Annotation of www/security.html, Revision 1.205
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1.20 deraadt 4: <title>OpenBSD Security</title>
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1.77 deraadt 14: <img alt="[OpenBSD]" height=30 width=141 SRC="images/smalltitle.gif">
1.106 deraadt 15: <p>
1.110 deraadt 16: <h2><font color=#e00000>Security</font><hr></h2>
1.1 deraadt 17:
1.114 philen 18: <table width="100%">
19: <tr>
20: <td colspan="2">
21: <strong>Index</strong>
22: </td>
23: </tr>
24: <tr>
25: <td valign="top">
1.106 deraadt 26: <a href=#goals>Security goals of the Project</a>.<br>
27: <a href=#disclosure>Full Disclosure policy</a>.<br>
28: <a href=#process>Source code auditing process</a>.<br>
1.111 aaron 29: <a href=#default>"Secure by Default"</a>.<br>
1.106 deraadt 30: <a href=#crypto>Use of Cryptography</a>.<br>
31: <p>
32: <a href=#watching>Watching changes</a>.<br>
33: <a href=#reporting>Reporting security issues</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 34: <a href=#papers>Further Reading</a><br>
1.106 deraadt 35: <p>
1.114 philen 36: </td>
37: <td valign="top">
1.204 jufi 38: <a href="#31">For 3.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.187 deraadt 39: <a href="#30">For 3.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.173 deraadt 40: <a href="#29">For 2.9 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.152 deraadt 41: <a href="#28">For 2.8 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.124 deraadt 42: <a href="#27">For 2.7 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.119 deraadt 43: <a href="#26">For 2.6 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.114 philen 44: <a href="#25">For 2.5 security advisories</a>.<br>
45: <a href="#24">For 2.4 security advisories</a>.<br>
46: <a href="#23">For 2.3 security advisories</a>.<br>
47: <a href="#22">For 2.2 security advisories</a>.<br>
48: <a href="#21">For 2.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
49: <a href="#20">For 2.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
50: </td>
51: </tr>
52: </table>
1.56 deraadt 53: <hr>
54:
1.106 deraadt 55: <dl>
56: <a name=goals></a>
1.110 deraadt 57: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Goal</font></h3><p>
1.22 deraadt 58:
1.14 deraadt 59: OpenBSD believes in strong security. Our aspiration is to be NUMBER
1.22 deraadt 60: ONE in the industry for security (if we are not already there). Our
61: open software development model permits us to take a more
62: uncompromising view towards increased security than Sun, SGI, IBM, HP,
63: or other vendors are able to. We can make changes the vendors would
1.27 deraadt 64: not make. Also, since OpenBSD is exported with <a href=crypto.html>
1.45 deraadt 65: cryptography</a>, we are able to take cryptographic approaches towards
66: fixing security problems.<p>
1.18 deraadt 67:
1.106 deraadt 68: <a name=disclosure></a>
1.110 deraadt 69: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Full Disclosure</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 70:
1.45 deraadt 71: Like many readers of the
1.196 jufi 72: <a href="http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1">
1.18 deraadt 73: BUGTRAQ mailing list</a>,
1.106 deraadt 74: we believe in full disclosure of security problems. In the
75: operating system arena, we were probably the first to embrace
76: the concept. Many vendors, even of free software, still try
77: to hide issues from their users.<p>
78:
79: Security information moves very fast in cracker circles. On the other
80: hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security
81: fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix
82: turnaround is possible. Thus we think that full disclosure helps the
83: people who really care about security.<p>
84:
1.153 jufi 85: <a name=process></a>
1.110 deraadt 86: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Audit Process</font></h3><p>
1.15 deraadt 87:
1.12 deraadt 88: Our security auditing team typically has between six and twelve
1.45 deraadt 89: members who continue to search for and fix new security holes. We
90: have been auditing since the summer of 1996. The process we follow to
91: increase security is simply a comprehensive file-by-file analysis of
1.106 deraadt 92: every critical software component. We are not so much looking for
93: security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if
1.138 deraadt 94: years later someone discovers the problem used to be a security
1.106 deraadt 95: issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the
96: better. Flaws have been found in just about every area of the system.
97: Entire new classes of security problems have been found during our
98: audit, and often source code which had been audited earlier needs
99: re-auditing with these new flaws in mind. Code often gets audited
100: multiple times, and by multiple people with different auditing
101: skills.<p>
1.12 deraadt 102:
1.94 deraadt 103: Some members of our security auditing team worked for Secure Networks,
104: the company that made the industry's premier network security scanning
105: software package Ballista (Secure Networks got purchased by Network
106: Associates, Ballista got renamed to Cybercop Scanner, and well...)
107: That company did a lot of security research, and thus fit in well
1.106 deraadt 108: with the OpenBSD stance. OpenBSD passed Ballista's tests with flying
109: colours since day 1.<p>
1.31 deraadt 110:
1.34 deraadt 111: Another facet of our security auditing process is its proactiveness.
1.45 deraadt 112: In most cases we have found that the determination of exploitability
113: is not an issue. During our ongoing auditing process we find many
114: bugs, and endeavor to fix them even though exploitability is not
115: proven. We fix the bug, and we move on to find other bugs to fix. We
116: have fixed many simple and obvious careless programming errors in code
117: and only months later discovered that the problems were in fact
118: exploitable. (Or, more likely someone on
1.197 jufi 119: <a href="http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1">BUGTRAQ</a>
1.45 deraadt 120: would report that other operating systems were vulnerable to a `newly
121: discovered problem', and then it would be discovered that OpenBSD had
122: been fixed in a previous release). In other cases we have been saved
123: from full exploitability of complex step-by-step attacks because we
124: had fixed one of the intermediate steps. An example of where we
1.94 deraadt 125: managed such a success is the lpd advisory that Secure Networks put out.
126: <p>
1.29 deraadt 127:
1.110 deraadt 128: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>The Reward</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 129:
1.45 deraadt 130: Our proactive auditing process has really paid off. Statements like
1.35 deraadt 131: ``This problem was fixed in OpenBSD about 6 months ago'' have become
1.45 deraadt 132: commonplace in security forums like
1.197 jufi 133: <a href="http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1">BUGTRAQ</a>.<p>
1.35 deraadt 134:
1.45 deraadt 135: The most intense part of our security auditing happened immediately
1.80 espie 136: before the OpenBSD 2.0 release and during the 2.0->2.1 transition,
1.45 deraadt 137: over the last third of 1996 and first half of 1997. Thousands (yes,
138: thousands) of security issues were fixed rapidly over this year-long
139: period; bugs like the standard buffer overflows, protocol
140: implementation weaknesses, information gathering, and filesystem
141: races. Hence most of the security problems that we encountered were
142: fixed before our 2.1 release, and then a far smaller number needed
143: fixing for our 2.2 release. We do not find as many problems anymore,
144: it is simply a case of diminishing returns. Recently the security
145: problems we find and fix tend to be significantly more obscure or
146: complicated. Still we will persist for a number of reasons:<p>
1.36 deraadt 147:
1.35 deraadt 148: <ul>
1.45 deraadt 149: <li>Occasionally we find a simple problem we missed earlier. Doh!
1.35 deraadt 150: <li>Security is like an arms race; the best attackers will continue
1.45 deraadt 151: to search for more complicated exploits, so we will too.
152: <li>Finding and fixing subtle flaws in complicated software is
153: a lot of fun.
1.35 deraadt 154: </ul>
1.106 deraadt 155: <p>
1.15 deraadt 156:
1.14 deraadt 157: The auditing process is not over yet, and as you can see we continue
1.28 deraadt 158: to find and fix new security flaws.<p>
1.12 deraadt 159:
1.106 deraadt 160: <a name=default></a>
1.110 deraadt 161: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>"Secure by Default"</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 162:
163: To ensure that novice users of OpenBSD do not need to become security
164: experts overnight (a viewpoint which other vendors seem to have), we
165: ship the operating system in a Secure by Default mode. All non-essential
166: services are disabled. As the user/administrator becomes more familiar
167: with the system, he will discover that he has to enable daemons and other
168: parts of the system. During the process of learning how to enable a new
169: service, the novice is more likely to learn of security considerations.<p>
170:
171: This is in stark contrast to the increasing number of systems that
172: ship with NFS, mountd, web servers, and various other services enabled
173: by default, creating instantaneous security problems for their users
174: within minutes after their first install.<p>
175:
1.153 jufi 176: <a name=crypto></a>
1.110 deraadt 177: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Cryptography</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 178:
179: And of course, since the OpenBSD project is based in Canada, it is possible
180: for us to integrate cryptography. For more information, read the page
1.116 deraadt 181: outlining <a href=crypto.html>what we have done with cryptography</a>.</p>
1.106 deraadt 182:
1.110 deraadt 183: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Advisories</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 184:
185: <dl>
186:
187: <li>
1.203 deraadt 188: <a name=31></a>
189:
190: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 3.1 Security Advisories</font></h3>
191: These are the OpenBSD 3.1 advisories -- all these problems are solved
192: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
193: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
194:
195: <p>
196: <ul>
1.205 ! millert 197: <li><a href=errata.html#sudo>April 25, 2002:
! 198: A bug in sudo may allow an attacker to corrupt the heap.</a>
! 199: <li><a href=errata.html#sshafs>April 22, 2002:
! 200: A local user can gain super-user privileges due to a buffer
! 201: overflow in sshd(8) if AFS has been configured on the system
! 202: or if KerberosTgtPassing or AFSTokenPassing has been enabled
! 203: in the sshd_config file.</a>
1.203 deraadt 204: </ul>
205:
206: <p>
207:
208: <li>
1.187 deraadt 209: <a name=30></a>
210:
211: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 3.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
212: These are the OpenBSD 3.0 advisories -- all these problems are solved
213: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
214: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
215:
216: <p>
217: <ul>
1.205 ! millert 218: <li><a href=errata30.html#sudo2>April 25, 2002:
! 219: A bug in sudo may allow an attacker to corrupt the heap.</a>
! 220: <li><a href=errata30.html#sshafs>April 22, 2002:
! 221: A local user can gain super-user privileges due to a buffer
! 222: overflow in sshd(8) if AFS has been configured on the system
! 223: or if KerberosTgtPassing or AFSTokenPassing has been enabled
! 224: in the sshd_config file.</a>
1.203 deraadt 225: <li><a href=errata30.html#mail>April 11, 2002:
1.202 millert 226: The mail(1) was interpreting tilde escapes even when invoked
227: in non-interactive mode. As mail(1) is called as root from cron,
228: this can lead to a local root compromise.</a>
1.203 deraadt 229: <li><a href=errata30.html#approval>March 19, 2002:
1.201 millert 230: Under certain conditions, on systems using YP with netgroups in
231: the password database, it is possible for the rexecd(8) and rshd(8)
232: daemons to execute a shell from a password database entry for a
233: different user. Similarly, atrun(8) may change to the wrong
234: home directory when running jobs.</a>
1.203 deraadt 235: <li><a href=errata30.html#zlib>March 13, 2002:
1.200 millert 236: A potential double free() exists in the zlib library;
237: this is not exploitable on OpenBSD.
238: The kernel also contains a copy of zlib; it is not
239: currently known if the kernel zlib is exploitable.</a>
1.203 deraadt 240: <li><a href=errata30.html#openssh>March 8, 2002:
1.198 millert 241: An off-by-one check in OpenSSH's channel forwarding code
1.199 jufi 242: may allow a local user to gain super-user privileges.</a>
1.203 deraadt 243: <li><a href=errata30.html#ptrace>January 21, 2002:
1.192 jason 244: A race condition between the ptrace(2) and execve(2) system calls
245: allows an attacker to modify the memory contents of suid/sgid
246: processes which could lead to compromise of the super-user account.</a>
1.203 deraadt 247: <li><a href=errata30.html#sudo>January 17, 2002:
1.191 millert 248: There is a security hole in sudo(8) that can be exploited
249: when the Postfix sendmail replacement is installed that may
250: allow an attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.203 deraadt 251: <li><a href=errata30.html#lpd>November 28, 2001:
1.189 millert 252: An attacker can trick a machine running the lpd daemon into
253: creating new files in the root directory from a machine with
254: remote line printer access.</a>
1.203 deraadt 255: <li><a href=errata30.html#vi.recover>November 13, 2001:
1.188 millert 256: The vi.recover script can be abused in such a way as
257: to cause arbitrary zero-length files to be removed.</a>
1.203 deraadt 258: <li><a href=errata30.html#pf>November 13, 2001:
1.190 mpech 259: pf(4) was incapable of dealing with certain ipv6 icmp packets,
260: resulting in a crash.</a>
1.203 deraadt 261: <li><a href=errata30.html#sshd>November 12, 2001:
1.190 mpech 262: A security hole that may allow an attacker to partially authenticate
263: if -- and only if -- the administrator has enabled KerberosV.</a>
1.187 deraadt 264: </ul>
265:
266: <p>
267: <li>
1.173 deraadt 268: <a name=29></a>
269:
270: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.9 Security Advisories</font></h3>
271: These are the OpenBSD 2.9 advisories -- all these problems are solved
272: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
1.179 jufi 273: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
1.173 deraadt 274:
275: <p>
276: <ul>
1.202 millert 277: <li><a href=errata29.html#mail>April 11, 2002:
278: The mail(1) was interpreting tilde escapes even when invoked
279: in non-interactive mode. As mail(1) is called as root from cron,
280: this can lead to a local root compromise.</a>
1.200 millert 281: <li><a href=errata29.html#zlib>March 13, 2002:
282: A potential double free() exists in the zlib library;
283: this is not exploitable on OpenBSD.
284: The kernel also contains a copy of zlib; it is not
285: currently known if the kernel zlib is exploitable.</a>
1.198 millert 286: <li><a href=errata29.html#openssh>March 8, 2002:
287: An off-by-one check in OpenSSH's channel forwarding code
1.199 jufi 288: may allow a local user to gain super-user privileges.</a>
1.198 millert 289: <li><a href=errata29.html#ptrace>January 21, 2002:
290: A race condition between the ptrace(2) and execve(2) system calls
291: allows an attacker to modify the memory contents of suid/sgid
292: processes which could lead to compromise of the super-user account.</a>
1.191 millert 293: <li><a href=errata29.html#sudo>January 17, 2002:
294: There is a security hole in sudo(8) that can be exploited
295: when the Postfix sendmail replacement is installed that may
296: allow an attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.189 millert 297: <li><a href=errata29.html#lpd2>November 28, 2001:
298: An attacker can trick a machine running the lpd daemon into
299: creating new files in the root directory from a machine with
300: remote line printer access.</a>
1.190 mpech 301: <li><a href=errata29.html#vi.recover>November 13, 2001:
302: The vi.recover script can be abused in such a way as
303: to cause arbitrary zero-length files to be removed.</a>
1.185 deraadt 304: <li><a href=errata29.html#uucp>September 11, 2001:
1.184 millert 305: A security hole exists in uuxqt(8) that may allow an
306: attacker to gain root privileges.</a>
1.185 deraadt 307: <li><a href=errata29.html#lpd>August 29, 2001:
1.183 millert 308: A security hole exists in lpd(8) that may allow an
309: attacker to gain root privileges if lpd is running.</a>
1.185 deraadt 310: <li><a href=errata29.html#sendmail2>August 21, 2001:
1.181 millert 311: A security hole exists in sendmail(8) that may allow an
312: attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.185 deraadt 313: <li><a href=errata29.html#nfs>July 30, 2001:
1.180 jason 314: A kernel buffer overflow in the NFS code can be used to execute
315: arbitrary code by users with mount privileges (only root by
1.181 millert 316: default).</a>
1.185 deraadt 317: <li><a href=errata29.html#kernexec>June 15, 2001:
1.178 aaron 318: A race condition in the kernel can lead to local root compromise.</a>
1.185 deraadt 319: <li><a href=errata29.html#sshcookie>June 12, 2001:
1.177 markus 320: sshd(8) allows users to delete arbitrary files named "cookies"
321: if X11 forwarding is enabled. X11 forwarding is disabled
322: by default.</a>
1.185 deraadt 323: <li><a href=errata29.html#fts>May 30, 2001:
1.176 millert 324: Programs using the fts routines can be tricked into changing
325: into the wrong directory.</a>
1.185 deraadt 326: <li><a href=errata29.html#sendmail>May 29, 2001:
1.174 millert 327: Sendmail signal handlers contain unsafe code,
328: leading to numerous race conditions.</a>
1.173 deraadt 329: </ul>
330:
331: <p>
332: <li>
1.152 deraadt 333: <a name=28></a>
334:
335: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.8 Security Advisories</font></h3>
336: These are the OpenBSD 2.8 advisories -- all these problems are solved
1.154 millert 337: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
1.179 jufi 338: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
1.152 deraadt 339:
340: <p>
341: <ul>
1.184 millert 342: <li><a href=errata28.html#uucp>September 11, 2001:
343: A security hole exists in uuxqt(8) that may allow an
344: attacker to gain root privileges.</a>
1.183 millert 345: <li><a href=errata28.html#lpd>August 29, 2001:
346: A security hole exists in lpd(8) that may allow an
347: attacker to gain root privileges if lpd is running.</a>
1.181 millert 348: <li><a href=errata28.html#sendmail2>August 21, 2001:
349: A security hole exists in sendmail(8) that may allow an
350: attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.178 aaron 351: <li><a href=errata28.html#kernexec>June 15, 2001:
352: A race condition in the kernel can lead to local root compromise.</a>
1.176 millert 353: <li><a href=errata28.html#fts>May 30, 2001:
354: Programs using the fts routines can be tricked into changing
355: into the wrong directory.</a>
1.175 millert 356: <li><a href=errata28.html#sendmail>May 29, 2001:
357: Sendmail signal handlers contain unsafe code,
358: leading to numerous race conditions.</a>
1.173 deraadt 359: <li><a href=errata28.html#ipf_frag>Apr 23, 2001:
1.172 ericj 360: IPF contains a serious bug with its handling of fragment cacheing.</a>
1.173 deraadt 361: <li><a href=errata28.html#glob_limit>Apr 23, 2001:
1.172 ericj 362: ftpd(8) contains a potential DoS relating to glob(3).</a>
1.173 deraadt 363: <li><a href=errata28.html#glob>Apr 10, 2001:
1.170 ericj 364: The glob(3) library call contains multiple buffer overflows.</a>
1.173 deraadt 365: <li><a href=errata28.html#readline>Mar 18, 2001:
1.169 millert 366: The readline library creates history files with permissive modes based on the user's umask.</a>
1.173 deraadt 367: <li><a href=errata28.html#ipsec_ah>Mar 2, 2001:
1.167 ericj 368: Insufficient checks in the IPSEC AH IPv4 option handling code can lead to a buffer overrun in the kernel.</a>
1.173 deraadt 369: <li><a href=errata28.html#userldt>Mar 2, 2001:
1.168 horacio 370: The <b>USER_LDT</b> kernel option allows an attacker to gain access to privileged areas of kernel memory.</a>
1.173 deraadt 371: <li><a href=errata28.html#sudo>Feb 22, 2001:
1.171 millert 372: a non-exploitable buffer overflow was fixed in sudo(8).</a>
1.173 deraadt 373: <li><a href=errata28.html#named>Jan 29, 2001:
1.163 jason 374: merge named(8) with ISC BIND 4.9.8-REL, which fixes some buffer vulnerabilities.</a>
1.173 deraadt 375: <li><a href=errata28.html#rnd>Jan 22, 2001:
1.162 jason 376: rnd(4) did not use all of its input when written to.</a>
1.173 deraadt 377: <li><a href=errata28.html#xlock>Dec 22, 2000:
1.159 ericj 378: xlock(1)'s authentication was re-done to authenticate via a named pipe. (patch and new xlock binaries included).</a>
1.173 deraadt 379: <li><a href=errata28.html#procfs>Dec 18, 2000:
1.157 ericj 380: Procfs contains numerous overflows. Procfs is not used by default in OpenBSD. (patch included).</a>
1.173 deraadt 381: <li><a href=errata28.html#kerberos2>Dec 10, 2000:
1.156 deraadt 382: Another problem exists in KerberosIV libraries (patch included).</a>
1.173 deraadt 383: <li><a href=errata28.html#kerberos>Dec 7, 2000:
1.155 deraadt 384: A set of problems in KerberosIV exist (patch included).</a>
1.173 deraadt 385: <li><a href=errata28.html#ftpd>Dec 4, 2000:
1.154 millert 386: A single-byte buffer overflow exists in ftpd (patch included).</a>
1.152 deraadt 387: </ul>
388:
389: <p>
390: <li>
1.124 deraadt 391: <a name=27></a>
392:
393: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.7 Security Advisories</font></h3>
394: These are the OpenBSD 2.7 advisories -- all these problems are solved
395: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
396: OpenBSD 2.6 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.7.
397:
398: <p>
399: <ul>
1.169 millert 400: <li><a href=errata27.html#readline>Mar 18, 2001:
401: The readline library creates history files with permissive modes based on the user's umask.</a>
402: <li><a href=errata27.html#sudo>Feb 22, 2001:
403: a buffer overflow was fixed in sudo(8).</a>
1.154 millert 404: <li><a href=errata27.html#ftpd>Dec 4, 2000:
405: A single-byte buffer overflow exists in ftpd (patch included).</a>
1.152 deraadt 406: <li><a href=errata27.html#sshforwarding>Nov 10, 2000:
407: Hostile servers can force OpenSSH clients to do agent or X11 forwarding.
408: (patch included)</a>
409: <li><a href=errata27.html#xtrans>Oct 26, 2000:
1.151 matthieu 410: X11 libraries have 2 potential overflows in xtrans code.
411: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 412: <li><a href=errata27.html#httpd>Oct 18, 2000:
1.150 beck 413: Apache mod_rewrite and mod_vhost_alias modules could expose files
414: on the server in certain configurations if used.
415: (patch included)</a>
1.164 deraadt 416: <li><a href=errata27.html#telnetd>Oct 10, 2000:
1.149 millert 417: The telnet daemon does not strip out the TERMINFO, TERMINFO_DIRS,
418: TERMPATH and TERMCAP environment variables as it should.
419: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 420: <li><a href=errata27.html#format_strings>Oct 6, 2000:
1.148 millert 421: There are printf-style format string bugs in several privileged
422: programs. (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 423: <li><a href=errata27.html#curses>Oct 6, 2000:
1.147 millert 424: libcurses honored terminal descriptions in the $HOME/.terminfo
425: directory as well as in the TERMCAP environment variable for
426: setuid and setgid applications.
1.146 deraadt 427: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 428: <li><a href=errata27.html#talkd>Oct 6, 2000:
1.146 deraadt 429: A format string vulnerability exists in talkd(8).
430: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 431: <li><a href=errata27.html#pw_error>Oct 3, 2000:
1.145 aaron 432: A format string vulnerability exists in the pw_error() function of the
433: libutil library, yielding localhost root through chpass(1).
434: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 435: <li><a href=errata27.html#ipsec>Sep 18, 2000:
1.144 jason 436: Bad ESP/AH packets could cause a crash under certain conditions.
437: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 438: <li><a href=errata27.html#xlock>Aug 16, 2000:
1.141 deraadt 439: A format string vulnerability (localhost root) exists in xlock(1).
440: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 441: <li><a href=errata27.html#X11_libs>July 14, 2000:
1.139 deraadt 442: Various bugs found in X11 libraries have various side effects, almost
443: completely denial of service in OpenBSD.
444: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 445: <li><a href=errata27.html#ftpd>July 5, 2000:
1.136 deraadt 446: Just like pretty much all the other unix ftp daemons
447: on the planet, ftpd had a remote root hole in it.
448: Luckily, ftpd was not enabled by default.
1.137 deraadt 449: The problem exists if anonymous ftp is enabled.
1.136 deraadt 450: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 451: <li><a href=errata27.html#mopd>July 5, 2000:
1.136 deraadt 452: Mopd, very rarely used, contained some buffer overflows.
453: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 454: <li><a href=errata27.html#libedit>June 28, 2000:
1.135 deraadt 455: libedit would check for a <b>.editrc</b> file in the current
456: directory. Not known to be a real security issue, but a patch
457: is available anyways.
458: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 459: <li><a href=errata27.html#dhclient>June 24, 2000:
1.134 deraadt 460: A serious bug in dhclient(8) could allow strings from a
461: malicious dhcp server to be executed in the shell as root.
462: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 463: <li><a href=errata27.html#isakmpd>June 9, 2000:
1.133 deraadt 464: A serious bug in isakmpd(8) policy handling wherein
465: policy verification could be completely bypassed in isakmpd.
466: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 467: <li><a href=errata27.html#uselogin>June 6, 2000:
1.132 deraadt 468: The non-default flag UseLogin in <b>/etc/sshd_config</b> is broken,
469: should not be used, and results in security problems on
470: other operating systems.</a>
1.152 deraadt 471: <li><a href=errata27.html#bridge>May 26, 2000:
1.129 deraadt 472: The bridge(4) <i>learning</i> flag may be bypassed.
1.128 deraadt 473: (patch included)</a>
1.152 deraadt 474: <li><a href=errata27.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
1.127 kjell 475: Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
476: in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
477:
1.124 deraadt 478: </ul>
479:
480: <p>
481: <li>
1.119 deraadt 482: <a name=26></a>
483:
484: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.6 Security Advisories</font></h3>
485: These are the OpenBSD 2.6 advisories -- all these problems are solved
486: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
487: OpenBSD 2.5 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.6.
488:
489: <p>
490: <ul>
1.130 deraadt 491: <li><a href=errata26.html#semconfig>May 26, 2000:
492: SYSV semaphore support contained an undocumented system call
1.131 deraadt 493: which could wedge semaphore-using processes from exiting. (patch included)</a>
1.127 kjell 494: <li><a href=errata26.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
495: Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
496: in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
1.126 deraadt 497: <li><a href=errata26.html#xlockmore>May 25, 2000:
1.125 deraadt 498: xlockmore has a bug which a localhost attacker can use to gain
499: access to the encrypted root password hash (which is normally
500: encoded using blowfish (see
501: <a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=crypt&sektion=3">
502: crypt(3)</a>)
503: (patch included).</a>
1.126 deraadt 504: <li><a href=errata26.html#procfs>Jan 20, 2000:
1.123 deraadt 505: Systems running with procfs enabled and mounted are
506: vulnerable to a very tricky exploit. procfs is not
507: mounted by default.
508: (patch included).</a>
1.190 mpech 509: <li><a href=errata26.html#sendmail>Dec 4, 1999:
510: Sendmail permitted any user to cause a aliases file wrap,
511: thus exposing the system to a race where the aliases file
512: did not exist.
1.119 deraadt 513: (patch included).</a>
1.190 mpech 514: <li><a href=errata26.html#poll>Dec 4, 1999:
515: Various bugs in poll(2) may cause a kernel crash.</a>
1.126 deraadt 516: <li><a href=errata26.html#sslUSA>Dec 2, 1999:
1.120 deraadt 517: A buffer overflow in the RSAREF code included in the
518: USA version of libssl, is possibly exploitable in
519: httpd, ssh, or isakmpd, if SSL/RSA features are enabled.
1.124 deraadt 520: (patch included).<br></a>
521: <strong>Update:</strong> Turns out that this was not exploitable
522: in any of the software included in OpenBSD 2.6.
1.190 mpech 523: <li><a href=errata26.html#ifmedia>Nov 9, 1999:
524: Any user could change interface media configurations, resulting in
525: a localhost denial of service attack.
1.121 deraadt 526: (patch included).</a>
1.119 deraadt 527: </ul>
528:
529: <p>
530: <li>
531:
1.93 deraadt 532: <a name=25></a>
1.106 deraadt 533:
1.110 deraadt 534: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.5 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.93 deraadt 535: These are the OpenBSD 2.5 advisories -- all these problems are solved
536: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
537: OpenBSD 2.4 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.5.
538:
1.96 deraadt 539: <p>
1.104 deraadt 540: <ul>
1.117 deraadt 541: <li><a href=errata25.html#cron>Aug 30, 1999:
1.103 deraadt 542: In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the
543: fake popen() and run sendmail as the user, not as root.
544: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 545: <li><a href=errata25.html#miscfs>Aug 12, 1999: The procfs and fdescfs
1.101 deraadt 546: filesystems had an overrun in their handling of uio_offset
547: in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
548: enabled by default). (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 549: <li><a href=errata25.html#profil>Aug 9, 1999: Stop profiling (see profil(2))
1.100 deraadt 550: when we execve() a new process. (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 551: <li><a href=errata25.html#ipsec_in_use>Aug 6, 1999: Packets that should have
1.98 deraadt 552: been handled by IPsec may be transmitted as cleartext.
553: PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
554: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 555: <li><a href=errata25.html#rc>Aug 5, 1999: In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for
1.97 deraadt 556: motd re-writing and change the find(1) to use -execdir
557: (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 558: <li><a href=errata25.html#chflags>Jul 30, 1999: Do not permit regular
1.95 deraadt 559: users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or block devices
560: which they may currently be the owner of (patch included).</a>
1.117 deraadt 561: <li><a href=errata25.html#nroff>Jul 27, 1999: Cause groff(1) to be invoked
1.95 deraadt 562: with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1) (patch included).</a>
1.93 deraadt 563: </ul>
564:
1.106 deraadt 565: <p>
566: <li>
1.75 deraadt 567: <a name=24></a>
1.110 deraadt 568: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.4 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.75 deraadt 569: These are the OpenBSD 2.4 advisories -- all these problems are solved
570: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
571: OpenBSD 2.3 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.4.
572:
1.96 deraadt 573: <p>
1.75 deraadt 574: <ul>
1.92 deraadt 575: <li><a href=errata24.html#poll>Mar 22, 1999: The nfds argument for poll(2) needs
1.91 deraadt 576: to be constrained, to avoid kvm starvation (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 577: <li><a href=errata24.html#tss>Mar 21, 1999: A change in TSS handling stops
1.91 deraadt 578: another kernel crash case caused by the <strong>crashme</strong>
579: program (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 580: <li><a href=errata24.html#nlink>Feb 25, 1999: An unbounded increment on the
1.90 deraadt 581: nlink value in FFS and EXT2FS filesystems can cause a system crash.
1.89 deraadt 582: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 583: <li><a href=errata24.html#ping>Feb 23, 1999: Yet another buffer overflow
1.88 deraadt 584: existed in ping(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 585: <li><a href=errata24.html#ipqrace>Feb 19, 1999: ipintr() had a race in use of
1.87 deraadt 586: the ipq, which could permit an attacker to cause a crash.
587: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 588: <li><a href=errata24.html#accept>Feb 17, 1999: A race condition in the
1.86 deraadt 589: kernel between accept(2) and select(2) could permit an attacker
590: to hang sockets from remote.
591: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 592: <li><a href=errata24.html#maxqueue>Feb 17, 1999: IP fragment assembly can
1.85 deraadt 593: bog the machine excessively and cause problems.
594: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 595: <li><a href=errata24.html#trctrap>Feb 12, 1999: i386 T_TRCTRAP handling and
1.84 deraadt 596: DDB interacted to possibly cause a crash.
597: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 598: <li><a href=errata24.html#rst>Feb 11, 1999: TCP/IP RST handling was sloppy.
1.83 deraadt 599: (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 600: <li><a href=errata24.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
1.81 deraadt 601: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 602: <li><a href=errata24.html#termcap>Nov 19, 1998: There is a possibly locally
1.82 deraadt 603: exploitable problem relating to environment variables in termcap
604: and curses. (patch included).</a>
1.92 deraadt 605: <li><a href=errata24.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
1.78 deraadt 606: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.75 deraadt 607: </ul>
608:
1.106 deraadt 609: <p>
610: <li>
1.58 deraadt 611: <a name=23></a>
1.110 deraadt 612: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.3 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.73 deraadt 613: These are the OpenBSD 2.3 advisories -- all these problems are solved
614: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>. Obviously, all the
615: OpenBSD 2.2 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.3.
1.53 matthieu 616:
1.96 deraadt 617: <p>
1.53 matthieu 618: <ul>
1.81 deraadt 619: <li><a href=errata23.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
620: problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.78 deraadt 621: <li><a href=errata23.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
622: bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.190 mpech 623: <li><a href=errata23.html#resolver>August 31, 1998: A benign looking resolver
624: buffer overflow bug was re-introduced accidentally (patches included).</a>
625: <li><a href=errata23.html#chpass>Aug 2, 1998:
626: chpass(1) has a file descriptor leak which allows an
627: attacker to modify /etc/master.passwd.</a>
628: <li><a href=errata23.html#inetd>July 15, 1998: Inetd had a file descriptor leak.</a>
1.76 aaron 629: <li><a href=errata23.html#fdalloc>Jul 2, 1998: setuid and setgid processes
1.72 deraadt 630: should not be executed with fd slots 0, 1, or 2 free.
631: (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 632: <li><a href=errata23.html#xlib>June 6, 1998: Further problems with the X
1.71 deraadt 633: libraries (patches included).</a>
1.76 aaron 634: <li><a href=errata23.html#kill>May 17, 1998: kill(2) of setuid/setgid target
1.66 deraadt 635: processes too permissive (4th revision patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 636: <li><a href=errata23.html#immutable>May 11, 1998: mmap() permits partial bypassing
1.60 deraadt 637: of immutable and append-only file flags. (patch included).</a>
1.190 mpech 638: <li><a href=errata23.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC packets
639: if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
1.76 aaron 640: <li><a href=errata23.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm and Xaw
1.58 deraadt 641: (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
1.53 matthieu 642: </ul>
1.9 deraadt 643:
1.106 deraadt 644: <p>
645: <li>
1.58 deraadt 646: <a name=22></a>
1.110 deraadt 647: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.2 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.45 deraadt 648: These are the OpenBSD 2.2 advisories. All these problems are solved
1.55 deraadt 649: in <a href=23.html>OpenBSD 2.3</a>. Some of these problems
1.45 deraadt 650: still exist in other operating systems. (The supplied patches are for
651: OpenBSD 2.2; they may or may not work on OpenBSD 2.1).
1.9 deraadt 652:
1.96 deraadt 653: <p>
1.9 deraadt 654: <ul>
1.72 deraadt 655: <li><a href=errata22.html#ipsec>May 5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC
656: packets if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
657: <li><a href=errata22.html#xterm-xaw>May 1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm
658: and Xaw (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
659: <li><a href=errata22.html#uucpd>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer overflow in uucpd
660: (patch included).</a>
661: <li><a href=errata22.html#rmjob>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer mismanagement in lprm
662: (patch included).</a>
663: <li><a href=errata22.html#ping>Mar 31, 1998: Overflow in ping -R (patch included).</a>
664: <li><a href=errata22.html#named>Mar 30, 1998: Overflow in named fake-iquery
1.59 deraadt 665: (patch included).</a>
1.72 deraadt 666: <li><a href=errata22.html#mountd>Mar 2, 1998: Accidental NFS filesystem
667: export (patch included).</a>
1.112 philen 668: <li><a href="advisories/mmap.txt">Feb 26, 1998: Read-write mmap() flaw.</a>
1.72 deraadt 669: Revision 3 of the patch is available <a href=errata22.html#mmap>here</a>
1.112 philen 670: <li><a href="advisories/sourceroute.txt">Feb 19, 1998: Sourcerouted Packet
1.59 deraadt 671: Acceptance.</a>
1.50 deraadt 672: A patch is available <a href=errata22.html#sourceroute>here</a>.
1.122 rohee 673: <li><a href=errata22.html#ruserok>Feb 13, 1998: Setuid coredump & Ruserok()
1.72 deraadt 674: flaw (patch included).</a>
675: <li><a href=errata22.html#ldso>Feb 9, 1998: MIPS ld.so flaw (patch included).</a>
1.1 deraadt 676: </ul>
677:
1.106 deraadt 678: <p>
679: <li>
1.58 deraadt 680: <a name=21></a>
1.110 deraadt 681: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.1 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.52 deraadt 682: These are the OpenBSD 2.1 advisories. All these problems are solved
683: in <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>. Some of these problems still
684: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.1, we
685: would strongly recommend an upgrade to the newest release, as this
686: patch list only attempts at fixing the most important security
687: problems. In particular, OpenBSD 2.2 fixes numerous localhost
688: security problems. Many of those problems were solved in ways which
689: make it hard for us to provide patches).
690:
1.96 deraadt 691: <p>
1.52 deraadt 692: <ul>
1.112 philen 693: <li><a href="advisories/signals.txt">Sep 15, 1997: Deviant Signals (patch included)</a>
694: <li><a href="advisories/rfork.txt">Aug 2, 1997: Rfork() system call flaw
1.59 deraadt 695: (patch included)</a>
1.112 philen 696: <li><a href="advisories/procfs.txt">Jun 24, 1997: Procfs flaws (patch included)</a>
1.52 deraadt 697: </ul>
1.51 deraadt 698:
1.106 deraadt 699: <p>
700: <li>
701: <a name=20></a>
1.110 deraadt 702: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.99 deraadt 703: These are the OpenBSD 2.0 advisories. All these problems are solved
704: in <a href=21.html>OpenBSD 2.1</a>. Some of these problems still
705: exist in other operating systems. (If you are running OpenBSD 2.0, we
706: commend you for being there back in the old days!, but you're really
707: missing out if you don't install a new version!)
708:
709: <p>
710: <ul>
1.112 philen 711: <li><a href="advisories/res_random.txt">April 22, 1997: Predictable IDs in the
1.99 deraadt 712: resolver (patch included)</a>
713: <li>Many others... if people can hunt them down, please let me know
714: and we'll put them up here.
715: </ul>
716:
1.106 deraadt 717: </dl>
1.51 deraadt 718: <p>
1.106 deraadt 719:
720: <a name=watching></a>
1.110 deraadt 721: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Watching our Changes</font></h3><p>
1.106 deraadt 722:
1.21 deraadt 723: Since we take a proactive stance with security, we are continually
724: finding and fixing new security problems. Not all of these problems
1.80 espie 725: get widely reported because (as stated earlier) many of them are not
1.45 deraadt 726: confirmed to be exploitable; many simple bugs we fix do turn out to
727: have security consequences we could not predict. We do not have the
728: time resources to make these changes available in the above format.<p>
1.21 deraadt 729:
730: Thus there are usually minor security fixes in the current source code
731: beyond the previous major OpenBSD release. We make a limited
1.45 deraadt 732: guarantee that these problems are of minimal impact and unproven
1.44 ian 733: exploitability. If we discover that a problem definitely matters for
1.45 deraadt 734: security, patches will show up here <strong>VERY</strong> quickly.<p>
1.21 deraadt 735:
1.45 deraadt 736: People who are really concerned with security can do a number of
737: things:<p>
1.21 deraadt 738:
739: <ul>
740: <li>If you understand security issues, watch our
1.27 deraadt 741: <a href=mail.html>source-changes mailing list</a> and keep an
1.23 deraadt 742: eye out for things which appear security related. Since
1.21 deraadt 743: exploitability is not proven for many of the fixes we make,
744: do not expect the relevant commit message to say "SECURITY FIX!".
745: If a problem is proven and serious, a patch will be available
746: here very shortly after.
1.161 horacio 747: <li>In addition to source changes, you can watch our <a href="mail.html">
1.160 ericj 748: security-announce mailing list</a> which will notify you for every
1.186 ian 749: security related item that the OpenBSD team deems as a possible threat,
1.160 ericj 750: and instruct you on how to patch the problem.
1.21 deraadt 751: <li>Track our current source code tree, and teach yourself how to do a
1.29 deraadt 752: complete system build from time to time (read /usr/src/Makefile
753: carefully). Users can make the assumption that the current
754: source tree always has stronger security than the previous release.
1.45 deraadt 755: However, building your own system from source code is not trivial;
756: it is nearly 300MB of source code, and problems do occur as we
757: transition between major releases.
1.115 ericj 758: <li>Install a binary snapshot for your
1.80 espie 759: architecture, which are made available fairly often. For
1.29 deraadt 760: instance, an i386 snapshot is typically made available weekly.
1.21 deraadt 761: </ul>
762:
1.9 deraadt 763: <p>
1.153 jufi 764: <a name=reporting></a>
1.110 deraadt 765: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Reporting problems</font></h3><p>
1.3 deraadt 766:
1.5 deraadt 767: <p> If you find a new security problem, you can mail it to
1.6 deraadt 768: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>deraadt@openbsd.org</a>.
1.7 deraadt 769: <br>
1.5 deraadt 770: If you wish to PGP encode it (but please only do so if privacy is very
1.112 philen 771: urgent, since it is inconvenient) use this <a href="advisories/pgpkey.txt">pgp key</a>.
1.5 deraadt 772:
1.107 deraadt 773: <p>
774: <a name=papers></a>
1.110 deraadt 775: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Further Reading</font></h3><p>
1.107 deraadt 776:
777: A number of papers have been written by OpenBSD team members, about security
778: related changes they have done in OpenBSD. The postscript versions of these
1.108 deraadt 779: documents are available as follows.<p>
1.107 deraadt 780:
781: <ul>
1.113 deraadt 782: <li>A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme.<br>
1.118 deraadt 783: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.153 jufi 784: by <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>,
1.113 deraadt 785: <a href=mailto:dm@openbsd.org>David Mazieres</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 786: <a href=papers/bcrypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
787: <a href=papers/bcrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 788: <p>
789: <li>Cryptography in OpenBSD: An Overview.<br>
1.118 deraadt 790: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 791: by <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>,
792: <a href=mailto:niklas@openbsd.org>Niklas Hallqvist</a>,
793: <a href=mailto:art@openbsd.org>Artur Grabowski</a>,
794: <a href=mailto:angelos@openbsd.org>Angelos D. Keromytis</a>,
795: <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.107 deraadt 796: <a href=papers/crypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
797: <a href=papers/crypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 798: <p>
799: <li>strlcpy and strlcat -- consistent, safe, string copy and concatenation.<br>
1.118 deraadt 800: <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113 deraadt 801: by <a href=mailto:millert@openbsd.org>Todd C. Miller</a>,
802: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>.<br>
1.109 deraadt 803: <a href=papers/strlcpy-paper.ps>paper</a> and
804: <a href=papers/strlcpy-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113 deraadt 805: <p>
1.118 deraadt 806: <li>Dealing with Public Ethernet Jacks-Switches, Gateways, and Authentication.<br>
807: <a href=events.html#lisa99>LISA 1999</a>,
808: by <a href=mailto:beck@openbsd.org>Bob Beck</a>.<br>
809: <a href=papers/authgw-paper.ps>paper</a> and
810: <a href=papers/authgw-slides.ps>slides</a>.
811: <p>
1.153 jufi 812: <li>Encrypting Virtual Memory<br>
1.142 deraadt 813: <a href=events.html#sec2000>Usenix Security 2000</a>,
814: <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.143 provos 815: <a href=papers/swapencrypt.ps>paper</a> and
816: <a href=papers/swapencrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.142 deraadt 817: <p>
1.107 deraadt 818: </ul>
819:
1.106 deraadt 820: </dl>
821:
1.2 deraadt 822: <hr>
1.68 pauls 823: <a href=index.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.24 deraadt 824: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
825: <br>
1.205 ! millert 826: <small>$OpenBSD: security.html,v 1.204 2002/04/17 19:13:34 jufi Exp $</small>
1.1 deraadt 827:
1.24 deraadt 828: </body>
829: </html>
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