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1.1       deraadt     1: <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC  "-//IETF//DTD HTML Strict//EN">
                      2: <html>
                      3: <head>
1.20      deraadt     4: <title>OpenBSD Security</title>
1.1       deraadt     5: <link rev=made href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>
                      6: <meta name="resource-type" content="document">
                      7: <meta name="description" content="OpenBSD advisories">
                      8: <meta name="keywords" content="openbsd,main">
                      9: <meta name="distribution" content="global">
1.193     horacio    10: <meta name="copyright" content="This document copyright 1997-2002 by OpenBSD.">
1.1       deraadt    11: </head>
                     12:
                     13: <BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF" TEXT="#000000" LINK="#23238E">
1.210   ! jsyn       14: <a href="index.html"><img alt="[OpenBSD]" height="30" width="141" src="images/smalltitle.gif" border="0"></a>
1.106     deraadt    15: <p>
1.110     deraadt    16: <h2><font color=#e00000>Security</font><hr></h2>
1.1       deraadt    17:
1.114     philen     18: <table width="100%">
                     19: <tr>
                     20: <td colspan="2">
                     21: <strong>Index</strong>
                     22: </td>
                     23: </tr>
                     24: <tr>
                     25: <td valign="top">
1.106     deraadt    26: <a href=#goals>Security goals of the Project</a>.<br>
                     27: <a href=#disclosure>Full Disclosure policy</a>.<br>
                     28: <a href=#process>Source code auditing process</a>.<br>
1.111     aaron      29: <a href=#default>"Secure by Default"</a>.<br>
1.106     deraadt    30: <a href=#crypto>Use of Cryptography</a>.<br>
                     31: <p>
                     32: <a href=#watching>Watching changes</a>.<br>
                     33: <a href=#reporting>Reporting security issues</a>.<br>
1.107     deraadt    34: <a href=#papers>Further Reading</a><br>
1.106     deraadt    35: <p>
1.114     philen     36: </td>
                     37: <td valign="top">
1.204     jufi       38: <a href="#31">For 3.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.187     deraadt    39: <a href="#30">For 3.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.173     deraadt    40: <a href="#29">For 2.9 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.152     deraadt    41: <a href="#28">For 2.8 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.124     deraadt    42: <a href="#27">For 2.7 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.119     deraadt    43: <a href="#26">For 2.6 security advisories</a>.<br>
1.114     philen     44: <a href="#25">For 2.5 security advisories</a>.<br>
                     45: <a href="#24">For 2.4 security advisories</a>.<br>
                     46: <a href="#23">For 2.3 security advisories</a>.<br>
                     47: <a href="#22">For 2.2 security advisories</a>.<br>
                     48: <a href="#21">For 2.1 security advisories</a>.<br>
                     49: <a href="#20">For 2.0 security advisories</a>.<br>
                     50: </td>
                     51: </tr>
                     52: </table>
1.56      deraadt    53: <hr>
                     54:
1.106     deraadt    55: <dl>
                     56: <a name=goals></a>
1.110     deraadt    57: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Goal</font></h3><p>
1.22      deraadt    58:
1.14      deraadt    59: OpenBSD believes in strong security.  Our aspiration is to be NUMBER
1.22      deraadt    60: ONE in the industry for security (if we are not already there).  Our
                     61: open software development model permits us to take a more
                     62: uncompromising view towards increased security than Sun, SGI, IBM, HP,
                     63: or other vendors are able to.  We can make changes the vendors would
1.27      deraadt    64: not make.  Also, since OpenBSD is exported with <a href=crypto.html>
1.45      deraadt    65: cryptography</a>, we are able to take cryptographic approaches towards
                     66: fixing security problems.<p>
1.18      deraadt    67:
1.106     deraadt    68: <a name=disclosure></a>
1.110     deraadt    69: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Full Disclosure</font></h3><p>
1.106     deraadt    70:
1.45      deraadt    71: Like many readers of the
1.196     jufi       72: <a href="http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1">
1.18      deraadt    73: BUGTRAQ mailing list</a>,
1.106     deraadt    74: we believe in full disclosure of security problems.  In the
                     75: operating system arena, we were probably the first to embrace
                     76: the concept.  Many vendors, even of free software, still try
                     77: to hide issues from their users.<p>
                     78:
                     79: Security information moves very fast in cracker circles.  On the other
                     80: hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security
                     81: fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix
                     82: turnaround is possible.  Thus we think that full disclosure helps the
                     83: people who really care about security.<p>
                     84:
1.153     jufi       85: <a name=process></a>
1.110     deraadt    86: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Audit Process</font></h3><p>
1.15      deraadt    87:
1.12      deraadt    88: Our security auditing team typically has between six and twelve
1.45      deraadt    89: members who continue to search for and fix new security holes.  We
                     90: have been auditing since the summer of 1996.  The process we follow to
                     91: increase security is simply a comprehensive file-by-file analysis of
1.106     deraadt    92: every critical software component.  We are not so much looking for
                     93: security holes, as we are looking for basic software bugs, and if
1.138     deraadt    94: years later someone discovers the problem used to be a security
1.106     deraadt    95: issue, and we fixed it because it was just a bug, well, all the
                     96: better.  Flaws have been found in just about every area of the system.
                     97: Entire new classes of security problems have been found during our
                     98: audit, and often source code which had been audited earlier needs
                     99: re-auditing with these new flaws in mind.  Code often gets audited
                    100: multiple times, and by multiple people with different auditing
                    101: skills.<p>
1.12      deraadt   102:
1.94      deraadt   103: Some members of our security auditing team worked for Secure Networks,
                    104: the company that made the industry's premier network security scanning
                    105: software package Ballista (Secure Networks got purchased by Network
                    106: Associates, Ballista got renamed to Cybercop Scanner, and well...)
                    107: That company did a lot of security research, and thus fit in well
1.106     deraadt   108: with the OpenBSD stance.  OpenBSD passed Ballista's tests with flying
                    109: colours since day 1.<p>
1.31      deraadt   110:
1.34      deraadt   111: Another facet of our security auditing process is its proactiveness.
1.45      deraadt   112: In most cases we have found that the determination of exploitability
                    113: is not an issue.  During our ongoing auditing process we find many
                    114: bugs, and endeavor to fix them even though exploitability is not
                    115: proven.  We fix the bug, and we move on to find other bugs to fix.  We
                    116: have fixed many simple and obvious careless programming errors in code
                    117: and only months later discovered that the problems were in fact
                    118: exploitable.  (Or, more likely someone on
1.197     jufi      119: <a href="http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1">BUGTRAQ</a>
1.45      deraadt   120: would report that other operating systems were vulnerable to a `newly
                    121: discovered problem', and then it would be discovered that OpenBSD had
                    122: been fixed in a previous release).  In other cases we have been saved
                    123: from full exploitability of complex step-by-step attacks because we
                    124: had fixed one of the intermediate steps.  An example of where we
1.94      deraadt   125: managed such a success is the lpd advisory that Secure Networks put out.
                    126: <p>
1.29      deraadt   127:
1.110     deraadt   128: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>The Reward</font></h3><p>
1.106     deraadt   129:
1.45      deraadt   130: Our proactive auditing process has really paid off.  Statements like
1.35      deraadt   131: ``This problem was fixed in OpenBSD about 6 months ago'' have become
1.45      deraadt   132: commonplace in security forums like
1.197     jufi      133: <a href="http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1">BUGTRAQ</a>.<p>
1.35      deraadt   134:
1.45      deraadt   135: The most intense part of our security auditing happened immediately
1.80      espie     136: before the OpenBSD 2.0 release and during the 2.0-&gt;2.1 transition,
1.45      deraadt   137: over the last third of 1996 and first half of 1997.  Thousands (yes,
                    138: thousands) of security issues were fixed rapidly over this year-long
                    139: period; bugs like the standard buffer overflows, protocol
                    140: implementation weaknesses, information gathering, and filesystem
                    141: races.  Hence most of the security problems that we encountered were
                    142: fixed before our 2.1 release, and then a far smaller number needed
                    143: fixing for our 2.2 release.  We do not find as many problems anymore,
                    144: it is simply a case of diminishing returns.  Recently the security
                    145: problems we find and fix tend to be significantly more obscure or
                    146: complicated.  Still we will persist for a number of reasons:<p>
1.36      deraadt   147:
1.35      deraadt   148: <ul>
1.45      deraadt   149: <li>Occasionally we find a simple problem we missed earlier. Doh!
1.35      deraadt   150: <li>Security is like an arms race; the best attackers will continue
1.45      deraadt   151:        to search for more complicated exploits, so we will too.
                    152: <li>Finding and fixing subtle flaws in complicated software is
                    153:        a lot of fun.
1.35      deraadt   154: </ul>
1.106     deraadt   155: <p>
1.15      deraadt   156:
1.14      deraadt   157: The auditing process is not over yet, and as you can see we continue
1.28      deraadt   158: to find and fix new security flaws.<p>
1.12      deraadt   159:
1.106     deraadt   160: <a name=default></a>
1.110     deraadt   161: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>"Secure by Default"</font></h3><p>
1.106     deraadt   162:
                    163: To ensure that novice users of OpenBSD do not need to become security
                    164: experts overnight (a viewpoint which other vendors seem to have), we
                    165: ship the operating system in a Secure by Default mode.  All non-essential
                    166: services are disabled.  As the user/administrator becomes more familiar
                    167: with the system, he will discover that he has to enable daemons and other
                    168: parts of the system.  During the process of learning how to enable a new
                    169: service, the novice is more likely to learn of security considerations.<p>
                    170:
                    171: This is in stark contrast to the increasing number of systems that
                    172: ship with NFS, mountd, web servers, and various other services enabled
                    173: by default, creating instantaneous security problems for their users
                    174: within minutes after their first install.<p>
                    175:
1.153     jufi      176: <a name=crypto></a>
1.110     deraadt   177: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Cryptography</font></h3><p>
1.106     deraadt   178:
                    179: And of course, since the OpenBSD project is based in Canada, it is possible
                    180: for us to integrate cryptography.  For more information, read the page
1.116     deraadt   181: outlining <a href=crypto.html>what we have done with cryptography</a>.</p>
1.106     deraadt   182:
1.110     deraadt   183: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Advisories</font></h3><p>
1.106     deraadt   184:
                    185: <dl>
                    186:
                    187: <li>
1.203     deraadt   188: <a name=31></a>
                    189:
                    190: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 3.1 Security Advisories</font></h3>
                    191: These are the OpenBSD 3.1 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    192: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
                    193: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
                    194:
                    195: <p>
                    196: <ul>
1.209     markus    197: <li><a href=errata.html#sshbsdauth>May 22, 2002:
                    198:         Under certain conditions, on systems using YP with netgroups
                    199:         in the password database, it is possible that sshd(8) does
                    200:         ACL checks for the requested user name but uses the password
                    201:         database entry of a different user for authentication.  This
                    202:         means that denied users might authenticate successfully
                    203:         while permitted users could be locked out.</a>
1.208     millert   204: <li><a href=errata.html#fdalloc2>May 8, 2002:
                    205:        A race condition exists that could defeat the kernel's
                    206:        protection of fd slots 0-2 for setuid processes.</a>
1.205     millert   207: <li><a href=errata.html#sudo>April 25, 2002:
                    208:        A bug in sudo may allow an attacker to corrupt the heap.</a>
                    209: <li><a href=errata.html#sshafs>April 22, 2002:
                    210:         A local user can gain super-user privileges due to a buffer
                    211:         overflow in sshd(8) if AFS has been configured on the system
                    212:         or if KerberosTgtPassing or AFSTokenPassing has been enabled
                    213:         in the sshd_config file.</a>
1.203     deraadt   214: </ul>
                    215:
                    216: <p>
                    217:
                    218: <li>
1.187     deraadt   219: <a name=30></a>
                    220:
                    221: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 3.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
                    222: These are the OpenBSD 3.0 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    223: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
                    224: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
                    225:
                    226: <p>
                    227: <ul>
1.208     millert   228: <li><a href=errata30.html#fdalloc2>May 8, 2002:
                    229:        A race condition exists that could defeat the kernel's
                    230:        protection of fd slots 0-2 for setuid processes.</a>
1.205     millert   231: <li><a href=errata30.html#sudo2>April 25, 2002:
                    232:        A bug in sudo may allow an attacker to corrupt the heap.</a>
                    233: <li><a href=errata30.html#sshafs>April 22, 2002:
                    234:         A local user can gain super-user privileges due to a buffer
                    235:         overflow in sshd(8) if AFS has been configured on the system
                    236:         or if KerberosTgtPassing or AFSTokenPassing has been enabled
                    237:         in the sshd_config file.</a>
1.203     deraadt   238: <li><a href=errata30.html#mail>April 11, 2002:
1.202     millert   239:        The mail(1) was interpreting tilde escapes even when invoked
                    240:        in non-interactive mode.  As mail(1) is called as root from cron,
                    241:        this can lead to a local root compromise.</a>
1.203     deraadt   242: <li><a href=errata30.html#approval>March 19, 2002:
1.201     millert   243:        Under certain conditions, on systems using YP with netgroups in
                    244:        the password database, it is possible for the rexecd(8) and rshd(8)
                    245:        daemons to execute a shell from a password database entry for a
                    246:        different user. Similarly, atrun(8) may change to the wrong
                    247:        home directory when running jobs.</a>
1.203     deraadt   248: <li><a href=errata30.html#zlib>March 13, 2002:
1.200     millert   249:        A potential double free() exists in the zlib library;
                    250:        this is not exploitable on OpenBSD.
                    251:        The kernel also contains a copy of zlib; it is not
                    252:        currently known if the kernel zlib is exploitable.</a>
1.203     deraadt   253: <li><a href=errata30.html#openssh>March 8, 2002:
1.198     millert   254:        An off-by-one check in OpenSSH's channel forwarding code
1.199     jufi      255:        may allow a local user to gain super-user privileges.</a>
1.203     deraadt   256: <li><a href=errata30.html#ptrace>January 21, 2002:
1.192     jason     257:        A race condition between the ptrace(2) and execve(2) system calls
                    258:        allows an attacker to modify the memory contents of suid/sgid
                    259:        processes which could lead to compromise of the super-user account.</a>
1.203     deraadt   260: <li><a href=errata30.html#sudo>January 17, 2002:
1.191     millert   261:        There is a security hole in sudo(8) that can be exploited
                    262:        when the Postfix sendmail replacement is installed that may
                    263:        allow an attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.203     deraadt   264: <li><a href=errata30.html#lpd>November 28, 2001:
1.189     millert   265:        An attacker can trick a machine running the lpd daemon into
                    266:        creating new files in the root directory from a machine with
                    267:        remote line printer access.</a>
1.203     deraadt   268: <li><a href=errata30.html#vi.recover>November 13, 2001:
1.188     millert   269:        The vi.recover script can be abused in such a way as
                    270:        to cause arbitrary zero-length files to be removed.</a>
1.203     deraadt   271: <li><a href=errata30.html#pf>November 13, 2001:
1.190     mpech     272:        pf(4) was incapable of dealing with certain ipv6 icmp packets,
                    273:        resulting in a crash.</a>
1.203     deraadt   274: <li><a href=errata30.html#sshd>November 12, 2001:
1.190     mpech     275:        A security hole that may allow an attacker to partially authenticate
                    276:        if -- and only if -- the administrator has enabled KerberosV.</a>
1.187     deraadt   277: </ul>
                    278:
                    279: <p>
                    280: <li>
1.173     deraadt   281: <a name=29></a>
                    282:
                    283: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.9 Security Advisories</font></h3>
                    284: These are the OpenBSD 2.9 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    285: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
1.179     jufi      286: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
1.173     deraadt   287:
                    288: <p>
                    289: <ul>
1.208     millert   290: <li><a href=errata29.html#fdalloc2>May 8, 2002:
                    291:        A race condition exists that could defeat the kernel's
                    292:        protection of fd slots 0-2 for setuid processes.</a>
1.207     millert   293: <li><a href=errata29.html#sudo2>April 25, 2002:
                    294:        A bug in sudo may allow an attacker to corrupt the heap.</a>
1.206     millert   295: <li><a href=errata29.html#sshafs>April 22, 2002:
                    296:         A local user can gain super-user privileges due to a buffer
                    297:         overflow in sshd(8) if AFS has been configured on the system
                    298:         or if KerberosTgtPassing or AFSTokenPassing has been enabled
                    299:         in the sshd_config file.</a>
1.202     millert   300: <li><a href=errata29.html#mail>April 11, 2002:
                    301:        The mail(1) was interpreting tilde escapes even when invoked
                    302:        in non-interactive mode.  As mail(1) is called as root from cron,
                    303:        this can lead to a local root compromise.</a>
1.200     millert   304: <li><a href=errata29.html#zlib>March 13, 2002:
                    305:        A potential double free() exists in the zlib library;
                    306:        this is not exploitable on OpenBSD.
                    307:        The kernel also contains a copy of zlib; it is not
                    308:        currently known if the kernel zlib is exploitable.</a>
1.198     millert   309: <li><a href=errata29.html#openssh>March 8, 2002:
                    310:        An off-by-one check in OpenSSH's channel forwarding code
1.199     jufi      311:        may allow a local user to gain super-user privileges.</a>
1.198     millert   312: <li><a href=errata29.html#ptrace>January 21, 2002:
                    313:        A race condition between the ptrace(2) and execve(2) system calls
                    314:        allows an attacker to modify the memory contents of suid/sgid
                    315:        processes which could lead to compromise of the super-user account.</a>
1.191     millert   316: <li><a href=errata29.html#sudo>January 17, 2002:
                    317:        There is a security hole in sudo(8) that can be exploited
                    318:        when the Postfix sendmail replacement is installed that may
                    319:        allow an attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.189     millert   320: <li><a href=errata29.html#lpd2>November 28, 2001:
                    321:        An attacker can trick a machine running the lpd daemon into
                    322:        creating new files in the root directory from a machine with
                    323:        remote line printer access.</a>
1.190     mpech     324: <li><a href=errata29.html#vi.recover>November 13, 2001:
                    325:        The vi.recover script can be abused in such a way as
                    326:        to cause arbitrary zero-length files to be removed.</a>
1.185     deraadt   327: <li><a href=errata29.html#uucp>September 11, 2001:
1.184     millert   328:        A security hole exists in uuxqt(8) that may allow an
                    329:        attacker to gain root privileges.</a>
1.185     deraadt   330: <li><a href=errata29.html#lpd>August 29, 2001:
1.183     millert   331:        A security hole exists in lpd(8) that may allow an
                    332:        attacker to gain root privileges if lpd is running.</a>
1.185     deraadt   333: <li><a href=errata29.html#sendmail2>August 21, 2001:
1.181     millert   334:        A security hole exists in sendmail(8) that may allow an
                    335:        attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.185     deraadt   336: <li><a href=errata29.html#nfs>July 30, 2001:
1.180     jason     337:        A kernel buffer overflow in the NFS code can be used to execute
                    338:        arbitrary code by users with mount privileges (only root by
1.181     millert   339:        default).</a>
1.185     deraadt   340: <li><a href=errata29.html#kernexec>June 15, 2001:
1.178     aaron     341:        A race condition in the kernel can lead to local root compromise.</a>
1.185     deraadt   342: <li><a href=errata29.html#sshcookie>June 12, 2001:
1.177     markus    343:         sshd(8) allows users to delete arbitrary files named "cookies"
                    344:         if X11 forwarding is enabled. X11 forwarding is disabled
                    345:         by default.</a>
1.185     deraadt   346: <li><a href=errata29.html#fts>May 30, 2001:
1.176     millert   347:         Programs using the fts routines can be tricked into changing
                    348:         into the wrong directory.</a>
1.185     deraadt   349: <li><a href=errata29.html#sendmail>May 29, 2001:
1.174     millert   350:        Sendmail signal handlers contain unsafe code,
                    351:        leading to numerous race conditions.</a>
1.173     deraadt   352: </ul>
                    353:
                    354: <p>
                    355: <li>
1.152     deraadt   356: <a name=28></a>
                    357:
                    358: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.8 Security Advisories</font></h3>
                    359: These are the OpenBSD 2.8 advisories -- all these problems are solved
1.154     millert   360: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a> and the
1.179     jufi      361: <a href=stable.html>patch branch</a>.
1.152     deraadt   362:
                    363: <p>
                    364: <ul>
1.184     millert   365: <li><a href=errata28.html#uucp>September 11, 2001:
                    366:        A security hole exists in uuxqt(8) that may allow an
                    367:        attacker to gain root privileges.</a>
1.183     millert   368: <li><a href=errata28.html#lpd>August 29, 2001:
                    369:        A security hole exists in lpd(8) that may allow an
                    370:        attacker to gain root privileges if lpd is running.</a>
1.181     millert   371: <li><a href=errata28.html#sendmail2>August 21, 2001:
                    372:        A security hole exists in sendmail(8) that may allow an
                    373:        attacker on the local host to gain root privileges.</a>
1.178     aaron     374: <li><a href=errata28.html#kernexec>June 15, 2001:
                    375:        A race condition in the kernel can lead to local root compromise.</a>
1.176     millert   376: <li><a href=errata28.html#fts>May 30, 2001:
                    377:         Programs using the fts routines can be tricked into changing
                    378:         into the wrong directory.</a>
1.175     millert   379: <li><a href=errata28.html#sendmail>May 29, 2001:
                    380:        Sendmail signal handlers contain unsafe code,
                    381:        leading to numerous race conditions.</a>
1.173     deraadt   382: <li><a href=errata28.html#ipf_frag>Apr 23, 2001:
1.172     ericj     383:        IPF contains a serious bug with its handling of fragment cacheing.</a>
1.173     deraadt   384: <li><a href=errata28.html#glob_limit>Apr 23, 2001:
1.172     ericj     385:        ftpd(8) contains a potential DoS relating to glob(3).</a>
1.173     deraadt   386: <li><a href=errata28.html#glob>Apr 10, 2001:
1.170     ericj     387:        The glob(3) library call contains multiple buffer overflows.</a>
1.173     deraadt   388: <li><a href=errata28.html#readline>Mar 18, 2001:
1.169     millert   389:        The readline library creates history files with permissive modes based on the user's umask.</a>
1.173     deraadt   390: <li><a href=errata28.html#ipsec_ah>Mar 2, 2001:
1.167     ericj     391:        Insufficient checks in the IPSEC AH IPv4 option handling code can lead to a buffer overrun in the kernel.</a>
1.173     deraadt   392: <li><a href=errata28.html#userldt>Mar 2, 2001:
1.168     horacio   393:        The <b>USER_LDT</b> kernel option allows an attacker to gain access to privileged areas of kernel memory.</a>
1.173     deraadt   394: <li><a href=errata28.html#sudo>Feb 22, 2001:
1.171     millert   395:        a non-exploitable buffer overflow was fixed in sudo(8).</a>
1.173     deraadt   396: <li><a href=errata28.html#named>Jan 29, 2001:
1.163     jason     397:        merge named(8) with ISC BIND 4.9.8-REL, which fixes some buffer vulnerabilities.</a>
1.173     deraadt   398: <li><a href=errata28.html#rnd>Jan 22, 2001:
1.162     jason     399:        rnd(4) did not use all of its input when written to.</a>
1.173     deraadt   400: <li><a href=errata28.html#xlock>Dec 22, 2000:
1.159     ericj     401:        xlock(1)'s authentication was re-done to authenticate via a named pipe. (patch and new xlock binaries included).</a>
1.173     deraadt   402: <li><a href=errata28.html#procfs>Dec 18, 2000:
1.157     ericj     403:        Procfs contains numerous overflows. Procfs is not used by default in OpenBSD. (patch included).</a>
1.173     deraadt   404: <li><a href=errata28.html#kerberos2>Dec 10, 2000:
1.156     deraadt   405:        Another problem exists in KerberosIV libraries (patch included).</a>
1.173     deraadt   406: <li><a href=errata28.html#kerberos>Dec 7, 2000:
1.155     deraadt   407:        A set of problems in KerberosIV exist (patch included).</a>
1.173     deraadt   408: <li><a href=errata28.html#ftpd>Dec 4, 2000:
1.154     millert   409:        A single-byte buffer overflow exists in ftpd (patch included).</a>
1.152     deraadt   410: </ul>
                    411:
                    412: <p>
                    413: <li>
1.124     deraadt   414: <a name=27></a>
                    415:
                    416: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.7 Security Advisories</font></h3>
                    417: These are the OpenBSD 2.7 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    418: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>.  Obviously, all the
                    419: OpenBSD 2.6 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.7.
                    420:
                    421: <p>
                    422: <ul>
1.169     millert   423: <li><a href=errata27.html#readline>Mar 18, 2001:
                    424:        The readline library creates history files with permissive modes based on the user's umask.</a>
                    425: <li><a href=errata27.html#sudo>Feb 22, 2001:
                    426:        a buffer overflow was fixed in sudo(8).</a>
1.154     millert   427: <li><a href=errata27.html#ftpd>Dec 4, 2000:
                    428:        A single-byte buffer overflow exists in ftpd (patch included).</a>
1.152     deraadt   429: <li><a href=errata27.html#sshforwarding>Nov 10, 2000:
                    430:        Hostile servers can force OpenSSH clients to do agent or X11 forwarding.
                    431:        (patch included)</a>
                    432: <li><a href=errata27.html#xtrans>Oct 26, 2000:
1.151     matthieu  433:        X11 libraries have 2 potential overflows in xtrans code.
                    434:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   435: <li><a href=errata27.html#httpd>Oct 18, 2000:
1.150     beck      436:        Apache mod_rewrite and mod_vhost_alias modules could expose files
                    437:        on the server in certain configurations if used.
                    438:        (patch included)</a>
1.164     deraadt   439: <li><a href=errata27.html#telnetd>Oct 10, 2000:
1.149     millert   440:        The telnet daemon does not strip out the TERMINFO, TERMINFO_DIRS,
                    441:        TERMPATH and TERMCAP environment variables as it should.
                    442:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   443: <li><a href=errata27.html#format_strings>Oct 6, 2000:
1.148     millert   444:        There are printf-style format string bugs in several privileged
                    445:        programs.  (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   446: <li><a href=errata27.html#curses>Oct 6, 2000:
1.147     millert   447:        libcurses honored terminal descriptions in the $HOME/.terminfo
                    448:        directory as well as in the TERMCAP environment variable for
                    449:        setuid and setgid applications.
1.146     deraadt   450:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   451: <li><a href=errata27.html#talkd>Oct 6, 2000:
1.146     deraadt   452:        A format string vulnerability exists in talkd(8).
                    453:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   454: <li><a href=errata27.html#pw_error>Oct 3, 2000:
1.145     aaron     455:        A format string vulnerability exists in the pw_error() function of the
                    456:        libutil library, yielding localhost root through chpass(1).
                    457:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   458: <li><a href=errata27.html#ipsec>Sep 18, 2000:
1.144     jason     459:        Bad ESP/AH packets could cause a crash under certain conditions.
                    460:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   461: <li><a href=errata27.html#xlock>Aug 16, 2000:
1.141     deraadt   462:        A format string vulnerability (localhost root) exists in xlock(1).
                    463:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   464: <li><a href=errata27.html#X11_libs>July 14, 2000:
1.139     deraadt   465:        Various bugs found in X11 libraries have various side effects, almost
                    466:        completely denial of service in OpenBSD.
                    467:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   468: <li><a href=errata27.html#ftpd>July 5, 2000:
1.136     deraadt   469:        Just like pretty much all the other unix ftp daemons
                    470:        on the planet, ftpd had a remote root hole in it.
                    471:        Luckily, ftpd was not enabled by default.
1.137     deraadt   472:        The problem exists if anonymous ftp is enabled.
1.136     deraadt   473:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   474: <li><a href=errata27.html#mopd>July 5, 2000:
1.136     deraadt   475:        Mopd, very rarely used, contained some buffer overflows.
                    476:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   477: <li><a href=errata27.html#libedit>June 28, 2000:
1.135     deraadt   478:        libedit would check for a <b>.editrc</b> file in the current
                    479:        directory.  Not known to be a real security issue, but a patch
                    480:        is available anyways.
                    481:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   482: <li><a href=errata27.html#dhclient>June 24, 2000:
1.134     deraadt   483:        A serious bug in dhclient(8) could allow strings from a
                    484:        malicious dhcp server to be executed in the shell as root.
                    485:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   486: <li><a href=errata27.html#isakmpd>June 9, 2000:
1.133     deraadt   487:        A serious bug in isakmpd(8) policy handling wherein
                    488:        policy verification could be completely bypassed in isakmpd.
                    489:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   490: <li><a href=errata27.html#uselogin>June 6, 2000:
1.132     deraadt   491:        The non-default flag UseLogin in <b>/etc/sshd_config</b> is broken,
                    492:        should not be used, and results in security problems on
                    493:        other operating systems.</a>
1.152     deraadt   494: <li><a href=errata27.html#bridge>May 26, 2000:
1.129     deraadt   495:        The bridge(4) <i>learning</i> flag may be bypassed.
1.128     deraadt   496:        (patch included)</a>
1.152     deraadt   497: <li><a href=errata27.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
1.127     kjell     498:        Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
                    499:        in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
                    500:
1.124     deraadt   501: </ul>
                    502:
                    503: <p>
                    504: <li>
1.119     deraadt   505: <a name=26></a>
                    506:
                    507: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.6 Security Advisories</font></h3>
                    508: These are the OpenBSD 2.6 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    509: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>.  Obviously, all the
                    510: OpenBSD 2.5 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.6.
                    511:
                    512: <p>
                    513: <ul>
1.130     deraadt   514: <li><a href=errata26.html#semconfig>May 26, 2000:
                    515:        SYSV semaphore support contained an undocumented system call
1.131     deraadt   516:        which could wedge semaphore-using processes from exiting. (patch included)</a>
1.127     kjell     517: <li><a href=errata26.html#ipf>May 25, 2000:
                    518:        Improper use of ipf <i>keep-state</i> rules can result
                    519:        in firewall rules being bypassed. (patch included)</a>
1.126     deraadt   520: <li><a href=errata26.html#xlockmore>May 25, 2000:
1.125     deraadt   521:        xlockmore has a bug which a localhost attacker can use to gain
                    522:        access to the encrypted root password hash (which is normally
                    523:        encoded using blowfish (see
                    524:        <a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=crypt&sektion=3">
                    525:        crypt(3)</a>)
                    526:        (patch included).</a>
1.126     deraadt   527: <li><a href=errata26.html#procfs>Jan 20, 2000:
1.123     deraadt   528:        Systems running with procfs enabled and mounted are
                    529:        vulnerable to a very tricky exploit.  procfs is not
                    530:        mounted by default.
                    531:        (patch included).</a>
1.190     mpech     532: <li><a href=errata26.html#sendmail>Dec 4, 1999:
                    533:        Sendmail permitted any user to cause a aliases file wrap,
                    534:        thus exposing the system to a race where the aliases file
                    535:        did not exist.
1.119     deraadt   536:        (patch included).</a>
1.190     mpech     537: <li><a href=errata26.html#poll>Dec 4, 1999:
                    538:        Various bugs in poll(2) may cause a kernel crash.</a>
1.126     deraadt   539: <li><a href=errata26.html#sslUSA>Dec 2, 1999:
1.120     deraadt   540:        A buffer overflow in the RSAREF code included in the
                    541:        USA version of libssl, is possibly exploitable in
                    542:        httpd, ssh, or isakmpd, if SSL/RSA features are enabled.
1.124     deraadt   543:        (patch included).<br></a>
                    544:        <strong>Update:</strong> Turns out that this was not exploitable
                    545:        in any of the software included in OpenBSD 2.6.
1.190     mpech     546: <li><a href=errata26.html#ifmedia>Nov 9, 1999:
                    547:        Any user could change interface media configurations, resulting in
                    548:        a localhost denial of service attack.
1.121     deraadt   549:        (patch included).</a>
1.119     deraadt   550: </ul>
                    551:
                    552: <p>
                    553: <li>
                    554:
1.93      deraadt   555: <a name=25></a>
1.106     deraadt   556:
1.110     deraadt   557: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.5 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.93      deraadt   558: These are the OpenBSD 2.5 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    559: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>.  Obviously, all the
                    560: OpenBSD 2.4 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.5.
                    561:
1.96      deraadt   562: <p>
1.104     deraadt   563: <ul>
1.117     deraadt   564: <li><a href=errata25.html#cron>Aug 30, 1999:
1.103     deraadt   565:        In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the
                    566:        fake popen() and run sendmail as the user, not as root.
                    567:        (patch included).</a>
1.117     deraadt   568: <li><a href=errata25.html#miscfs>Aug 12, 1999: The procfs and fdescfs
1.101     deraadt   569:        filesystems had an overrun in their handling of uio_offset
                    570:        in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
                    571:        enabled by default). (patch included).</a>
1.117     deraadt   572: <li><a href=errata25.html#profil>Aug 9, 1999: Stop profiling (see profil(2))
1.100     deraadt   573:        when we execve() a new process. (patch included).</a>
1.117     deraadt   574: <li><a href=errata25.html#ipsec_in_use>Aug 6, 1999: Packets that should have
1.98      deraadt   575:        been handled by IPsec may be transmitted as cleartext.
                    576:        PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
                    577:        (patch included).</a>
1.117     deraadt   578: <li><a href=errata25.html#rc>Aug 5, 1999: In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for
1.97      deraadt   579:        motd re-writing and change the find(1) to use -execdir
                    580:        (patch included).</a>
1.117     deraadt   581: <li><a href=errata25.html#chflags>Jul 30, 1999: Do not permit regular
1.95      deraadt   582:        users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or block devices
                    583:        which they may currently be the owner of (patch included).</a>
1.117     deraadt   584: <li><a href=errata25.html#nroff>Jul 27, 1999: Cause groff(1) to be invoked
1.95      deraadt   585:        with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1) (patch included).</a>
1.93      deraadt   586: </ul>
                    587:
1.106     deraadt   588: <p>
                    589: <li>
1.75      deraadt   590: <a name=24></a>
1.110     deraadt   591: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.4 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.75      deraadt   592: These are the OpenBSD 2.4 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    593: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>.  Obviously, all the
                    594: OpenBSD 2.3 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.4.
                    595:
1.96      deraadt   596: <p>
1.75      deraadt   597: <ul>
1.92      deraadt   598: <li><a href=errata24.html#poll>Mar 22, 1999: The nfds argument for poll(2) needs
1.91      deraadt   599:        to be constrained, to avoid kvm starvation (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   600: <li><a href=errata24.html#tss>Mar 21, 1999: A change in TSS handling stops
1.91      deraadt   601:        another kernel crash case caused by the <strong>crashme</strong>
                    602:        program (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   603: <li><a href=errata24.html#nlink>Feb 25, 1999: An unbounded increment on the
1.90      deraadt   604:        nlink value in FFS and EXT2FS filesystems can cause a system crash.
1.89      deraadt   605:        (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   606: <li><a href=errata24.html#ping>Feb 23, 1999: Yet another buffer overflow
1.88      deraadt   607:        existed in ping(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   608: <li><a href=errata24.html#ipqrace>Feb 19, 1999: ipintr() had a race in use of
1.87      deraadt   609:        the ipq, which could permit an attacker to cause a crash.
                    610:        (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   611: <li><a href=errata24.html#accept>Feb 17, 1999: A race condition in the
1.86      deraadt   612:        kernel between accept(2) and select(2) could permit an attacker
                    613:        to hang sockets from remote.
                    614:        (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   615: <li><a href=errata24.html#maxqueue>Feb 17, 1999: IP fragment assembly can
1.85      deraadt   616:        bog the machine excessively and cause problems.
                    617:        (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   618: <li><a href=errata24.html#trctrap>Feb 12, 1999: i386 T_TRCTRAP handling and
1.84      deraadt   619:        DDB interacted to possibly cause a crash.
                    620:        (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   621: <li><a href=errata24.html#rst>Feb 11, 1999: TCP/IP RST handling was sloppy.
1.83      deraadt   622:        (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   623: <li><a href=errata24.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
1.81      deraadt   624:        problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   625: <li><a href=errata24.html#termcap>Nov 19, 1998: There is a possibly locally
1.82      deraadt   626:        exploitable problem relating to environment variables in termcap
                    627:        and curses. (patch included).</a>
1.92      deraadt   628: <li><a href=errata24.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
1.78      deraadt   629:        bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.75      deraadt   630: </ul>
                    631:
1.106     deraadt   632: <p>
                    633: <li>
1.58      deraadt   634: <a name=23></a>
1.110     deraadt   635: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.3 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.73      deraadt   636: These are the OpenBSD 2.3 advisories -- all these problems are solved
                    637: in <a href=anoncvs.html>OpenBSD current</a>.  Obviously, all the
                    638: OpenBSD 2.2 advisories listed below are fixed in OpenBSD 2.3.
1.53      matthieu  639:
1.96      deraadt   640: <p>
1.53      matthieu  641: <ul>
1.81      deraadt   642: <li><a href=errata23.html#bootpd>Nov 27, 1998: There is a remotely exploitable
                    643:        problem in bootpd(8). (patch included).</a>
1.78      deraadt   644: <li><a href=errata23.html#tcpfix>Nov 13, 1998: There is a remote machine lockup
                    645:        bug in the TCP decoding kernel. (patch included).</a>
1.190     mpech     646: <li><a href=errata23.html#resolver>August 31, 1998: A benign looking resolver
                    647:        buffer overflow bug was re-introduced accidentally (patches included).</a>
                    648: <li><a href=errata23.html#chpass>Aug 2, 1998:
                    649:        chpass(1) has a file descriptor leak which allows an
                    650:        attacker to modify /etc/master.passwd.</a>
                    651: <li><a href=errata23.html#inetd>July 15, 1998: Inetd had a file descriptor leak.</a>
1.76      aaron     652: <li><a href=errata23.html#fdalloc>Jul  2, 1998: setuid and setgid processes
1.72      deraadt   653:        should not be executed with fd slots 0, 1, or 2 free.
                    654:        (patch included).</a>
1.76      aaron     655: <li><a href=errata23.html#xlib>June 6, 1998: Further problems with the X
1.71      deraadt   656:        libraries (patches included).</a>
1.76      aaron     657: <li><a href=errata23.html#kill>May 17, 1998: kill(2) of setuid/setgid target
1.66      deraadt   658:        processes too permissive (4th revision patch included).</a>
1.76      aaron     659: <li><a href=errata23.html#immutable>May 11, 1998: mmap() permits partial bypassing
1.60      deraadt   660:        of immutable and append-only file flags. (patch included).</a>
1.190     mpech     661: <li><a href=errata23.html#ipsec>May  5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC packets
                    662:        if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
1.76      aaron     663: <li><a href=errata23.html#xterm-xaw>May  1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm and Xaw
1.58      deraadt   664:        (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
1.53      matthieu  665: </ul>
1.9       deraadt   666:
1.106     deraadt   667: <p>
                    668: <li>
1.58      deraadt   669: <a name=22></a>
1.110     deraadt   670: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.2 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.45      deraadt   671: These are the OpenBSD 2.2 advisories.  All these problems are solved
1.55      deraadt   672: in <a href=23.html>OpenBSD 2.3</a>.  Some of these problems
1.45      deraadt   673: still exist in other operating systems.  (The supplied patches are for
                    674: OpenBSD 2.2; they may or may not work on OpenBSD 2.1).
1.9       deraadt   675:
1.96      deraadt   676: <p>
1.9       deraadt   677: <ul>
1.72      deraadt   678: <li><a href=errata22.html#ipsec>May  5, 1998: Incorrect handling of IPSEC
                    679:        packets if IPSEC is enabled (patch included).</a>
                    680: <li><a href=errata22.html#xterm-xaw>May  1, 1998: Buffer overflow in xterm
                    681:        and Xaw (CERT advisory VB-98.04) (patch included).</a>
                    682: <li><a href=errata22.html#uucpd>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer overflow in uucpd
                    683:        (patch included).</a>
                    684: <li><a href=errata22.html#rmjob>Apr 22, 1998: Buffer mismanagement in lprm
                    685:        (patch included).</a>
                    686: <li><a href=errata22.html#ping>Mar 31, 1998: Overflow in ping -R (patch included).</a>
                    687: <li><a href=errata22.html#named>Mar 30, 1998: Overflow in named fake-iquery
1.59      deraadt   688:        (patch included).</a>
1.72      deraadt   689: <li><a href=errata22.html#mountd>Mar  2, 1998: Accidental NFS filesystem
                    690:        export (patch included).</a>
1.112     philen    691: <li><a href="advisories/mmap.txt">Feb 26, 1998: Read-write mmap() flaw.</a>
1.72      deraadt   692:        Revision 3 of the patch is available <a href=errata22.html#mmap>here</a>
1.112     philen    693: <li><a href="advisories/sourceroute.txt">Feb 19, 1998: Sourcerouted Packet
1.59      deraadt   694:        Acceptance.</a>
1.50      deraadt   695:        A patch is available <a href=errata22.html#sourceroute>here</a>.
1.122     rohee     696: <li><a href=errata22.html#ruserok>Feb 13, 1998: Setuid coredump &amp; Ruserok()
1.72      deraadt   697:        flaw (patch included).</a>
                    698: <li><a href=errata22.html#ldso>Feb  9, 1998: MIPS ld.so flaw (patch included).</a>
1.1       deraadt   699: </ul>
                    700:
1.106     deraadt   701: <p>
                    702: <li>
1.58      deraadt   703: <a name=21></a>
1.110     deraadt   704: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.1 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.52      deraadt   705: These are the OpenBSD 2.1 advisories.  All these problems are solved
                    706: in <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>.  Some of these problems still
                    707: exist in other operating systems.  (If you are running OpenBSD 2.1, we
                    708: would strongly recommend an upgrade to the newest release, as this
                    709: patch list only attempts at fixing the most important security
                    710: problems.  In particular, OpenBSD 2.2 fixes numerous localhost
                    711: security problems.  Many of those problems were solved in ways which
                    712: make it hard for us to provide patches).
                    713:
1.96      deraadt   714: <p>
1.52      deraadt   715: <ul>
1.112     philen    716: <li><a href="advisories/signals.txt">Sep 15, 1997: Deviant Signals (patch included)</a>
                    717: <li><a href="advisories/rfork.txt">Aug  2, 1997: Rfork() system call flaw
1.59      deraadt   718:        (patch included)</a>
1.112     philen    719: <li><a href="advisories/procfs.txt">Jun 24, 1997: Procfs flaws (patch included)</a>
1.52      deraadt   720: </ul>
1.51      deraadt   721:
1.106     deraadt   722: <p>
                    723: <li>
                    724: <a name=20></a>
1.110     deraadt   725: <h3><font color=#e00000>OpenBSD 2.0 Security Advisories</font></h3>
1.99      deraadt   726: These are the OpenBSD 2.0 advisories.  All these problems are solved
                    727: in <a href=21.html>OpenBSD 2.1</a>.  Some of these problems still
                    728: exist in other operating systems.  (If you are running OpenBSD 2.0, we
                    729: commend you for being there back in the old days!, but you're really
                    730: missing out if you don't install a new version!)
                    731:
                    732: <p>
                    733: <ul>
1.112     philen    734: <li><a href="advisories/res_random.txt">April 22, 1997: Predictable IDs in the
1.99      deraadt   735:        resolver (patch included)</a>
                    736: <li>Many others... if people can hunt them down, please let me know
                    737:        and we'll put them up here.
                    738: </ul>
                    739:
1.106     deraadt   740: </dl>
1.51      deraadt   741: <p>
1.106     deraadt   742:
                    743: <a name=watching></a>
1.110     deraadt   744: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Watching our Changes</font></h3><p>
1.106     deraadt   745:
1.21      deraadt   746: Since we take a proactive stance with security, we are continually
                    747: finding and fixing new security problems.  Not all of these problems
1.80      espie     748: get widely reported because (as stated earlier) many of them are not
1.45      deraadt   749: confirmed to be exploitable; many simple bugs we fix do turn out to
                    750: have security consequences we could not predict.  We do not have the
                    751: time resources to make these changes available in the above format.<p>
1.21      deraadt   752:
                    753: Thus there are usually minor security fixes in the current source code
                    754: beyond the previous major OpenBSD release.  We make a limited
1.45      deraadt   755: guarantee that these problems are of minimal impact and unproven
1.44      ian       756: exploitability.  If we discover that a problem definitely matters for
1.45      deraadt   757: security, patches will show up here <strong>VERY</strong> quickly.<p>
1.21      deraadt   758:
1.45      deraadt   759: People who are really concerned with security can do a number of
                    760: things:<p>
1.21      deraadt   761:
                    762: <ul>
                    763: <li>If you understand security issues, watch our
1.27      deraadt   764:        <a href=mail.html>source-changes mailing list</a> and keep an
1.23      deraadt   765:        eye out for things which appear security related.  Since
1.21      deraadt   766:        exploitability is not proven for many of the fixes we make,
                    767:        do not expect the relevant commit message to say "SECURITY FIX!".
                    768:        If a problem is proven and serious, a patch will be available
                    769:        here very shortly after.
1.161     horacio   770: <li>In addition to source changes, you can watch our <a href="mail.html">
1.160     ericj     771:        security-announce mailing list</a> which will notify you for every
1.186     ian       772:        security related item that the OpenBSD team deems as a possible threat,
1.160     ericj     773:        and instruct you on how to patch the problem.
1.21      deraadt   774: <li>Track our current source code tree, and teach yourself how to do a
1.29      deraadt   775:        complete system build from time to time (read /usr/src/Makefile
                    776:        carefully).  Users can make the assumption that the current
                    777:        source tree always has stronger security than the previous release.
1.45      deraadt   778:        However, building your own system from source code is not trivial;
                    779:        it is nearly 300MB of source code, and problems do occur as we
                    780:        transition between major releases.
1.115     ericj     781: <li>Install a binary snapshot for your
1.80      espie     782:        architecture, which are made available fairly often.  For
1.29      deraadt   783:        instance, an i386 snapshot is typically made available weekly.
1.21      deraadt   784: </ul>
                    785:
1.9       deraadt   786: <p>
1.153     jufi      787: <a name=reporting></a>
1.110     deraadt   788: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Reporting problems</font></h3><p>
1.3       deraadt   789:
1.5       deraadt   790: <p> If you find a new security problem, you can mail it to
1.6       deraadt   791: <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>deraadt@openbsd.org</a>.
1.7       deraadt   792: <br>
1.5       deraadt   793: If you wish to PGP encode it (but please only do so if privacy is very
1.112     philen    794: urgent, since it is inconvenient) use this <a href="advisories/pgpkey.txt">pgp key</a>.
1.5       deraadt   795:
1.107     deraadt   796: <p>
                    797: <a name=papers></a>
1.110     deraadt   798: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>Further Reading</font></h3><p>
1.107     deraadt   799:
                    800: A number of papers have been written by OpenBSD team members, about security
                    801: related changes they have done in OpenBSD.  The postscript versions of these
1.108     deraadt   802: documents are available as follows.<p>
1.107     deraadt   803:
                    804: <ul>
1.113     deraadt   805: <li>A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme.<br>
1.118     deraadt   806:     <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.153     jufi      807:     by <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>,
1.113     deraadt   808:     <a href=mailto:dm@openbsd.org>David Mazieres</a>.<br>
1.107     deraadt   809:     <a href=papers/bcrypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
                    810:     <a href=papers/bcrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113     deraadt   811: <p>
                    812: <li>Cryptography in OpenBSD: An Overview.<br>
1.118     deraadt   813:     <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113     deraadt   814:     by <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>,
                    815:     <a href=mailto:niklas@openbsd.org>Niklas Hallqvist</a>,
                    816:     <a href=mailto:art@openbsd.org>Artur Grabowski</a>,
                    817:     <a href=mailto:angelos@openbsd.org>Angelos D. Keromytis</a>,
                    818:     <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.107     deraadt   819:     <a href=papers/crypt-paper.ps>paper</a> and
                    820:     <a href=papers/crypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113     deraadt   821: <p>
                    822: <li>strlcpy and strlcat -- consistent, safe, string copy and concatenation.<br>
1.118     deraadt   823:     <a href=events.html#usenix99>Usenix 1999</a>,
1.113     deraadt   824:     by <a href=mailto:millert@openbsd.org>Todd C. Miller</a>,
                    825:     <a href=mailto:deraadt@openbsd.org>Theo de Raadt</a>.<br>
1.109     deraadt   826:     <a href=papers/strlcpy-paper.ps>paper</a> and
                    827:     <a href=papers/strlcpy-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.113     deraadt   828: <p>
1.118     deraadt   829: <li>Dealing with Public Ethernet Jacks-Switches, Gateways, and Authentication.<br>
                    830:     <a href=events.html#lisa99>LISA 1999</a>,
                    831:     by <a href=mailto:beck@openbsd.org>Bob Beck</a>.<br>
                    832:     <a href=papers/authgw-paper.ps>paper</a> and
                    833:     <a href=papers/authgw-slides.ps>slides</a>.
                    834: <p>
1.153     jufi      835: <li>Encrypting Virtual Memory<br>
1.142     deraadt   836:     <a href=events.html#sec2000>Usenix Security 2000</a>,
                    837:     <a href=mailto:provos@openbsd.org>Niels Provos</a>.<br>
1.143     provos    838:     <a href=papers/swapencrypt.ps>paper</a> and
                    839:     <a href=papers/swapencrypt-slides.ps>slides</a>.
1.142     deraadt   840: <p>
1.107     deraadt   841: </ul>
                    842:
1.106     deraadt   843: </dl>
                    844:
1.2       deraadt   845: <hr>
1.68      pauls     846: <a href=index.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.24      deraadt   847: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
                    848: <br>
1.210   ! jsyn      849: <small>$OpenBSD: security.html,v 1.209 2002/05/22 22:32:29 markus Exp $</small>
1.1       deraadt   850:
1.24      deraadt   851: </body>
                    852: </html>