kerberos>Dec 7, 2000:
1.155 deraadt 321: A set of problems in KerberosIV exist (patch included).</a>
1.173 deraadt 322: <li><a href=errata28.html#ftpd>Dec 4, 2000:
1.154 millert 323: A single-byte buffer overflow exists in ftpd (patch included).</a>
1.152 deraadt 324: </ul>
325:
326: <p>
327: <li>
1.124 deraadt 328: <a name=27></a>
329:
330: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.7 Security Advisories</font></h3>
331: These are the OpenBSD 2.7 advisories -- all these problems are solved
332: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
333: OpenBSD 2.6 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.7.
334:
335: <p>
336: <ul>
1.169 millert 337: <li><a href=errata27.html#readline>Mar 18, 2001:
338: The readline library creates history files with permissive modes based on the user's umask.</a>
339: <li><a href=errata27.html#sudo>Feb 22, 2001:
340: a buffer overflow was fixed in sudo(8).</a>
1.154 millert 341: <li><a href=errata27.html#ftpd>Dec 4, 2000:
342: A single-byte buffer overflow exists in ftpd (patch included).</a>
1.152 deraadt 343: <li><a href=errata27.html#sshforwarding>Nov 10, 2000:
344: Hostile servers can force OpenSSH clients to do agent or X11 forwarding.
345: (patch included)</a>
346: <li><a href=errata27.html#xtrans>Oct 26, 2000:
1.151 matthieu 347: X11 libraries have 2 potential overflows in xtrans code.
348: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 349: <li><a href=errata27.html#httpd>Oct 18, 2000:
1.150 beck 350: Apache mod_rewrite and mod_vhost_alias modules could expose files
351: on the server in certain configurations if used.
352: (patch included)</a>
1.164 deraadt 353: <li><a href=errata27.html#telnetd>Oct 10, 2000:
1.149 millert 354: The telnet daemon does not strip out the TERMINFO, TERMINFO_DIRS,
355: TERMPATH and TERMCAP environment variables as it should.
356: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 357: <li><a href=errata27.html#format_strings>Oct 6, 2000:
1.148 millert 358: There are printf-style format string bugs in several privileged
359: programs. (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 360: <li><a href=errata27.html#curses>Oct 6, 2000:
1.147 millert 361: libcurses honored terminal descriptions in the $HOME/.terminfo
362: directory as well as in the TERMCAP environment variable for
363: setuid and setgid applications.
1.146 deraadt 364: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 365: <li><a href=errata27.html#talkd>Oct 6, 2000:
1.146 deraadt 366: A format string vulnerability exists in talkd(8).
367: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 368: <li><a href=errata27.html#pw_error>Oct 3, 2000:
1.145 aaron 369: A format string vulnerability exists in the pw_error() function of the
370: libutil library, yielding localhost root through chpass(1).
371: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 372: <li><a href=errata27.html#ipsec>Sep 18, 2000:
1.144 jason 373: Bad ESP/AH packets could cause a crash under certain conditions.
374: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 375: <li><a href=errata27.html#xlock>Aug 16, 2000:
1.141 deraadt 376: A format string vulnerability (localhost root) exists in xlock(1).
377: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 378: <li><a href=errata27.html#X11_libs>July 14, 2000:
1.139 deraadt 379: Various bugs found in X11 libraries have various side effects, almost
380: completely denial of service in OpenBSD.
381: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 382: <li><a href=errata27.html#ftpd>July 5, 2000:
1.136 deraadt 383: Just like pretty much all the other unix ftp daemons
384: on the planet, ftpd had a remote root hole in it.
385: Luckily, ftpd was not enabled by default.
1.137 deraadt 386: The problem exists if anonymous ftp is enabled.
1.136 deraadt 387: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 388: <li><a href=errata27.html#mopd>July 5, 2000:
1.136 deraadt 389: Mopd, very rarely used, contained some buffer overflows.
390: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 391: <li><a href=errata27.html#libedit>June 28, 2000:
1.135 deraadt 392: libedit would check for a <b>.editrc</b> file in the current
393: directory. Not known to be a real security issue, but a patch
394: is available anyways.
395: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 396: <li><a href=errata27.html#dhclient>June 24, 2000:
1.134 deraadt 397: A serious bug in dhclient(8) could allow strings from a
398: malicious dhcp server to be executed in the shell as root.
399: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 400: <li><a href=errata27.html#isakmpd>June 9, 2000:
1.133 deraadt 401: A serious bug in isakmpd(8) policy handling wherein
402: policy verification could be completely bypassed in isakmpd.
403: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 404: <li><a href=errata27.html#uselogin>June 6, 2000:
1.132 deraadt 405: The non-default flag UseLogin in <b>/etc/sshd_config</b> is broken,
406: should not be used, and results in security problems on
407: other operating systems.</a>
1.152 deraadt 408: <li><a href=errata27.html#bridge>May 26, 2000:
1.129 deraadt 409: The bridge(4) <i>learning</i> flag may be bypassed.
1.128 deraadt 410: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 411: <li><a href=errata27.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
1.127 kjell 412: Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
413: in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
414:
1.124 deraadt 415: </ul>
416:
417: <p>
418: <li>
1.119 deraadt 419: <a name=26></a>
420:
421: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.6 Security Advisories</font></h3>
422: These are the OpenBSD 2.6 advisories -- all these problems are solved
423: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
424: OpenBSD 2.5 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.6.
425:
426: <p>
427: <ul>
1.130 deraadt 428: <li><a href=errata26.html#semconfig>May 26, 2000:
429: SYSV semaphore support contained an undocumented system call
1.131 deraadt 430: which could wedge semaphore-using processes from exiting. (patch included)</a>
1.127 kjell 431: <li><a href=errata26.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
432: Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
433: in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
1.126 deraadt 434: <li><a href=errata26.html#xlockmore>May 25, 2000:
1.125 deraadt 435: xlockmore has a bug which a localhost attacker can use to gain
436: access to the encrypted root password hash (which is normally
437: encoded using blowfish (see
438: <a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=crypt&sektion=3">
439: crypt(3)</a>)
440: (patch included).</a>
1.126 deraadt 441: <li><a href=errata26.html#procfs>Jan 20, 2000:
1.123 deraadt 442: Systems running with procfs enabled and mounted are
443: vulnerable to a very tricky exploit. procfs is not
444: mounted by default.
445: (patch included).</a>
1.190 mpech 446: <li><a href=errata26.html#sendmail>Dec 4, 1999:
447: Sendmail permitted any user to cause a aliases file wrap,
448: thus exposing the system to a race where the aliases file
449: did not exist.
1.119 deraadt 450: (patch included).</a>
1.190 mpech 451: <li><a href=errata26.html#poll>Dec 4, 1999:
452: Various bugs in poll(2) may cause a kernel crash.</a>
1.126 deraadt 453: <li><a href=errata26.html#sslUSA>Dec 2, 1999:
1.120 deraadt 454: A buffer overflow in the RSAREF code included in the
455: USA version of libssl, is possibly exploitable in
456: httpd, ssh, or isakmpd, if SSL/RSA features are enabled.
1.124 deraadt 457: (patch included).<br></a>
458: <strong>Update:</strong> Turns out that this was not exploitable
459: in any of the software included in OpenBSD 2.6.
1.190 mpech 460: <li><a href=errata26.html#ifmedia>Nov 9, 1999:
461: Any user could change interface media configurations, resulting in
462: a localhost denial of service attack.
1.121 deraadt 463: (patch included).</a>
1.119 deraadt 464: </ul>
465:
466: <p>
467: <li>
468:
1.93 deraadt 469: <a name=25></a>
1.106 deraadt 470:
1.110 deraadt 471: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.5 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.93 deraadt 472: These are the OpenBSD 2.5 advisories -- all these problems are solved
473: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
474: OpenBSD 2.4 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.5.
475:
1.96 deraadt 476: <p>
1.104 deraadt 477: <ul>
1.117 deraadt 478: <li><a href=errata25.html#cron>Aug 30, 1999:
1.103 deraadt 479: In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the
480: fake popen() and run sendmail as the user, not as root.
481: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 482: <li><a href=errata25.html#miscfs>Aug 12, 1999: The procfs and fdescfs
1.101 deraadt 483: filesystems had an overrun in their handling of uio_offset
484: in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
485: enabled by default). (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 486: <li><a href=errata25.html#profil>Aug 9, 1999: Stop profiling (see profil(2))
1.100 deraadt 487: when we execve() a new process. (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 488: <li><a href=errata25.html#ipsec_in_use>Aug 6, 1999: Packets that should have
1.98 deraadt 489: been handled by IPsec may be transmitted as cleartext.
490: PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
491: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 492: <li><a href=errata25.html#rc>Aug 5, 1999: In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for
1.97 deraadt 493: motd re-writing and change the find(1) to use -execdir
494: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 495: <li><a href=errata25.html#chflags>Jul 30, 1999: Do not permit regular
1.95 deraadt 496: users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or block devices
497: which they may currently be the owner of (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 498: <li><a href=errata25.html#nroff>Jul 27, 1999: Cause groff(1) to be invoked
1.95 deraadt 499: with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1) (patch included).</a>
1.93 deraadt 500: </ul>
501:
1.106 deraadt 502: <p>
503: <li>
1.75 deraadt 504: <a name=24></a>
1.110 deraadt 505: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.4 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.75 deraadt 506: These are the OpenBSD 2.4 advisories -- all these problems are solved
507: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
508: OpenBSD 2.3 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.4.
509:
1.96 deraadt 510: <p>
1.75 deraadt 511: <ul>
1.92 deraadt 512: <li><a href=errata24.html#poll>Mar 22, 1999: The nfds argument for poll(2) needs
1.91 deraadt 513: to be constrained, to avoid kvm starvation (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 514: <li><a href=errata24.html#tss>Mar 21, 1999: A change in TSS handling stops
1.91 deraadt 515: another kernel crash case caused by the <strong>crashme</strong>
516: program (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 517: <li><a href=errata24.html#nlink>Feb 25, 1999: An unbounded increment on the
1.90 deraadt 518: nlink value in FFS and EXT2FS filesystems can cause a system crash.
1.89 deraadt 519: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 520: <li><a href=errata24.html#ping>Feb 23, 1999: Yet another buffer overflow
1.88 deraadt 521: existed in ping(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 522: <li><a href=errata24.html#ipqrace>Feb 19, 1999: ipintr() had a race in use of
1.87 deraadt 523: the ipq, which could permit an attacker to cause a crash.
524: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 525: <li><a href=errata24.html#accept>Feb 17, 1999: A race condition in the
1.86 deraadt 526: kernel between accept(2) and select(2) could permit an attacker
527: to hang sockets from remote.
528: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 529: <li><a href=errata24.html#maxqueue>Feb 17, 1999: IP fragment assembly can
1.85 deraadt 530: bog the machine excessively and cause problems.
531: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 532: <li><a href=errata24.html#trctrap>Feb 12, 1999: i386 T_TRCTRAP handling and
1.84 deraadt 533: DDB interacted to possibly cause a crash.
534: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 535: <li><a href=errata24.html#rst>Feb 11, 1999: TCP/IP RST handling was sloppy.
1.83 deraadt 536: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 537: <li><a href=errata24.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
1.81 deraadt 538: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 539: <li><a href=errata24.html#termcap>Nov 19, 1998: There is a possibly locally
1.82 deraadt 540: exploitable problem relating to environment variables in termcap
541: and curses. (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 542: <li><a href=errata24.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
1.78 deraadt 543: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.75 deraadt 544: </ul>
545:
1.106 deraadt 546: <p>
547: <li>
1.58 deraadt 548: <a name=23></a>
1.110 deraadt 549: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.3 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.73 deraadt 550: These are the OpenBSD 2.3 advisories -- all these problems are solved
551: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
552: OpenBSD 2.2 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.3.
1.53 matthieu 553:
1.96 deraadt 554: <p>
1.53 matthieu 555: <ul>
1.81 deraadt 556: <li><a href=errata23.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
557: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.78 deraadt 558: <li><a href=errata23.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
559: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.190 mpech 560: <li><a href=errata23.html#resolver>August 31, 1998: A benign looking resolver
561: buffer overflow bug was re-introduced accidentally (patches included).</a>
562: <li><a href=errata23.html#chpass>Aug 2, 1998:
563: chpass(1) has a file descriptor leak which allows an
564: attacker to modify /etc/master.passwd.</a>
565: <li><a href=errata23.html#inetd>July 15, 1998: Inetd had a file descriptor leak.</a>
1.76 aaron 566: <li><a href=errata23.html#fdalloc>Jul 2, 1998: setuid and setgid processes
1.72 deraadt 567: should not be executed with fd slots 0, 1, or 2 free.
568: (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 569: <li><a href=errata23.html#xlib>June 6, 1998: Further problems with the X
1.71 deraadt 570: libraries (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 571: <li><a href=errata23.html#kill>May 17, 1998: kill(2) of setuid/setgid target
1.66 deraadt 572: processes too permissive (4th revision patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 573: <li><a href=errata23.html#immutable>May 11, 1998: mmap() permits partial bypassing
1.60 deraadt 574: of immutable and append-only file flags. (patch included).</a>
1.190 mpech 575: <li><a href=errata23.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC packets
576: if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 577: <li><a href=errata23.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm and Xaw
1.58 deraadt 578: (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
1.53 matthieu 579: </ul>
1.9 deraadt 580:
1.106 deraadt 581: <p>
582: <li>
1.58 deraadt 583: <a name=22></a>
1.110 deraadt 584: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.2 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.45 deraadt 585: These are the OpenBSD 2.2 advisories. All these problems are solved
1.55 deraadt 586: in <a href=23.html>OpenBSD 2.3</a>. Some of these problems
1.45 deraadt 587: still exist in other operating systems. (The supplied patches are for
588: OpenBSD 2.2; they may or may not work on OpenBSD 2.1).
1.9 deraadt 589:
1.96 deraadt 590: <p>
1.9 deraadt 591: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 592: <li><a href=errata22.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC
593: packets if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
594: <li><a href=errata22.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm
595: and Xaw (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
596: <li><a href=errata22.html#uucpd>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer overflow in uucpd
597: (patch included).</a>
598: <li><a href=errata22.html#rmjob>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer mismanagement in lprm
599: (patch included).</a>
600: <li><a href=errata22.html#ping>Mar 31, 1998: Overflow in ping -R (patch included).</a>
601: <li><a href=errata22.html#named>Mar 30, 1998: Overflow in named fake-iquery
1.59 deraadt 602: (patch included).</a>
1.72 deraadt 603: <li><a href=errata22.html#mountd>Mar 2, 1998: Accidental NFS filesystem
604: export (patch included).</a>
1.112 philen 605: <li><a href="advisories/mmap.txt">Feb 26, 1998: Read-write mmap() flaw.</a>
1.72 deraadt 606: Revision 3 of the patch is available <a href=errata22.html#mmap>here</a>
1.112 philen 607: <li><a href="advisories/sourceroute.txt">Feb 19, 1998: Sourcerouted Packet
1.59 deraadt 608: Acceptance.</a>
1.50 deraadt 609: A patch is available <a href=errata22.html#sourceroute>here</a>.
1.122 rohee 610: <li><a href=errata22.html#ruserok>Feb 13, 1998: Setuid coredump & Ruserok()
1.72 deraadt 611: flaw (patch included).</a>
612: <li><a href=errata22.html#ldso>Feb 9, 1998: MIPS ld.so flaw (patch included).</a>
1.1 deraadt 613: </ul>
614:
1.106 deraadt 615: <p>
616: <li>
1.58 deraadt 617: <a name=21></a>
1.110 deraadt 618: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.1 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.52 deraadt 619: These are the OpenBSD 2.1 advisories. All these problems are solved
620: in <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>. Some of these problems still
621: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.1, we
622: would strongly recommend an upgrade to the newest release, as this
623: patch list only attempts at fixing the most important security
624: problems. In particular, OpenBSD 2.2 fixes numerous localhost
625: security problems. Many of those problems were solved in ways which
626: make it hard for us to provide patches).
627:
1.96 deraadt 628: <p>
1.52 deraadt 629: <ul>
1.112 philen 630: <li><a href="advisories/signals.txt">Sep 15, 1997: Deviant Signals (patch included)</a>
631: <li><a href="advisories/rfork.txt">Aug 2, 1997: Rfork() system call flaw
1.59 deraadt 632: (patch included)</a>
1.112 philen 633: <li><a href="advisories/procfs.txt">Jun 24, 1997: Procfs flaws (patch included)</a>
1.52 deraadt 634: </ul>
1.51 deraadt 635:
1.106 deraadt 636: <p>
637: <li>
638: <a name=20></a>
1.110 deraadt 639: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.99 deraadt 640: These are the OpenBSD 2.0 advisories. All these problems are solved
641: in <a href=21.html>OpenBSD 2.1</a>. Some of these problems still
642: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.0, we
643: commend you for being there back in the old days!, but you're really
644: missing out if you don't install a new version!)
645:
646: <p>
647: <ul>
1.112 philen 648: <li><a href="advisories/res_random.txt">April 22, 1997: Predictable IDs in the
1.99 deraadt 649: resolver (patch included)</a>
650: <li>Many others... if people can hunt them down, please let me know
651: and we'll put them up here.
652: </ul>
653:
1.106 deraadt 654: </dl>
1.51 deraadt 655: <p>
1.106 deraadt 656:
657: <a name=watching></a>
1.110 deraadt 658: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Watching our Changes</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 659:
1.21 deraadt 660: Since we take a proactive stance with security, we are continually
661: finding and fixing new security problems. Not all of these problems
1.80 espie 662: get widely reported because (as stated earlier) many of them are not
1.45 deraadt 663: confirmed to be exploitable; many simple bugs we fix do turn out to
664: have security consequences we could not predict. We do not have the
665: time resources to make these changes available in the above format.<p>
1.21 deraadt 666:
667: Thus there are usually minor security fixes in the current source code
668: beyond the previous major OpenBSD release. We make a limited
1.45 deraadt 669: guarantee that these problems are of minimal impact and unproven
1.44 ian 670: exploitability. If we discover that a problem definitely matters for
1.45 deraadt 671: security, patches will show up here <strong>VERY</strong> quickly.<p>
1.21 deraadt 672:
1.45 deraadt 673: People who are really concerned with security can do a number of
674: things:<p>
1.21 deraadt 675:
676: <ul>
677: <li>If you understand security issues, watch our
1.27 deraadt 678: <a href=mail.html>source-changes mailing list</a> and keep an
1.23 deraadt 679: eye out for things which appear security related. Since
1.21 deraadt 680: exploitability is not proven for many of the fixes we make,
681: do not expect the relevant commit message to say "SECURITY FIX!".
682: If a problem is proven and serious, a patch will be available
683: here very shortly after.
1.161 horacio 684: <li>In addition to source changes, you can watch our <a href="mail.html">
1.160 ericj 685: security-announce mailing list</a> which will notify you for every
1.186 ian 686: security related item that the OpenBSD team deems as a possible threat,
1.160 ericj 687: and instruct you on how to patch the problem.
1.21 deraadt 688: <li>Track our current source code tree, and teach yourself how to do a
1.29 deraadt 689: complete system build from time to time (read /usr/src/Makefile
690: carefully). Users can make the assumption that the current
691: source tree always has stronger security than the previous release.
1.45 deraadt 692: However, building your own system from source code is not trivial;
693: it is nearly 300MB of source code, and problems do occur as we
694: transition between major releases.
1.115 ericj 695: <li>Install a binary snapshot for your
1.80 espie 696: architecture, which are made available fairly often. For
1.29 deraadt 697: instance, an i386 snapshot is typically made available weekly.
1.21 deraadt 698: </ul>
699:
1.9 deraadt 700: <p>
1.153 jufi 701: <a name=reporting></a>
1.110 deraadt 702: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Reporting problems</font></h3><p>
1.3 deraadt 703:
1.5 deraadt 704: <p> If you find a new security problem, you can mail it to
1.6 deraadt 705: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>deraadt@openbsd.org</a>.
1.7 deraadt 706: <br>
1.5 deraadt 707: If you wish to PGP encode it (but please only do so if privacy is very
1.112 philen 708: urgent, since it is inconvenient) use this <a href="advisories/pgpkey.txt">pgp key</a>.
1.5 deraadt 709:
1.107 deraadt 710: <p>
711: <a name=papers></a>
1.110 deraadt 712: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Further Reading</font></h3><p>
1.107 deraadt 713:
714: A number of papers have been written by OpenBSD team members, about security
715: related changes they have done in OpenBSD. The postscript versions of these
1.108 deraadt 716: documents are available as follows.<p>
1.107 deraadt 717:
718: <ul>
1.113 deraadt 719: <li>A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme.<br>
1.118 deraadt 720: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.153 jufi 721: by <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>,
1.113 deraadt 722: <a href=mailto:dm@openbsd.org>David Mazieres</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 723: <a href=papers/bcrypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
724: <a href=papers/bcrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 725: <p>
726: <li>Cryptography in OpenBSD: An Overview.<br>
1.118 deraadt 727: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 728: by <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>,
729: <a href=mailto:niklas@openbsd.org>Niklas Hallqvist</a>,
730: <a href=mailto:art@openbsd.org>Artur Grabowski</a>,
731: <a href=mailto:angelos@openbsd.org>Angelos D. Keromytis</a>,
732: <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 733: <a href=papers/crypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
734: <a href=papers/crypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 735: <p>
736: <li>strlcpy and strlcat -- consistent, safe, string copy and concatenation.<br>
1.118 deraadt 737: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 738: by <a href=mailto:millert@openbsd.org>Todd C. Miller</a>,
739: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>.<br>
1.109 deraadt 740: <a href=papers/strlcpy-paper.ps>paper</a> and
741: <a href=papers/strlcpy-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 742: <p>
1.118 deraadt 743: <li>Dealing with Public Ethernet Jacks-Switches, Gateways, and Authentication.<br>
744: <a href=events.html#lisa99>LISA 1999</a>,
745: by <a href=mailto:beck@openbsd.org>Bob Beck</a>.<br>
746: <a href=papers/authgw-paper.ps>paper</a> and
747: <a href=papers/authgw-slides.ps>slides</a>.
748: <p>
1.153 jufi 749: <li>Encrypting Virtual Memory<br>
1.142 deraadt 750: <a href=events.html#sec2000>Usenix Security 2000</a>,
751: <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.143 provos 752: <a href=papers/swapencrypt.ps>paper</a> and
753: <a href=papers/swapencrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.142 deraadt 754: <p>
1.107 deraadt 755: </ul>
756:
1.106 deraadt 757: </dl>
758:
1.2 deraadt 759: <hr>
1.68 pauls 760: <a href=index.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.24 deraadt 761: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
762: <br>
1.196 ! jufi 763: <small>$OpenBSD: security.html,v 1.195 2002/02/14 07:37:15 mpech Exp $</small>
1.1 deraadt 764:
1.24 deraadt 765: </body>
766: </html>
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